



POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL THEORY

VOLUME 18

DIANE E. DAVIS

Editor

POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL THEORY

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EDITED BY

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CONTENTS

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS	<i>vii</i>	
EDITORIAL BOARD	<i>ix</i>	
EDITORIAL STATEMENT	<i>xi</i>	
LIST OF REVIEWERS	<i>xiii</i>	
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION <i>Diane E. Davis</i>	<i>xv</i>	
 PART I: POLITICAL POWER, STATE FORMATION, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT		
 STATE BUILDING IN PRE-COLONIAL SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: THE CASE OF YORUBALAND <i>E. C. Ejiogu</i>		<i>3</i>
 POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF RUSSIAN CAPITAL OWNERS: WHAT MATTERS? <i>Nathalia Rogers</i>		<i>41</i>
 DEVELOPMENT AND COLLECTIVE ACTION IN CHILE'S NEOLIBERAL DEMOCRACY <i>Paul W. Posner</i>		<i>85</i>

**PART II: OPPOSITION POLITICS IN AMERICA:
PAST AND PRESENT**

THE CIO AND THIRD PARTY POLITICS IN
NEW YORK: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CIO-ALP
Stuart Eimer 133

THIS IS NOT YOUR FATHER'S WAR: THE
CHANGING ORGANIZATION OF MILITARISM
AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
Alec Campbell 173

PART III: SCHOLARLY CONTROVERSY

MODES OF REPAIR: REPARATIONS
AND CITIZENSHIP AT THE DAWN OF
THE NEW MILLENNIUM
John Torpey 207

REPARATION AS LUXURY OR AS BASIC
NEED: ATONEMENT FOR CANADIANS,
REDISTRIBUTION FOR AFRICA
Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann 227

REPUBLICAN MERITOCRACY, IDENTITY
POLITICS AND THE IDEA OF REVERSE
REPARATION: COMMENTARY
Yossi Yonah 237

REPARATIONS CLAIMS: POLITICS BY
ANOTHER NAME
Melissa Nobles 253

REJOINDER
John Torpey 259

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EDITORIAL STATEMENT

Political Power and Social Theory is a peer-reviewed annual journal committed to advancing the interdisciplinary understanding of the linkages between political power, class relations, and historical development. The journal welcomes both empirical and theoretical work and is willing to consider papers of substantial length.

Publication decisions are made by the editor in consultation with members of the editorial board and anonymous reviewers. Potential contributors should submit manuscripts in electronic format to ppst@mit.edu. Alternatively, authors may direct manuscripts to the mailing address below; please include four additional copies to the managing editor when submitting by post. Potential contributors are asked to remove any references to the author in the body of the text in order to preserve anonymity during review.

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EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

True to our stated mandate, this year's volume of *Political Power and Social Theory* opens new windows of understanding on the relationship between political power, class politics, and historical development, and does so through a wide range of articles that present research or commentary on Russia, Chile, several countries in Africa, Israel, Canada, Brazil, and the United States. As much of our readership knows, *Political Power and Social Theory* prides itself on offering a venue where serious scholarship can meet normative concerns with justice, equity, inequality and their implications as well as social and political change. We also see our mandate as providing a setting for scholars to explore these questions in comparative and historical context, thereby offering a geographic and methodological eclecticism frequently absent in a single journal. As a scholar of the developing world, I know well that the ethnocentrism of U.S. social science often limits the peer-review process, and that scholars who write on locations outside the advanced capitalist context frequently find themselves relegated to area studies journals. As an historical sociologist, I also know that scholars who focus on the past, or employ an historical methodology, must struggle hard to convince reviewers of the larger sociological relevance of their claims or of the importance of taking history seriously in a modern world. To a certain extent these trends seem to be changing slowly, perhaps because globalization is making the world a smaller place, and because history is always a good reference point in times of significant transition, which, as some suggest, characterizes the current rise of the information/internet economy. In any case, because of our wonderfully diverse editorial board and our stated mission, *Political Power and Social Theory* has always sought to represent a wide range of comparative and historical scholarship, and we continue to do so this year with Volume 18.

Part I presents three articles that examine the broader theme of political power, state formation, and economic development. Its cases focus on Russia and Chile in the post-authoritarian neoliberal period and Yorubaland in pre-colonial Africa. The section starts with a detailed historical discussion of Yorubaland in the late 18th century and throughout the 19th century. In this discussion, E. C. Ejiogu draws on Tilly and Finer's general

frameworks about warmaking and statemaking, but asks whether, how, and why the historical peculiarities of sub-Saharan Africa, especially the predominance of slavery and slave trading in the local and regional economy, might have set Yoruba on a different path than that embedded in the predominant theoretical frameworks generated in the study of early modern Europe. Ejiogu's conclusions validate the European emphasis on warfare and warmaking, but also reformulate their theoretical and historical significance in Africa by identifying warfare as connected to the slave trade, a fact suggesting a more dialectical understanding of the relationship between slavery and warmaking, and in turn, accumulation, warmaking, and state formation. Specifically, Ejiogu argues that in Yoruba, slaves were not merely the subject of economic accumulation; they were also deployed as soldiers and bureaucrats as well as in various realms of the economy where they produced further wealth for members of the elite classes. This meant that slavery was simultaneously a source of capital accumulation and a means as well as ends for warmaking. In contrast to Europe, slavery served a multiplicity of purposes that molded subsequent patterns of African state formation and set Yoruban state on a path where coercive power and influence were legitimized, but "rightful power" remained elusive.

The second article in this section, Nathalia Rogers' "Political Attitudes and Political Participation of Russian Capital Owners: What Matters?," turns to a discussion of the role of capital and capitalists in a post-coercive state, if you will. This chapter concerns itself less with state formation per se, and more with political participation and attitudes in newly liberalized Russia, mainly the extent to which capitalists would be willing to lend political support to a newly democratic state even when upholding democratic principles might offset personal economic gain. To a certain degree, the article considers whether a desire to foster capital accumulation presupposes a certain state form, even as it examines the tensions rather than synergy between capital and regime type that dominates much of the literature on democracy and state formation. Using a sample of Russian capital owners surveyed in 1997–1998 that allowed a comparison of political attitudes by size and character of firm (independent vs. state-linked, small vs. large, young vs. old), Rogers seeks to understand whether commitment to democracy varies by ownership type, and whether political attitudes, even if there is variation, translate either into differential forms of collective political action or views of the state. Her conclusions, while exploratory, are revealing.

For one, Rogers found that while the majority of respondents in the newly liberalized Russia held pro-democratic attitudes, they also displayed a

complex understanding of the differences between the ideals of democracy and the imperfect reality of the transformation of Russian political, social, and economic institutions. For another, she found a complex interrelationship among the factors influencing individual political views and participation. This led her to some quixotic findings, including the fact that “old state-type capitalists” were more likely to support a multi-party political system than independent capital or both small or large capital firms. Rogers traces these and other results to both respondents’ structural positions in the Russian economy, positions that were not necessarily coincident with ownership type, as well as past socialization practices. But despite these differences, what persisted across all the groupings was not merely the fact that most capital owners, regardless of size and character, had expectations of power sharing with the state through the support for a more equitable, pro-liberal regime that would allow its citizens to participate democratically in political decision making. What was most striking was the fact that all respondents supported and identified a powerful state as taking the lead in guiding the nation in this pro-democratic direction, a finding that raises new questions for our readers about the particular state forms that might be most likely to materialize and be politically legitimated in a post-authoritarian, liberalizing world.

The final chapter in this section, Paul Posner’s “Development and Collective Action in Chile’s Neoliberal Democracy,” carries forward many of the same questions and themes about state forms and political participation in a neoliberal economic setting, but turns to another continent, Latin America. With a focus on Chile in the last decade, as neoliberalism became firmly ensconced as both ideology and practice, Posner questions the possibilities for collective action generally and political opposition to the state more specifically. Using literature on state formation, but focusing primarily on the ways in which states are embedded in civil society, this article seeks to understand the political opportunities for collective action among competing segments of the population whose lives and livelihoods have been changed by the new economy. Posner argues that structural and institutional reforms originally imposed by the military regime, but accepted by the post-dictatorship democratically elected ruling political coalition (Concertación), produced impediments to collective action among Chilean popular sectors. In particular, labor market and social welfare policies exacerbated social stratification, deprived the public of vital resources, reinforced workers’ vulnerability to market forces, and undermined social trust. Like Rogers, Posner concludes that the state continues to be a guiding force in politics and society, despite the advent of neoliberalism. But in a mirror

image to Rogers' claim, in which political attitudes and collective political participation are generally marshaled in support of greater state involvement, Posner argues that it is precisely direct state involvement (in the form of social and economic policies) that constrains collective political participation. Accordingly, while the Russian capitalists Rogers examines see greater state involvement as positive, by virtue of its capacity to insure beneficial economic outcomes, Posner's popular sectors see the state's guiding role as more negative, not only economically, but also in political terms, because it limits their democratic capacities to give voice. A comparison of the findings from these two articles not only highlights a paradox: that capitalists, who generally prefer markets over states, are often the ones who support greater state involvement. They also highlight the class-specific differences in views regarding the positive vs. negative relationships between neoliberalism, political participation, and democracy.

Part II turns directly to opposition politics, a theme running through the Posner article, but drops the preoccupation with states and economic development as it moves to the study of the United States, both past and present. The first of the two papers, Stuart Eimer's "The CIO and Third Party Politics in New York: The Rise and Fall of the CIO-ALP," is framed within the context of literatures on American exceptionalism. In a nuanced and deeply researched historical New York City in the 1930s and 40s, Eimer asks why the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) opted to back a labor party in the 1940s, and why this support ended abruptly in 1948. In response, he suggests that "CIO unions in New York backed a labor party because they were embedded in an institutional context that offered an unusual menu of political choices," which themselves were enabled by the legality of fusion, or cross-endorsement, thereby making it possible for NYC unions to support one party at the local level and another party at the state and national level. That is, it was the politico-institutional context of labor mobilization and political action, and not ideology or culture per se, that explains this exceptional outcome in the 1940s.

Recast in terms more consistent with the literature on state forms and political participation, as well as the literature on the relationship between political opportunity structure and collective action, it was the co-existence of multiple scales for political participation, themselves a product of federalism and the decentralized American state, that gave the CIO an opportunity to support a labor party. However, this opportunity did not translate into a fundamental shift in regime either locally or nationally, at least as evidenced by the rise or triumph of the labor party as a permanent feature of American politics. Rather, despite the decentralized nature of American

politics, federalism in America still privileged the national scale and the dominance of two-party politics, in which support for the Labor Party was a non-starter. As such, Eimer's situation of the political preferences and choices of CIO unions in a broader politico-institutional context helps us understand how unique political opportunities enabled by local election laws both facilitated the emergence of a labor party in New York *and* at the same time blocked the emergence of a labor party in America, precisely because of the mismatch between local (state) and national contexts.

The second article in this section is Alec Campbell's "This is Not your Father's War: The Changing Organization of Militarism and Social Movements" inspired in part by a heated debate in the pages of this journal on the Iraq War (published in Volume 16), Campbell's paper addresses both normative and empirical questions about warmaking and the conditions under which mobilized citizens can affect outcomes. Thus, it carries forward the theme of warfare that emerged in the first part of this volume, but marries this topic to the literature on political opportunities and social movements, addressed indirectly in the Eimer chapter, rather than state formation. To begin, Campbell takes seriously the controversial claim offered by Ian Roxborough in Volume 16 that sociologists ought to engage military elites and intellectuals on questions of military doctrine and strategy. That is, he suggests that warmaking should be the purview of civil society and not merely the state and coercive actors. He then offers a normative proposition about how to achieve this aim, one in which sociological methods should be considered as relevant as political attitudes in molding collective behavior.

Specifically, Campbell argues that prediction is underutilized by potentially useful methodological strategy for study of social movements and their potential activities. He then provides an example by making predictions about the political opportunities available to current peace and anti-war movements, specifying a range of political opportunities and distinguishing between conditional vs. unconditional predictions about the direction of the Iraq war. This exercise leads him to claim that current political opportunities favor the engagement between sociologists and military elites, and that such an enterprise could in turn affect warmaking outcomes in the contemporary period. In many ways, this article well represents this journal's longstanding dual commitment to serious scholarship and social science examination, on the one hand, and its preoccupation with the major political, social injustice, and social change concerns of our times, on the other.

The volume ends with its customary Scholarly Controversy, where a range of experts debate complex contemporary social and political issues. From the Iraq War in Volume 16 to corporate bailouts and scandals in

Volume 17, we now turn to the issue of reparations. In a masterful overview of the political, cultural, and social issues at stake in the debate over reparations, John Torpey raises the bar of controversy by advancing serious and controversial questions about the negative implications for democracy, citizenship, and even state formation posed by citizen claims for reparations of past historical injustices. In his commentary, and in the responses offered by an esteemed group of political scientists, lawyers, philosophers, and sociologists, evidence from cases as diverse as Africa, Israel, Brazil, Germany, and the United States are used to support or oppose the value of reparations. It is our hope that this topic will continue to generate debate and discussion, and perhaps even return (as did the Iraq War scholarly controversy) in the peer-reviewed pages of this journal sometime in the future.

As always, profuse thanks are in order for those who helped insure the successful completion of this volume. Christina Proenza-Coles, our managing editor, is the mainstay of this enterprise, and her work consistently exceeds all expectations. We also thank John Torpey and our invited commentators for their accommodation of our rather tight production deadlines. Additional thanks goes to our peer reviewers, the Editorial Board, and countless authors who continue to identify *Political Power and Social Theory* as a preferred outlet for their research. Keep those submissions coming!

Diane E. Davis
Cambridge, MA, USA
May, 2006

**PART I:
POLITICAL POWER, STATE
FORMATION, AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT**

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STATE BUILDING IN PRE-COLONIAL SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: THE CASE OF YORUBALAND

E. C. Ejiogu

ABSTRACT

State building in pre-colonial sub-Saharan Africa is a much-neglected subject in historical sociology. This paper, which begins to close that gap accounts for state building and transformation in pre-colonial Yorubaland and highlights slavery, slave-taking, and other distinctive features of the Yoruba states. The paper argues that slavery and slave-taking affected warfare in the Yoruba states with remarkable consequences for the Yoruba state system. Furthermore, the paper applied some aspects of existing analytical approaches in historical sociology and comparative politics to elucidate our understanding of the role and limitations of warfare, slave-taking, and slavery in state development in pre-colonial Yorubaland.

THEORETICAL PROBLEM

Historical sociologists as well as political scientists such as Charles Tilly (1975, 1985, 1990), Brian Downing (1988, 1992), Thomas Ertman (1997),

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Rasler and Thompson (1985, 1989) Kiser and Linton (2001), Centeno (1997, 2002) have focused considerable attention on state formation. The literature on the subject is filled with studies that built mostly on Tilly's (1975, 1985) claim that "war made state, and the state made war". But for a few non-European cases in Latin America and Asia, most of these studies have been on Europe. The extensive interest shown by historical sociologists in the subject may be because "the origins of the state counts among [historical sociology's] best (sic) developed specialty areas, and rightly so" (Deflem, 2004, p. 3). Although Europe continues to receive most of the attention in this regard, Centeno (1997, 2002) and Kiser and Cai (2003) stand as proof that there was state development elsewhere too, during the era that began with the early modern period and even thereafter.¹ A particularly neglected region in the inquiry by historical sociologists on state development is sub-Saharan Africa. Historians (Forde & Kaberry, 1967; Morton-Williams, 1971) agree that viable states that were characterized by certain distinctive features were built as far back as the fifteenth century and earlier in Yorubaland, which is a part of the sub-region located in southwest Niger basin.

Most, if not all, of the competing definitions of state and types of state that the aforementioned scholars – and even the likes of John Fortescue (1885), the English political theorist and statesman; the Frenchman Jean Bodin (1977), and the German scholars Max Weber (1978) and Otto Hintze (1975) before them – either developed and or adapted and applied in their work are specific to the European world, the main focus of their work. This observation is underscored by the "broad consensus" (Ertman, 1997, p. 3) evident in the work of these scholars who are still living and active – who have also drawn from Weber, Otto Hinze, Tocqueville, and Norbert Elias in their work (Ertman, 1997) – that,

Weber was right when he pointed out that what set the early modern West apart from other great civilizations was the combination of a distinctive kind of polity – the exceptionally penetrative sovereign, territorial state – and a dynamic market economy which permitted a breakthrough to self-sustaining growth and hence escape from periodic Malthusian crises. (Ertman, 1997, pp. 3–4)

That definition of state takes sovereignty and territoriality into account and even goes further to delineate "states" and "stateness" in terms of regime-type and "the character of the state apparatus" (Ertman, 1997, p. 6).

Regarding regime-type, the definition posits that a regime can be either absolutist (uniting both legislative and executive authority in the hands of the monarch or ruler), or constitutional (sharing legislative authority with representatives of the people). The character of the apparatus of state

presents more challenges in classifying European states due to the incidence of several forms of organizational formats evident in Europe’s various states (Ertman, 1997). Again in their work the scholars have tended to draw from Weber’s articulations, this time on bureaucracy (“means of administration”) to account for the changes and the conflict that occurred in Europe’s politics culminating in the emergence of various state types in early modern Europe and elsewhere. The crucial point that I hope to emphasize here in this account is that aspects of the various articulations on and definitions of “state” and stateness in the various European cases are equally evident in the Yoruba politics.

Tilly’s proposition on the symbiotic relationship between warfare and state making presented in Fig. 1 is specific to Europe. Among other things it encapsulates his argument that war was the agency through which European state builders extracted the resources that they used to run state affairs including the prosecution of more wars. As he puts it,

In the case of extraction, the smaller the pool of resources and the less commercialized the economy, other things being equal, the more difficult was the work of extracting resources to sustain war and other government activities; hence, the more extensive was the fiscal apparatus On the whole, taxes on land were expensive to collect as compared with taxes on trade, especially large flows of trade past easily controlled checkpoints. (Tilly, 1985, p. 182)²




Fig. 1. Symbiotic Interaction between War Making and State Making. Source: Charles Tilly (1985).

Tilly believes that the size and character of the bureaucracy developed in a state in response to the demands of war and war making are not the functions of those demands necessarily.³ He is arguing in essence that “a polity could avoid bureaucracy and perhaps also absolutism in the wake of sustained military pressure if, as a result of a high level of economic development, it had access to abundant commercial revenues” (Ertman, 1997, p. 14). This is exactly where another framework developed specifically to reflect the configuration of state-types in the Yoruba country during the pre-colonial period by Toyin Falola and Akanmu Adebayo (2000) – see Table 2 presented later in the text – comes in. In this account of warfare and state development in the Yoruba country during the pre-colonial period, I have juxtaposed aspects of the Falola–Adebayo framework to aspects of Tilly’s for the following among several other reasons: Economy in the Yoruba country was robust and commercialized enough to have furnished the requisite resources for state building. Also, the possibility of high cost of land tax may have encouraged the extraction of state revenue in the various Yoruba kingdoms from taxation, levies, court fees and fines, death duties, the elaborate toll system, etc. Furthermore, there was a well-developed trade and commerce that was based on large-scale agricultural and craft production evident in Yoruba societies over the course of the period (Falola & Adebayo, 2000) that may have discouraged the evolution of elaborate bureaucracy and the emergence of absolutism in the Yoruba states. “High level of economic development” and “abundant commercial revenue” can be interpreted relative to the Yoruba country at the time.

In this essay therefore, I have argued that some of Tilly’s (1990) theoretical propositions and their expansion on the symbiotic relationship between warfare and state making in Europe can be extended to sub-Saharan Africa during the same period. But previous studies have only associated population alone or in conjunction with geography with state formation in sub-Saharan Africa in the pre-colonial period (Stevenson, 1968; Bates, 1983; Ilife, 1995; Herbst, 2000). The essay embodies the exploration of a more complex model of interactive elements: authority patterns, war, and socio-economic organization that were involved in state formation in the part of the lower Niger inhabited by the Yoruba.⁴ Furthermore, it explores the ramifications of the distinctive features of Yoruba states, i.e. the support that state building and the Yoruba state system derived from slavery on one count, and on the other, the impact of slave-taking on war and its consequences for political development in some of the pre-colonial Yoruba states.

The attraction of Yorubaland as a case study rests on several factors. It is the homeland of the Yoruba who are one of sub-Saharan Africa’s more

populous nationalities. History shows that the Yoruba founded large political organizations based on well-structured constitutional monarchies⁵ (Atanda, 1973a; Lloyd, 1960b). Furthermore, warfare, which historical sociologists and political scientists agree served as engines that drove state development particularly in early modern Europe, was quite pronounced in Yoruba history during that same period, and most of the Yoruba states remained in existence up until later in the 1800s when European colonial intervention, which Tilly (1990) rightly characterized as the imposition of European state system collapsed them – together with the other diverse indigenous political formations in that part of West Africa – into what was subsequently called “Nigeria” – a supra-national state – in 1914.

YORUBALAND AS CASE STUDY

*Historical Context*⁶

The Yoruba inhabit the deciduous rain forest ecological zone of the Niger basin. Their *homeland*, which is located in the southwest of the Niger basin, occupies an area that stretches more than 200 miles (Forde, 1951) as far as present day Benin Republic and Togoland (westwards) and northwards towards Nupeland. Besides their common language (Forde, 1951; Kenyo, 1951; Johnson, 1921; Biobaku, 1955), they share some other traditional and cultural traits that include the claim to a common origin traceable to the town of Ile-Ife and the same mythical ancestor, Oduduwa (Oguntomisin, 1981, p. 223). In situations where differences exist between their political institutions, such differences are often minor (Lloyd, 1954).

The Yoruba settled their part of the Niger basin in kinship groups or lineages. Their political development was along those lineages that then evolved into kingdoms in each case (Atanda, 1973a). Thus, while the Egba Yoruba founded the kingdom polity of Egba, the Oyo Yoruba founded the Oyo Ife, and the Ijebu Yoruba founded the kingdom polity of Ijebu Ode, respectively. In addition to these three kingdoms, several other smaller kingdoms emerged in the Yoruba country before the 1400s. One of the common characteristics shared by the various Yoruba kingdoms – irrespective of their size – is that they were all constitutional monarchies. Each of them underwent considerable growth and transformation before the second decade in the nineteenth century. Most of that growth and transformation resulted from their conquest of surrounding towns in the Yoruba country into which they extended their political authority (Akintoye, 1971; Atanda, 1973a). Such

growth and expansion was most evident in the kingdom of Oyo, which had transformed itself into an empire by the middle of the sixteenth century. Old Oyo made contact with Europeans on the coast early in the seventeenth century, and became significantly involved in the Atlantic slave trade as a result (Law, 1971; Johnson, 1921). Old Oyo's involvement in the Atlantic slave trade was probably the impetus that drove its expansion south and southwest toward the coast in the Yoruba country and beyond (Johnson, 1921, p. 169; Akinjogbin, 1967). Old Oyo Empire reached the apogee of its power in the eighteenth century, after which it declined and subsequently disintegrated early in the 1800s (Morton-Williams, 1967). Yoruba authority patterns derived from unwritten constitutional stipulations, which rendered the separation of powers clauses vague (Law, 1971). In the Old Oyo Empire that vagueness was the basis of some of the problems that arose in the eighteenth century when some individual political actors in the state availed themselves of the opportunities created by slave-taking and war to enhance their economic and political powers in society with far-reaching implications and enormous consequences for state building and stability.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

Authority Patterns in the Context of State Building

State building is a quintessential social context that involves individuals as well as groups as actors. State building is a social event that encompasses power and pressure even though individuals are not the primary “building blocks of polities (states)” (Eckstein, 1998, p. 525).⁷ Unlike exchange (market) relations that prevail in symmetrical patterns, state building is one of those endeavors that encompass asymmetrical relations, i.e. it entails power or control relations: it involves the “particular form of power that involves authority” (Eckstein, 1998, p. 529), i.e. “power that involves considerations of legitimacy – rightful power” (Eckstein, 1998, p. 529).⁸

Authority, i.e. the “linkage variable ... which ... is both endogenous and exogenous to government and connects governments with the social settings ... in asymmetrical relations” (Eckstein, 1973, p. 1153, 1998, p. 530) is ubiquitous in social organization. In some societies authority originates internally. In situations when authority is imposed, it runs the risk of being perceived as illegitimate and unworthy, “that is, of actions that tend to keep the patterns in existence and functioning effectively” (Eckstein & Gurr, 1975, p. 198) by the ordinary members of society.

Authority configures in patterns at the governmental (polity or state; military; and other state establishments) and non-governmental (family; lineage; kindred; and other segmental units in society) levels. Leaders who emerge through processes that are perceived as illegitimate run the risk of encountering resistance against their authority in some segmental units of their society. If such leaders are state builders, their activities are bound to be frustrated as a result.

The asymmetric (authority) relations in a social unit sort members into those “who direct and [those that] are directed, and their interactions” (Eckstein & Gurr, 1975, p. 53). The consistent interactions between the two categories of members of the social unit take place through the medium of four distinct dimensions – *Directiveness*, *Participation*, *Responsiveness*, and *Compliance* as shown in Table 1, which I extrapolated from a framework by Eckstein and Gurr and called the E–G scheme.⁹

In the Yoruba authority structures, the interplay involving the four dimensions of influence relations (as shown in the E–G scheme) is quite evident in the practice of authority in their kingdoms. Leaders were not free agents. They were responsive to the citizens. That interplay obtained in a manner that integrated facilitated participation of citizens, which engendered responsiveness from their leaders (Ejiogu, 2001, 2004). The result was that *Directiveness* in each kingdom did not translate to absolutism, and *Compliance* was not submissive.

Finer’s Framework on Military Formats

Unlike the E–G scheme which is neither a time nor a culture-specific framework for political inquiry, Samuel E. Finer’s (1975) analytical framework on military formats was specifically developed and utilized to account for the development of modern states in the Pan-European world. For Finer, in the Pan-European world, there is a relationship between the development of the modern state and military formats. Finer defines military format on the one hand in the “narrow and most” (Finer, 1975, p. 90) sense as “the service basis of ... [military] forces; i.e. whether they were native or foreign, paid or unpaid, *ad hoc* or permanent” (Finer, 1975, p. 90). On the other hand, he also defined it in the broader sense to include “the size of the armed forces, the varying composition of its main arms (navy against land forces or artillery components against infantry or cavalry and the like), and ... the social stratification of the force[s]” (Finer, 1975, p. 90).

Table 1. Tabular Representation of the Eckstein–Gurr Scheme.

Dimension	Values	Aspects/components	Indices/metrics
<i>Directiveness</i> (general)	1. Regimented (+) 2. Mid point 3. Permissive (0)	1. Coverage (i) Comprehensive (ii) Restricted 2. Latitude (i) Specific (ii) General 3. Supervision (i) Close (ii) Loose 4. Sanction threshold (i) Severe (ii) Lenient	Laws, policies, customs, traditions, etc.
<i>Participation</i>	1. Participant (+) 2. Non-participant (0)	Channels + (i) Open (facilitated) (+) (ii) Closed (0) (impeded) formally provided, normatively tolerated, unsanctioned, feasible	Use (i) Voluminous (+) (ii) None (0) (iii) Frequency (iv) Intensity (v) Strenuousness of modes, variety of modes
<i>Responsiveness</i> (overall)	(1) Autocracy (+) (2) Mid point (3) Alterocracy	1. Definition of problems and issues 2. Deliberation 3. Resolution 4. Implementation 5. Sanctioning 6. Feed back	
<i>Compliance</i> (dispositions)	1. Submissive-ness (+) 2. Allegiance 3. Indifference (0) 4. Opposition 5. Insub-ordination	Determinants of compliance behavior: (a) General legitimacy perceptions – can dispose people to comply (b) specific cost calculations (i) General illegitimacy perceptions (ii) Specific cost calculations – can dispose people to defy	

The synopsis of Finer's work is that as European states evolved from their medieval forms into their modern versions through the acquisition of their modern characteristics of *territoriality*; paramount organ of government which is composed of the *civil* and *military* branches whose affaires are formulated and administered by specialized personnel; *sovereignty*; a population which "forms a community of feeling – a *Gemeinschaft* – based on self-consciousness of a common nationality" (Finer, 1975, p. 90) whose "members mutually distribute and share duties and benefits" (Finer, 1975, p. 90), so also have their military format. Both processes – state development and the development of military formats – have always influenced themselves reciprocally (Finer, 1975, p. 90).

Finer proceeds from the above and argued that European state builders arrived at different decisions concerning their choice of the most suitable military formats for the tasks of state building by taking such variables as socio-economic factors, technological innovations, the extent and degrees of stratification and belief systems in their societies into consideration. He insists that military formats – not wars – are essential in state building because "the format of armed forces and the resources they require from their host community [are] significantly alter[ed during wars]" (Finer, 1975, p. 90). The critical emphasis is on the "influence of armed forces in time of war and not war itself" (Finer, 1975, p. 90) on state building. In spite of its specificity to the Pan-European world, like Tilly's framework, elements of Finer's are also relevant in the present discourse.

HISTORICAL RESTATEMENTS

I can now restate that state *formation during the early modern period in many world regions that included the Yoruba country was impacted by warfare. But that in the specific case of the Yoruba country several other factors that included slavery and slave-taking, and indigenous authority patterns played crucial roles in aid of the processes of state building.* I can also restate the historical argument that underlay this essay as follows:

The interaction of the Yoruba with their homeland in stable climatic and ecological conditions influenced the evolution of a monarchical state system¹⁰ that was supported by authority patterns that accommodated some measures of regimentation that couldn't translate to absolutism. In the prevalent circumstances, there emerged states and a state system that derived extensive support from three distinctive features – warfare, slavery and slave-taking. All three distinctive features interacted amongst themselves in ways that furnished

members of elite groups in the Yoruba kingdoms with resources (base values) that they were able to convert into power and influence (scope values). However, that accomplishment did not necessarily imply that the actors who were involved were also able to establish the requisite bases of legitimacy necessary for their authority to be perceived as rightful particularly at the local segmental levels in their society. The implications of that for state building in the Yoruba country were both several and extensive.

AUTHORITY PATTERNS DERIVED FROM UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTIONALISM IN YORUBALAND

Authority in the Yoruba political system configures in four clearly structured and hierarchical levels. Those four levels are the lineage (*ebi* or *idile*); the compound (*agbo-ile*); the ward (*adugbo*); and the town (*ilu*). The configuration becomes explicit and even clearer when it is examined through the prism of the dimensions of *Participation* and *Responsiveness* in the E–G scheme. The choice of these two dimensions for such an examination derives from the fact that in their framework, Eckstein and Gurr presented them as the logical flips of themselves: “Participant subordinates” they argue, “seek to influence the way [their] superiors direct social units; responsive superiors are disposed to be influenced by them and seek out “inputs” from them” (Eckstein & Gurr, 1975, p. 67).

The norm of compulsory lineage membership, which is also central in the Yoruba social organization reflected in the practice of authority in their hierarchically structured political system. Every individual Yoruba “belonged to an *ebi* or *idile* (lineage) and the male members of a lineage, their wives (if they are married) and children lived together in one *agbo-ile* (compound)” (Akintoye, 1971, p. 13) (the *ebi* is referred to as compound in some cases). The lineage was therefore, the basic or lowest segmental component of society for the practice of authority in the Yoruba political system. A combined group of several compounds constituted the ward, which represented the next segmental unit of society for the practice of authority. The town was the apex unit of society for the practice of authority. Each kingdom was a town, which was organized according to all the lineages that founded and constituted it. That was particularly for that reason that Yoruba society is lineage-based (Llyod, 1955). The individuals who occupied principal state offices in every kingdom did so by virtue of their leadership positions as heads of their respective wards (Law, 1971). Chiefly titles or

state offices in the kingdoms including the office of the chief of state were all lineage-based. The evident interplay between the dimensions of *Participation* and *Responsiveness* in the practice of authority in the lineage; compound; ward; and town underscored the constitutionalism that characterized the Yoruba monarchy. Law captured that interplay partly and quite well too, when he observed that:

All important chiefly titles [in the town] belonged to particular lineages, and succession to the titles was determined by the lineage members. Chiefs were regarded ... as spokesmen of lineage interests, and the lineage exercised some control over the policy of its chief. (Law, 1971, p. 28)

The Yoruba are therefore, town-dwellers, who carved the town out as the apex of their monarchical political system (Atanda, 1973a, p. 3). Most of the kingdoms were composed of an original town and other towns that were either founded by people from the former or that were conquered and annexed as tribute-paying components. In every case, it was the original town that served as the metropolitan capital and seat of power in a kingdom (Fadipe, 1970). The other ones often functioned as its provinces. On one count, this configuration reflected the clear structure and hierarchy in the Yoruba political system, and on the other, it depicted the constitutionalism that characterized it. The authority relations that existed between the metropolis and their provinces were hardly absolute. The customary and traditional stipulations on types and aspects of authority ceded by the provinces to the metropolis were clear. Leaders of provinces retained considerable autonomy in their relations with the metropolis. The acquisition of provinces was mostly for the extraction of tributes, slaves, military manpower during national emergencies, and the control of trade routes but not for the practice of absolute authority (Fadipe, 1970). The control of trade routes was a huge source of state revenue that accrued from the toll system. The pattern of allowing provinces in kingdoms to retain considerable autonomy was even extended to non-Yoruba peoples such as the Nupe, Fon, and Dahomey who inhabit the areas that adjoin the Yoruba country, at the various times when they came under the sway of Old Oyo (Morton-Williams, 1964). With the decline and disintegration of Old Oyo, the reversal of that pattern by the new states – particularly Ibadan – that emerged in the Yoruba country bred extensive disaffection with adverse consequences for political development among the Yoruba. Political authority in all the kingdoms was therefore procedural, and there were remarkable similarities between them on authority patterns and the practice of authority.

Constitutional restraint was evident in the structures of authority in every kingdom and its provinces. For instance, military, civil, judicial, and external affairs in each kingdom were reposed in specific state offices, each of which was similar in each of the kingdoms (Fadipe, 1970). The king was the chief of state. In Old Oyo, his official title was *Aláàfin*. In Ijebu and Ife, he was called the *Awujale* and *Ooni*, respectively, while he was called the *Oba* in Ekiti.

In theoretical terms, the Yoruba monarchs were de facto leaders of their kingdoms. Their authority drove the bureaucracy of state in their respective kingdoms. The legitimacy of that authority derived from the intricate mix of religion, the social structure, and social organization. For instance, constitutionally, the king was the companion of the Gods worshipped in the kingdom (Atanda, 1973a). But in reality, because of clear limitations on his power that notion of “absolutism” did not translate to practice of his authority at all. A king who exercised his authority in a way that qualifies as “self-sustained power” (Eckstein & Gurr, 1975, p. 67) under the E–G scheme would be in violation of constitutional stipulations. In fact, an “*Oba* exercised little direct authority of his own. The chiefs, the councils, and further down the ladder, the lineages and associations were the chief instruments of authority” (Akintoye, 1971, p. 17). The *Igbimo* or State Council, which was composed of the principal chiefs – who represented their lineages, interest groups, and professional associations – was a major player in the formulation of state policy in each kingdom (Fadipe, 1970; Law, 1971). The State Council discharged legislative, judicial, and executive functions. In some kingdoms, it met without the king. In Old Oyo, the State Council which was called the “*Oyo ti o mo esi* – shortened as *Oyo-Mesi*, i.e. The Oyo who knows the appropriate answer [to problems]” (Atanda, 1970a, p. 228) was composed of seven titled chiefs including the *Basorun* who presided as its head. The *Oyo Mesi* and its head met separately from the *Aláàfin* and controlled and commanded the army of the metropolitan capital (Law, 1971). They gave the final approval on successions to the throne from the list of names they received from leaders of the royal lineages (Johnson, 1921; Law, 1971). Citizens exercised *Participation* indirectly through members of their lineage who served in the State Council. The bureaucracy of state in each kingdom enabled Yoruba monarchs to be quite directive in the practice of his authority. Ambitious monarchs who tried to over-step their legitimate authority were checked by the State Council, which could even compel them to commit suicide. When a monarch became autocratic, the people leveraged on their representatives in the State Council to reject him and trigger the sanction of suicide against him.

In kingdoms where the State Council lacked the constitutional authority to directly reject an autocratic chief of state through the demand of suicide; its members could initiate a popular revolt against him by refusing to make themselves available at the *Afin* (Palace) each morning to pay him their obligatory homage. That gesture of disapproval signaled the citizens to rise against that autocrat if he refused to heed the early warning to either abdicate or take flight or commit suicide. The authority of the State Council to engender responsiveness from the chief of state and participation from citizens is so immense in some kingdoms that it “virtually became the boss of the *Oba*, who, therefore, had little or no chance of becoming a despot” (Atanda, 1973a, p. 4).

A chief’s continued membership of the State Council depended on the approval and support of other members of his lineage with whom he regularly interacted. He was the channel through which members of the lineage conveyed their wishes to the king (Atanda, 1973a).

The primacy of the lineage in the authority patterns derived from the logic that in Yoruba society that the lineage evolved before the ward and the town (Fadipe, 1970). It was in the lineage that “the custom of deferring to seniors” (Fadipe, 1970, p. 210), a crucial element for stability in Yoruba body politic, was anchored. The lineage head who is called the *olori ebi* or *baálè* who is also the most senior male in the lineage retained the loyalty of its members because of his seniority. The loyalty of the ordinary individual Yoruba was expressed “to the head of state and the central government” (Fadipe, 1970, p. 211) through the lineage head. This is particularly crucial in a political system where “[t]here was not much abstract loyalty to country” (Fadipe, 1970, p. 211).

The authority of the lineage head extended to both judicial and legal autonomy in almost all issues that concerned the *ebi* and its members. Fadipe described him as “the chief law-giver and magistrate of the” lineage (Fadipe, 1970, p. 106). He collected assigned taxes from lineage members for onward transmission to the central bureaucracy of state in the metropolitan capital.

But for the lineage heads, state authorities in the metropolitan capitals could have found it impossible to assess levies for military duties and public works, much less summon individuals from lineages to appear before the State Councils. On those occasions when a lineage acted on the advice of its representative in the State Council and decide that a piece of directive from the palace was contrary to its interests, the lineage head conveyed their position to the palace through their representative in the State Council.

WARFARE, SLAVERY, SLAVE-TAKING, AND STATE BUILDING

From close scrutiny it is evident that there were definite distinctive features of the Yoruba state system. Among them were slavery and slave-taking. The significance of the role of slave-taking and slaves¹¹ in pre-colonial Yoruba societies revolved around the location of slaves in both their economy and larger societies. The logic of this assertion is derived from general observations – all of which are relevant to our analysis on the Yoruba case – made by Lovejoy (1983, pp. 9–11) on slavery in Africa’s pre-colonial social formations. The synopsis of Lovejoy’s observations is as follows. The demographic share of slaves in the population of a society that practiced slavery is important when it comes to their role. However, “far more significant was the location of slaves in the society and economy” (Lovejoy, 1983, p. 8). The spread of slaves in society could either be diffused in the hands of many or most of the members of society or concentrated in the hands of members of the narrow elite classes. Slaves could be deployed either in the economy as producers, in politics as soldiers and administrators, in the social realm as concubines and domestic servants, or in a combination of all three realms.

Societies that deployed slaves exclusively either in their social or political realms, or in a combination of both relied on other productions relations to service their economies. Such societies cannot qualify as slave societies. Slavery can be incidental in societies where tiny minorities of people practiced it as a status symbol. A “slave mode of production” (Lovejoy, 1983, p. 10) prevailed in societies where slaves performed crucial and extensive roles in the economy, politics, as well as in the social realm. Such societies devised the means through which it guaranteed the supply and procurement of slaves. It was under those circumstances that slavery functioned as an institution that was characterized by its own peculiar segmental structures.

Slavery did not necessarily have to be in the “social formation”¹² of a society for it to be operated in the society as a mode of production. It could have existed and functioned simultaneously with such other institutions as kinship and pawnship within either a state or in an enlarged region that contained several states and polities. A slave mode of production could be articulated to “other modes of production through long-distance trade, tributary relationships, or raids and warfare” (Lovejoy, 1983, p. 10). Even in the absence of diffused ownership, slavery could still be transformed into a necessary mode for “the reproduction of social formations” (Lovejoy, 1983, p. 11) when members of the narrow slave-owning elite classes depended on slaves to sustain and perpetuate their political and economic power in society.

The account of how slave-taking and slavery impacted warfare and their consequences on pre-colonial state building in the Yoruba country is given in the context of the transformations that occurred in slavery therein over the course of time. Initially, slavery was marginal and incidental in Yoruba societies. But with time, it was first transformed into an institution, which then became a mode of production that existed and functioned alongside other modes of production such as kinship and pawnship, in the social formation (Falola, 2003).

No one can say for certain when slavery became a feature of Yoruba societies. But it is known that Islam provided the ideological support for it when black Africans were brought into “societies north of the Sahara and along the shores of the Indian Ocean” (Lovejoy, 1983, p. 15) to be used as slaves in “the military, administration, and domestic service” (Lovejoy, 1983, p.15). From Arabia to the Persian Gulf and North Africa, Islam provided that kind of support in the consolidation of slavery. This observation is underscored by the fact that “for over seven hundred years before 1450 the Islamic world was virtually the only external influence on the political economy of Africa” (Lovejoy, 1983, p. 15). Northern Yorubaland where Old Oyo was founded shared a lot of interaction with societies in the upper Niger where the use of eunuch and no-eunuch slaves “in the army and bureaucracy” (Lovejoy, 1983, p. 17) seeped in quite deeply through Islamic contacts. That interaction did not stop with trade and commerce. It involved a lot of back and forth that included inter marriages and conquests and vassalage between the Oyo kingdom and the Nupe and Borgu kingdoms (Smith, 1965).¹³ Yorubaland was exposed to the advantages of incorporating “slave officials and soldiers [who] often proved very loyal because of the dependency on their master for status” (Lovejoy, 1983, p. 17) in the service of the state.

Fage’s observation “that some western African peoples had developed class and slave-owning societies as a result of pressures from the trans-Saharan slave trade before they were subjected to pressures from the Atlantic slave trade” (Fage, 1980, p. 293) is indeed relevant to the issue of slave-taking and slavery as unique features of states and the state system in pre-colonial Yorubaland. His argument further substantiates the one made earlier that the interaction of the Yoruba with the inhabitants and societies in the drier and *tse-tse* fly-free savanna which encouraged uninhibited migration and intermingling of non-indigenous peoples from the Sahel and across the Sahara with indigenes, opened their kings and notables up for the adoption of incidental slavery.

Early Europeans who visited West Africa attested to the presence of “established and hierarchical authorities” (Fage, 1980, p. 298) that they

associated with the dispensation of power in varied ramifications in areas that included Yorubaland. Pachero Pereira, the pioneer Portuguese seafarer, and others who visited Yorubaland and other parts of the lower Niger disclosed that they witnessed specific indications “that many western African societies did have within them persons whom European visitors could think of as slaves” (Fage, 1980, p. 297). They wrote about instances when persons were sold to them or they saw persons being used for sacrifice (Fage, 1980). Fage argues that even if such persons may not have necessarily qualified as belonging to a *slave class* in the European conception, “it does seem to mean that at least some social dependents could be dispensed of if the occasion arose, i.e. they might be exchanged for goods” (Fage, 1980, p. 298), sacrifices, etc.

Available evidence indicates that slavery in Yoruba societies in the period before the trans-Atlantic slave trade was marginal and incidental. But while that could imply that Yoruba societies were not slave societies in the classical sense of the word, it may indicate that the members of the elite classes who owned and exploited slave labor for crucial and extensive roles in the economy, politics, and the social realm had by then evolved the equivalent of a “slave mode of production”, which Lovejoy (1983, p. 10) argues does not require extensive ownership of slaves to exist in society. As Walter Rodney (1966, p. 431) pointed out with regard to the Upper Guinea Coast of West Africa, slavery was concentrated in the hands of the ruling elite.¹⁴ “Slavery and the making, buying and selling of slaves”, Fage argues,

were means by which certain privileged individuals in West African society (sic), or persons who wished to gain or extend positions of privilege in that society (sic), sought to mobilize the wealth inherent in the land and people on it and that this process had already gone some distance before the Europeans arrived. (Fage, 1969, p. 398)

There was indeed ample evidence of political and economic deployment of slaves in various Yoruba states (Falola, 2003). Palace slaves – they included Hausa, Nupe, and other upper Niger elements – who were of non-Yoruba stock (Clapperton, 1829 in Morton-Williams, 1971; Fage, 1980) were deployed to labor in royal farms, as messengers, administrators, etc. in the kingdoms. They served as special royal body guards whose numbers were increased in times of internal uprising to guarantee the safety of the kings (Lloyd, 1960b, p. 232). In the Ijebu kingdom for instance, palace slaves “were organized into nearly twenty groups each with specific functions” (Lloyd, 1954, p. 380). Some performed mortuary rites on deceased kings and some served as presenters of aspirants to the throne to the State Council in times of succession.

In most of Western Africa, European interest in the acquisition and export of Africans to the New World and elsewhere opened up an additional avenue for members of the elite classes who were already involved in slave-taking and slavery to seek for and make wealth. Members of the elite classes availed themselves of that option:

an economic choice: whether it was more advantageous to them to keep their slave labourers at home, as farmers, artisans, porters, retainers, soldiers, etc. or to exchange them or some of them for other forms of wealth (or of power, example guns and powder). (Fage, 1969, p. 398)

Old Oyo was one of the Yoruba states in which members of the elite classes utilized slaves in the aforementioned ways and for such purposes. Old Oyo

rose to military power ... in the fifteenth century and through warfare during the next 100–150 years both secured its frontiers against the Bariba and Nupe and also dominated the northern and central Yoruba kingdoms, bringing the large areas [in the Yoruba country] under close political control in a system of vassalage. (Morton-Williams, 1964, p. 25)¹⁵

Sometime before or around the second half of the seventeenth century the Oyo state had begun to reap from its war-driven expansion through slave-taking. Slave-taking in Old Oyo was the source of the estimated annual export of 1,200 (in the 1640s), 1,000 (in the 1650s), and 1,700 (in the 1660s), respectively from the “Slave Coast” (Lovejoy 1983, p. 54).

Slave-taking became an effective “means of mobilizing labour for economic and political needs of the state [It was] one of a number of ways of increasing a kingdom’s wealth and power, and in the Guinea coastlands only during the eighteenth century the most important way” (Fage, 1969, p. 400).

Perhaps in the specific cases of states that evolved either a centralized or hierarchically structured political system as was the case in the Yoruba country, the argument that West African societies engaged in slave-taking during the trans-Atlantic slave trade era out of expediency is valid. They did not want to loose trade with the European arm vendors and cede military advantage to rival polities (Akinjogbin, 1967).¹⁶ In the Yoruba states, slave-taking affected warfare through complex processes that aided state building and transformation. In time those processes produced the dire consequences that led to the collapse of states and the state system toward the end of the nineteenth century.

Probably, due to the logic that Old Oyo was the most imperial and as a result the most extensive of all the Yoruba states, those processes started from there and unfolded to virtually the rest of Yorubaland as they played themselves out. A considerable proportion of the Yoruba country and

beyond had been brought under Old Oyo's sway by around the end of the seventeenth century. By the late eighteenth century, most of the other Yoruba kingdoms had become the *Aláàfin's* vassalages. New ones were established, "ruled over, and probably mostly inhabited, by colonists from the Oyo territories" (Morton-Williams, 1964, p. 40). Elaborate trade routes to the coast were established and maintained. Slave-taking driven by warfare was the mainstay of the entire process and the system itself. It

was not only important to the Oyo to keep their frontiers secure against their most powerful neighbours; they needed also ... to engage in warfare for slaves. Slaves were needed not only to exchange for European goods but also as porters and labourers, and as craftsmen. (Morton-Williams, 1964, p. 41)¹⁷

Slavery had at this stage in Yoruba societies been transformed into a mode of production that functioned like an institution supplied and sustained through established structures.

State policy in Old Oyo was jointly formulated by the *Aláàfin* and the *Oyo Mesi* through constitutional arrangements that designated the former as the ultimate arbiter only in principle but invested the obligation on him "to take account of the views of the *Oyo Mesi*, who conferred separately from him" (Law, 1971, p. 28). The *Oyo Mesi's* power encompassed the constitutional authority to over-rule the *Aláàfin* and even compel him to abdicate by committing suicide. But the latter's immense power extended to granting "approval ... for succession to all Oyo titles, religious, military, and civil, including the *Oyo Mesi* titles" (Law, 1971, p. 29). He granted the final approval for all capital punishments (Law, 1971). Up until the capture and slaughter of an *Aláàfin* in a campaign gone bad against the Nupe in the seventeenth century, he even led the Oyo army into battles (Smith, 1965).¹⁸

The *Aláàfin* relied on "an immense staff of slaves attached to the palace"¹⁹ (Law, 1971, p. 29) to enforce his authority and safe-guard his power by reducing dependence on the *Oyo Mesi* as stipulated in the unwritten Constitution. Three of those slaves – all eunuchs – "in order of rank, the *Ona Efa* ("Eunuch of the Middle"), the *Otun Efa* ("Eunuch of the Right"), and the *Osi Efa* ("Eunuch of the Left" who were responsible respectively for judicial, religious, and administrative matters" (Law, 1971, p. 29) presided over that elaborate palace bureaucracy. The *ilari* was the other special aggregate of palace slave functionaries who were resident in the metropolitan capital, and through whom the various *ajele* (another special group of palace slaves each of whom were appointed to represent the kingdom government in each of the provincial polities) projected the king's authority back and forth between the metropolitan capital and provinces. Taxes and tributes from vassal polities

flowed into the palace treasury through the *ilari* after they had been collected by the *ajele*. The elaborate network of allegiance through which the *Aláàfin* garnered and controlled “enormous access of wealth and power” (Law 1971, p. 31) was serviced by slaves. By around the late eighteenth century, warfare, slave-taking and imperial expansion had combined to generate enormous wealth that “enabled the *Alafin* (sic) to expand his vast staff of palace slaves, through whom he administered the empire in a manner that reduced dependence on the *Oyo Mesi*” (Law, 1971, p. 31).

Old Oyo was not an absolute state by any stretch of the imagination. Although a monarchy, there were facilitated channels that enabled the participation of its citizens in the various realms of life and governance. There were also other channels that allowed not only the *Aláàfin* but also members of the *Oyo Mesi* and others to enrich themselves without hinderance. Like the *Aláàfin*, chiefs received allocations of war booty that included slaves (Lloyd, 1960a, b). One observer noted that “It was the king’s prerogative ... to make war ... a certain proportion of slaves and spoils taken in such wars were due him” (Morton-Williams, 1964, p. 41). In the absence of any artificial hindrance, members of the *Oyo Mesi* were therefore freed and engaged in trade and commerce, and reaped enormous wealth by doing so. The privileges of their offices enabled them to accumulate economic wealth, which they converted into political power and influence.

The *Oyo Mesi*’s control of the army of the capital implied “that the balance of military power within the city remained in their favor” (Law, 1971, p. 36). Sometime toward the mid-1700s a power situation ensued in Oyo in which the *Oyo Mesi* invoked its constitutional authority to demand and obtain the deposition of successive *Aláàfin*. It got to the point in 1754 when the *Basorun* effectively seized state power. He rendered each *Aláàfin* that ascended the throne a puppet who he placed on a daily token allowance (Law, 1971). He replaced the *ilari* and *ajele* with his sons and relatives, and through them he appropriated state revenue from the vassalages and provinces (Johnson, 1921). His sons embarked on a reign of terror in the provinces, which provoked a revolt in the Ilorin province. Their father responded by sending in his forces from the capital to hunt down and kill the governor (Johnson, 1921, pp. 199–200).

The *Basorun*’s power grab was only challenged when an *Aláàfin* made his own extra-constitutional move of mobilizing a military revolt in the provinces against the usurper and his sons. That counter measure, which began in the provinces with the support of the provincial military commanders, succeeded in ousting the sons before it spread to the metropolitan capital to do the same to their father.

Constitutional authority was restored but lasted up until 1789. But after that, things were hardly the same. The big destabilizing fallout from that first power situation was that the *Aláàfin*'s invitation of provincial forces to the metropolitan capital exposed "the "secret of empire" [to ambitious provincial officials who realized] that the balance of military power lay with the provinces against the capital" (Law, 1971, p. 43). Given the prevalence of slave-taking and the dependence of the *Aláàfin* and other state officials on the wealth that accrued therefrom to enhance and perpetuate their economic and political power, the recipe for sustained political instability was complete. When the power situation between palace and court erupted for the second time, the mobilization of military forces in the metropolitan capital against disloyal provincial officials and vice-versa was drawn into the fray. A point was reached in 1817 when another governor, in the province of Ilorin who was deep in a dispute with the *Aláàfin* requested and received military assistance from Fulani traders who were resident in his town. With their assistance he was able to assert political independence from Oyo. That action backfired on him in 1823/1824 when those Fulani traders turned against him. They killed him and seized power in the name of the *jihad* that their kinsman Usman dan Fodio declared in 1804 in Hausaland which his kinsmen were prosecuting in earnest in the larger upper Niger sub-region of West Africa. The ultimate outcome was that the Empire caved in from within when the provinces realized that they "could impose their will on the capital, [which] ... could no longer impose its will on [them]" (Law, 1971, p. 43). The follow-up to that outcome was that the provinces declined "any longer to serve as pawns in the game of metropolitan politics" (Law, 1971, p. 43). With that the rulers of the provinces reasserted their political autonomy and set the empire on the path of disintegration.

The empire's disintegration began effectively around the 1820s when "the slave trade from Africa had assumed gigantic proportions" (Lovejoy, 1983, p. 135). One can rightly argue that its disintegration did not in any way exhaust warfare, slave-taking and their beneficiaries, the trinity that functioned in tandem to aid and then undermine the empire. Being that by the nineteenth century slavery in Yoruba societies had become "the principal source of investment and, (sic) next to polygamy, the chief thing in which wealth consists" (Johnson, 1880 in Fage, 1980, p. 309) rather than diminish, warfare, which had become the main means for slave-taking assumed enhanced importance in the hands of those who felt liberated by the collapse and disintegration of Old Oyo. Yorubaland was therefore plunged into a century of warfare (Ajayi & Smith, 1971; Johnson, 1921).




Fig. 2. Relations among Elements in the Yoruba State System.

As I have portrayed in Fig. 2, one would discern from the forgoing that indigenous forms of political participation and local control hampered attempts to achieve centralization of state power in the Yoruba kingdoms. That hindrance was quite evident in the Old Oyo in the course of its expansion and transformation to encompass extensive portions of the Yoruba country. The successor states that emerged from its ruins experienced the same. Slave-taking and the slave trade in Old Oyo and those new states provided both political (coercive) and material (capital) resources that the *Aláàfin* and the leaders of the new states could have used to overcome those constraints posed by the local levels and build stronger, and more substantial state structures. But in the absence of holding monopoly of control over both the wealth that flowed from slave-taking and slave trade, rather than alter the status quo in Old Oyo, attempts by the Court to assume absolute power in the 1700s were indeed the spark that ignited the power situation that ensued between it and the aristocracy (Morton-Williams, 1971, p. 91) which led to the constitutional crisis (Gbadamosi, 1978) which produced that disintegration.²⁰

The main successor states – Oke-Odan, New Oyo, Ilorin, Ibadan, Abeokuta, and Ijaye – that emerged in the Yoruba country to fill the vacuum created by Old Oyo's disintegration were all products of the trinity of warfare, slave-taking, and slavery. Those new states thrived on militarist authority patterns as opposed to the age-old constitutional monarchical system of the Yoruba (Falola & Oguntomisin, 1984). Ibadan, which emerged as the new imperial overlord operated the quintessence of that new

political culture based on militarism (Awe, 1965; Falola, 1985). It “produced some dominant personalities who by sheer force of character gave Ibadan’s foreign policy such direction as they wished” (Awe, 1965, p. 225).

The preference for militarism in those new states is understandable at a time when slavery was already a parallel mode of production for the elite (Falola, 2003). During Ibadan’s “early years in 1830s, slave raiding was very intense and the careers of its early leaders were dependent upon it” (Falola, 2003, p. 115). Ibadan was not alone in that regard. Ann O’Hear (1997) observed that “Slaves were an important product of Ilorin’s early expansionist wars” (p. 23). According to Falola,

Each of the key operators of these states needed hundreds of people to fight, farm and trade. Their answer was to perfect the use of warfare, kidnapping and raiding as enslavement mechanisms. In the intense competition between these rival states ... and between the leaders ... slaves occupied a prominent position. Large household, large farms and a large band of followers became essential requirements in the maintenance of power. (Falola, 2003, p. 112)

In Ilorin where “slaves were acquired by the chiefs and [notable] people ... through trade, tribute and especially capture ... the emirs used their slaves as soldiers and administrations, settled them on their farms, and sent them to the market for sale” (O’Hear, 1997, pp. 24–25).

The households that the political and military elite who ran the new states established operated and were controlled in ways that were different from those that were based strictly on indigenous Yoruba kinship groups (Falola, 2003). Their households that grew mostly by fission (Falola, 2003) were segmental economic units that relied mostly on slave labor to produce surpluses in agriculture and in other “occupations such as horsetending, rope making, barbing, and cowherding” (Falola, 2003, p. 114). They encompassed “a range of relationships disguised within [them], which might appear ... as merely based on kinship but in fact included many unrelated servile members, both slave and pawn” (Falola, 2003, p. 112).²¹ Owing to the nature of society among the Yoruba, this new elite was unable to rely on orthodox institutional units to accomplish the unbridled political and economic ambitions of its members. There was, for instance, a limited extent to which anyone of them could have throttled the traditional kinship-based household for the production of the “base values” that were converted into “scope values” (Falola, 2003), i.e. the requisites for politics in society (Eckstein, 1998). Their recourse to circumvent whatever constraints placed on their ambitions by traditional institutional units and their structures was to build large households, maintain, and supply them to function as personal armies and as bases of economic and social production. They “assembled a

following through the manipulation of available resources for enslavement; armed slave supporters were used to make other slaves” (Falola, 2003, p. 114). So dependent on slavery was their power in the social formation that the displacement of the Atlantic slave trade by the so-called “legitimate” trade sometime around the 1850s did not erase their appetite for slaves described as bordering on greed (Akintoye, 1971). They promptly diverted their slaves to the production and transportation of agricultural produce. The number of slaves owned by each of them ran into several hundreds and thousands (Johnson, 1921; Falola, 2003).

The proportion of slaves to non-slaves in some of the Yoruba states during this time weighed highly in favor of the former (Johnson, 1877, 1880, 1898; Biobaku 1965; Lovejoy 1983). Prominent personalities – including merchants and women – in the new states owned hundreds and thousands of slaves (Lovejoy, 1983; Falola, 2003). Their reliance on slavery may have driven slave-taking in the Yoruba country and its surroundings more than was the case in the trans-Atlantic slave trade. By the second half of the nineteenth century in the Yoruba country, “most large slave-owners were organizing their slaves for agricultural production” (Lovejoy, 1983, p. 173).

But then, at no time did slave-taking and slavery rise to constitute the basis of the economy for everyone in Yoruba societies. Like in many other parts of West Africa, the trinity of warfare, slave-taking, and slavery were largely exploited by state officials and notable personalities who collected most of the captives or criminals (Manning, 1969) either sold them to Europeans (Falola, 2003) and or deployed them internally for other purposes (Lovejoy, 1983). The hierarchically structured socio-political systems of the Yoruba lent their institutional structures to aid and abet the exploitation of the trinity by those concerned.

Slavery and slave-taking became means to wealth and power (Dike, 1956; Fage, 1969) to a few in Yoruba societies who then proceeded to arrogate authority to themselves. They “tended to integrate, strengthen and develop” (Fage, 1969, p. 402) a sharp shift from established constitutional authority patterns to ones that revolved around bellicose personalities (Awe, 1964, 1965). The relentless drive by such personalities who controlled the affairs of state in Ibadan to increasingly regard its tributary polities in Yorubaland “primarily as ... means of wealth, cheap slaves to work their farms, and in general as ... rich field[s] for exploitation” (Awe, 1964, p. 227) eroded its authority as an imperial power. A point was reached when almost every other state in Yorubaland became convinced that peace would only be restored in the Yoruba country when Ibadan was defeated. It took British intervention by way of two treaties in 1886 and 1893 to bring that about.

The unfolding processes in state building in the Yoruba country were terminated effectively by the combination of internal and external factors.

WARFARE AND THE YORUBA STATE SYSTEM

Aspects of Tilly's (1990) analytical approach hold relevance for understanding the contributions made by war to state development in pre-colonial Yorubaland. The economy of Yorubaland was quite developed and well managed to the degree that it provided robust support for state power (Falola & Adebayo, 2000). Yoruba chiefs of state in the various kingdoms and their state officials availed themselves of established channels to extract resources from the economy through taxation, levies, court fees, fines, death duties, etc. (Fadipe, 1970; Falola & Adebayo, 2000, p. 100). Indicative of the component of protection in Tilly's analytical framework (Fig. 1) it was common customary practice for monarchs and their chiefs to accept lineages into their polity and grant them unoccupied tracts of land in the kingdom. In exchange "for the security provided by the king (they organized the expansion and protection of the kingdom's land through warfare), the people paid tax, tribute, or rent, subsequently shared by a king and his chiefs" (Falola & Adebayo, 2000, p. 100). In essence, most of the indicators in Tilly's framework were evident in the Yoruba case: proven military strength entailed protection, which in turn entailed extraction. Also, extraction-aided state making, which entailed protection, etc. A well-developed system of trade and commerce based on "large-scale production of agricultural and crafts production" (Falola & Adebayo, 2000, p. 100) involving all parts of Yorubaland and the adjoining polities in the Niger basin "provided opportunities for individuals and the state to exploit and benefit from" (Falola & Adebayo, 2000, p. 100).

Yoruba states established an efficient toll system through which they extracted hefty and reliable revenue for "road maintenance, payment of tributes if a community was under a metropolitan power, prosecution of war, etc" (Falola & Adebayo, 2000, p. 103). In most states, the toll system was placed in the care of the chiefs whose responsibility was to ensure that the trade routes were maintained and the traders who used them were given military protection (Bowen, 1969; Curtin, 1967). The aim being to "avoid, as much as possible, conflicts which would put the routes out of use" (Falola & Adebayo, 2000, p. 104) and inflict adverse impact on state revenue. Apart from being a source of state revenue, the toll system functioned to enhance the patterns of politics within states, the relationship between chiefs of state and their state

officials and between the latter. The toll system functioned to integrate “new elite into the political system” (Falola & Adebayo, 2000, p. 104) in states. There were differences in the ways that states utilized toll assignment to achieve the aforementioned ends. In the Oyo empire where there were a considerable number of tollgates, specific gates were assigned to designated state officials (Johnson, 1921) to “conciliate competing interests and chiefs ... for the sake of political stability” (Falola & Adebayo, 2000, p. 104). In some other states, the principal gates were assigned to the king, and whatever that was left were assigned to state officials (Falola, 1984). One of the official privileges enjoyed by the *Aláàfin* was the appointment of official toll collectors in his provincial polities and placing them under the *Onisare* or overseer. The empire accomplished the policy of monitoring and controlling exchange in its jurisdiction through the way that it managed its toll system. Tolls were located at entrances into cities, municipalities, at “the banks of rives and creeks, water routes, and highways” (Falola & Adebayo, 2000, p. 106).

The economy was inclusive of an elaborate credit and banking system (*esusu* and *ajo*) which furnished “big loans to the state” for the prosecution of wars (Falola & Adebayo, 2000, p. 132) and investment capital for the production and or distribution of arms and ammunitions”. War and the economics of war influenced the configuration of different state types in Yorubaland as is evident in Table 2.

War influenced “business and investment opportunities” (Falola & Adebayo, 2000, p. 164) for moneylenders whose activities played a role in the prosecution of wars by states. In the more belligerent Type A states, “the involvement of the elite in war ... promoted business” (Falola & Adebayo,

Table 2. The Configuration of State-Types due to War in Pre-Colonial Yorubaland.

Categories	Description	Examples
Type A: belligerent states	Type A1 – states constantly engaged in offensive wars Type A2 – states that bear the brunt of offensive wars	Ibadan, Ilorin, Ijebu, Modakeke Ekiti, Ijesa, Ife, Egba Villages, Egbado, Igbomina
Type B	States and polities that were obliterated by war	Old Oyo empire, Ijaye, Owu, Ikoyi, Iresa, Egba Villages, etc.
Type C	Partially belligerent states	New Oyo, Iwo, Ondo
Type D	Coastal states	Lagos, Epe, Badagry, etc.

Source: Adapted from Falola and Adebayo (2000, p. 165).

2000, p. 164) for the moneylenders and entrepreneurs who took loans from them to fund “many investments ... in the munitions industry” (Falola & Adebayo, 2000, p. 164). That involvement translated to security and protection of life and property in them, which in turn attracted people and business from the surrounding Type B states in which business opportunities were limited mostly to “the provision of food and some basic necessities” (Falola & Adebayo, 2000, p. 164). Specifically due to their location, the Type D states functioned as portals in the trade with Europeans. Slaves were, for instance, shipped through them and merchandise from Europe including firearms and gunpowder were delivered through them.

The Falola–Adebayo framework mirrors Tilly’s (1990) analytic approach to show that there were some elements of the *capital-intensive* path to state development in the Yoruba country. At the same time, there was also the evidence of dependence on the market and the structures in the larger society – evident in a functional constitutionalism and elaborate indigenous authority patterns – to supply the army, thereby ensuring the security of the state.

ARMY FORMAT IN PRE-COLONIAL YORUBA SOCIETIES

Army format in the Yoruba country was directly influenced by the nature of society. When we recall that through the ages the nature and structure of societies have often tended to impose some forms of liability on effective military recruitment, which some scholars have argued represents a necessary condition for war making and state building (Murdock, 1971; Howard, 1961; Forster & Nagler, 1997; Geary, 1991), we will be inclined to infer even at this point in the discourse that the Yoruba country was no exception when it came to factors that impacted army formats therein. The relationship between warfare and military manpower recruitment is intuitive: the former cannot be effective in the absence of the latter. Hence the logic in the considerations of issues of efficiency, expense, and loyalty – that Samuel Finer (1975) presents in his typology – as being crucial to military manpower recruitment and warfare decisions. I will add that the type and character of states can both be influenced by army formats. One can argue here that there is therefore the convergence of aspects of the Falola–Adebayo and Tilly frameworks on the one hand. On the other, the converging aspects of both frameworks can be linked to aspects of the typology by Finer (1975) that was formulated to elucidate the dynamism and interaction that prevailed between warfare and state making in early modern Europe in

this discourse. Finer's typology reflects considerations/issues that come into play when rulers/political actors decide on force formats. Issues of expense, loyalty, and efficiency have always been crucial in this regard (Finer, 1975, p. 94). Owing to the absence of standing armies in Yorubaland (Johnson, 1921; Ajayi & Smith, 1971) there never arose the need to quest for "foreign paid volunteers" who could have been organized on either ad hoc or permanent basis as "mercenaries" or "subsidy" troops as Finer indicated was the case in Europe. The absence of standing armies and the lack of need for "mercenaries" that it produced account for how and why the efficiency benefits that are associated with an army totally recruited from non-indigenous personnel were lost to Yoruba states. The absence of substantial proportions of non-indigenous elements in Yorubaland who could be tapped for military manpower was primarily due to its location in a part of the Niger basin, which is not prone to migration from outside. Its stable climatic and ecological zones with associated heavy rainfall is conducive to the *tse-tse* fly which gave it a buffer zone of protection against migration from the arid savanna which experienced unstable rains, frequent droughts and famine (Nicholson, 1979; Brooks, 1993). Those conditions guaranteed racial, ethnic, and cultural homogeneity in Yorubaland, which if otherwise could have opened the army format in the Yoruba states up for "mercenaries". Also, unlike in Europe, which experienced feudalism, at no time did the Yoruba country witness the evolution of landed and landless categories. No migrant group came from outside to transform the production and social relations along those lines either. As a result, the Yoruba were cultivators whose social relations mirrored their production relations. Hence, citizenship rights identified as a crucial component "means of state-making" (Mjøset & Van Holde, 2002, p. 5) in Europe when they were extended to all by the ruling classes (Bendix, 1964; Segal, 1989; Rokkan, 1975) were age-old and entrenched among the Yoruba. There were therefore, no feudal lords to compel members of society into military service in exchange for access to land. On its part, slavery was not a diffused mode of production that involved everyone in Yoruba societies. Hence, slaves only served in the army as retainers of their elite owners, but side-by-side with the free-born (Table 3).

However, it is not unexpected that army format in Yorubaland was a combination of elements from Finer's typology (ii) and (iii). State officials (chiefs) who, by the unwritten constitutional stipulation held their positions in the name of their lineages (Law, 1971)²² went into battles at the head of volunteers who were (Lloyd, 1960b) "called from their peace time occupations on the proclamation of war" (Ajayi & Smith, 1971, p. 13).

Table 3. Typology of Army Formats.

	Ad Hoc	Permanent	Consideration
Non-indigenous volunteers (paid)	“Mercenaries” (i)	“Subsidy troops” (iv)	Efficiency
Indigenous volunteers (obligatory)	Feudal host popular militia (ii)	Universal military service (v)	Expense
Indigenous volunteers (paid)	“Bandes” indentured companies (iii)	“Regulars” (vi)	Loyalty

Sources: Finer (1975, Figs. 2–4) and Mjøset and Van Holde (2002).

Included in each contingent were some “household slaves trained for war” (Ajayi & Smith, 1971, p. 14) belonging to the respective chiefs. These specially trained slaves are described as “constituting the nearest approach to regular troops among the Yoruba” (Ajayi & Smith, 1971, p. 14). In Old Oyo, the *Eso* were 70 junior commanders who were appointed by the *Aláàfin*. Together with their slave retainers the *Eso* constituted an elite corps of fighters “who supplied the highly trained cavalry and archers who were the main strength of the Oyo army” (Law, 1971, pp. 29–30).

The rest of the armies were raised from obligatory allocations of troops, ammunitions, arms, and provisions from subordinate polities and towns. The obligation to furnish troops for campaigns was strictly observed by the polities for protection. It was not observed by their leaders for access to land or privileges from the king as Anderson (1978, pp. 139–142, 147–153) points out was the case in Europe during the Middle Ages. The expense that was involved in supplying these armies was quite huge, becoming even bigger when imported arms from Europe became involved. Hence, the bellicose personalities who assumed power positions in the new states must have been constrained in their state building aspirations by the huge costs involved in supplying and equipping their respective personal armies raised from their slaves as standing outfits. There was a central command of the armies, but contingents extended a lot of loyalty to their chiefs. That loyalty factor posed obstacles to state building in the Old Oyo Empire in 1823/1824 when the provincial governor of Ilorin embarked on a rebellion against the *Aláàfin*. In the battle of Ilorin, all but a contingent of the Oyo army melted away with their commanding chiefs and exposed the *Aláàfin* to capture and death in the hands of the enemy (Johnson, 1921; Ajayi & Smith, 1971). Subsequent to that battle, the rebellious governor was killed by the Fulani forces that he invited to shore-up his rebellion, spawning the crisis that led to the disintegration of the empire.

Recruitment constraints frustrated the possibility of a military revolution ever taking place in Yorubaland.²³ As *Finer (1975, p. 96)* points out with respect to Europe: “Military forces call for men, materials ... and money”. But the nature and structure of society in Yorubaland did not make the extraction of those easy. Given a resistant population of citizens who clung fast to their authority patterns, a few ambitious individuals could not but continue their reliance on warfare to extract slaves even after the trans-Atlantic slave trade waned since that was their only means to sustain their economic and political influence in the social formation.²⁴ When the wanton destruction and pillage that characterized warfare is taken into cognizance it would not be difficult to establish why the same agency that helped a few to reach and sustain their ambition simultaneously entailed distress for larger societies and their members: When threatened many a town abandoned its home and fled into the hills and forests.²⁵

CONCLUSION

In sub-Saharan Africa, which has been left un-addressed in the discourse on the impacts of warfare on state development in the early modern period, there were indeed wars and states. Like in Europe during the period, warfare in sub-Saharan Africa was hardly an end in itself. As was the case in Europe, warfare in sub-Saharan Africa was an agency through which resources for state building were extracted. In the Yoruba country, which is the subject in the account that was given here, slavery and slave-taking – crucial elements that aided and abetted state building – both flourished largely because of warfare.

The relationships evident in the Yoruba case study between slavery, accumulation, war making and state formation represent the peculiar trait which has not been identified in state building in Europe. This observation is particularly true because of how rulers utilized slave-taking and slavery – which I identified as the two distinctive peculiarities of states in the Yoruba country – to reinforce the state building dynamics of *coercion* and *capital* – two of the prominent elements in Tilly’s framework. In contrast to early modern Europe, in the Yoruba country, slaves were deployed as soldiers, bureaucrats, as well as in various realms of the economy where they produced wealth for members of the elite classes.

My account of state building in the Yoruba country further substantiates the validity of Tilly’s and Finer’s theoretical frameworks. Although both frameworks were formulated and applied specifically to account for state building in Europe, I have utilized the narrative in this essay to establish

their relevance for accounts of state building in pre-colonial Africa. I have also established that the Yoruba states can be categorized in terms their belligerence, their survivability in the face of sustained warfare, etc. by tapping into the Falola–Adebayo framework which contains some elements that are compatible with some of the elements in Tilly’s framework. Finally, this case study has been used to show that while it was possible for state builders to utilize *coercion* (warfare) to extract *capital* (material resources) that they converted into *power and influence* and bring to bear on their state building activities, the need for *rightful power* in state building cannot be over-looked.

NOTES

1. Centeno’s work on Latin America focused on the nineteenth century, a period long before which historians acknowledge the emergence and transformation of states in various parts of sub-Saharan Africa.

2. Tilly reiterates this in *Coercion, Capital and European States A.D. 990–1990* when he said, “In the absence of ready capital ... rulers built massive apparatus to squeeze resources from a reluctant citizenry” (Tilly, 1990, p. 60).

3. Ertman (1997) points out that the German historian, Otto Hintze (1975) who also wrote on the same subject argued otherwise.

4. Only perfunctory mention will be accorded to the impact of geography on state building in the Yoruba country in this work.

5. Constitutions can be either written or unwritten. A good example of an unwritten Constitution is the one operated by Britain.

6. Various assertions and arguments have been proffered on the subject of state building in pre-colonial sub-Saharan Africa. Joseph P. Smaldone (1977) and Roberts (1987) who accounted for the impacts of war on state building in the 1880s and during the period of 1700–1914, respectively in the Niger basin focused specifically on the upper and middle Niger basin and the groups that inhabit them. But war making up until the late 1800s in the Yoruba country, which is located in the lower Niger, has largely been studied as historical events mostly by pioneer African historians – Ajayi and Smith (1971), Ajayi (1965), Akinjogbin (1963, 1965, 1966), Awe (1964, 1965, 1973), and several others.

7. Instead, the “interactions that involve a certain relationship between agents” (Eckstein, 1998, p. 525) actually constitute those “building blocks”. Eckstein points out that Catlin (1930) and Lasswell called that certain relationship between agents control relationship and power and influence relations, respectively, while Durkheim “argued that social facts are never individual facts but always consist at their most elementary level, of relationships between agents” (Eckstein, 1998, p. 525).

8. Eckstein’s proposition which ties all of these aforementioned crucial elements that I believe are all central in state building is most comprehensive. The way that Eckstein highlighted the “imbalances in the values of agents in a relationship” in his proposition reminds us that political actors (elites) are “the overall contours

of ... asymmetric power and influence relationships” in society. He also made it clear that everything “else is best regarded as an expression of elite structures, which include not only memberships of elite groups (who govern) but how resources (i.e. base values as referred to by Lasswell) are converted into power and influence (i.e. scope values) and which of these, in general and in particular cases, are privileged over others” (Eckstein, 1998, p. 526). My account of Yoruba state building mirrors much of aspects of what Eckstein says here. Hence, my view that aspects of social relationships that are asymmetrical (power or control) is authority, which in itself is a vital element in state building.

9. Briefly defined, *Directiveness* is the extent to which the activities and the behavior of members of social units are/can be influenced by directives from their leaders. *Directiveness* could be regimented, permissive, or mid point, configuring into four distinct components. Its coverage could either be comprehensive or restricted, while the latitude could be either specific or general. *Participation* encapsulates all attempts made by members of a social unit to influence their leadership. *Participation* occurs through designated channels that can be either open (facilitated) or closed (impeded), used or unused. When the channels of *Participation* are facilitated, they are usually formally provided, normatively tolerated, unsanctioned, and feasible. The story is otherwise when channels of *Participation* are impeded. The use of channels of *Participation* can be assessed in terms of volume, frequency, intensity, as well as strenuousness and variety of modes. *Responsiveness* is the flip side of *Participation*. Participating members of a social unit seek to influence their leadership, while responsive leaders “are disposed to being influenced by them and seek out ‘inputs’ from them” (Eckstein & Gurr, 1975 p. 67). *Compliance* represents the reaction that directives from the leadership elicit from the members of the social unit. Additional details on the four dimensions can be gleaned from Table 1. The interactions that take place between the two categories of members in a social unit “involve the flows of influence” (Eckstein & Gurr, 1975, p. 53). “Flows of influence” are “attempts to effect behavior and actual effects of attempts” (Eckstein & Gurr, 1975, p. 53) to achieve just that in the social unit.

10. Structure and hierarchy are age-old features of the state system among the Yoruba – see Johnson (1921), Lloyd (1960a), Fadipe (1970), and others.

11. J. D. Fage (1969) defined a slave as “a man or woman who was owned by some other person, whose labour was regarded as having economic value, and whose person had a commercial value” (p. 394).

12. Lovejoy (1983, p.10) conceives “social formation” as “the combined social and economic structures of production”.

13. Robert Smith’s (1965) account of these interactions between the Oyo, Nupe, and Borgu kingdoms is quite detailed.

14. Rodney (1966, p. 431) acknowledged the existence of “quasi-feudal exploitation of labour by a ruling *elite*, who received the greater portion of the harvest” Rodney (1966, p. 431) but argues “that many of the forms of slavery and subjection present in Africa in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and considered indigenous to the continent were in reality engendered by the Atlantic slave-trade” Rodney (1966, p. 443).

15. According to Lloyd (1960b, p. 232) the unwritten constitutional arrangements in the Yoruba states ceded “specific powers, those of internal government to

subordinate towns". Under that clause the subordinated towns "claim[ed] that the powers are and represent[ed] the powers which remain[ed] to them after ceding their sovereignty to the *oba*, whom they acknowledge[d] by virtue of his royal birth or by conquest". When Oyo achieved its empire status some of its vassals, particularly those through which trade routes to the coastal ports passed were "more rigorously controlled by the Alafin (sic)" (Morton-Williams, 1964, p. 40). The Alafin (sic) accomplished that feat through a coterie of high-ranking palace slaves who he posted to those provincial polities as his resident representatives. In the province of Ilaro in 1820, where the local rulers were not accounting for taxes and tolls satisfactorily, the slave resident was given the special titles of *Onisare* or "One with the work of envoy" and *abobaku* or "one who must die with the king". The *Onisare* was so effective that "The vassal kings no longer had direct access to the Alafin (sic)...[H]is officials collected the tolls ..., he led the procession to the New Year celebrations in Oyo, ... he alone has any cavalry at his command, or indeed any regular forces at all. Yet as a slave, of non-Yoruba origin (the three successive *Onisare* were of Hausa or Nupe stock), and *abobaku* ... the *Onisare*'s authority was as dependent upon the Alafin's (sic) sanction" (Morton-Williams, 1964, pp. 41–42). Their effectiveness was attested to by Hugh Clapperton (1829) and Lander and Lander (1832).

16. Kings Kpenggla (1774–1789) and Osei Bonsu (1801–1824) of Dahomey and Ashanti, respectively separately told European visitors that they waged wars not for slaves but "for political reasons, to protect, maintain or promote the power and prestige of their nations relative to their neighbours" (Fage, 1969, p. 402).

17. R. C. C. Law (1971) argues that military and economic expansion were interdependent in Old Oyo: "Some at least of the slaves sold at the coast were captives taken in war, and it is likely that one motive in Oyo expansion toward the coast was a desire to control important trade routes; moreover, the military power of Oyo rested principally on cavalry, whose mounts were obtained by trade, being purchased in the north with European goods and salt obtained at the coast in exchange for slaves" (pp. 35–36).

18. That incident led directly to the creation of the military" title of *Are ona Kakamfo*, which was conferred on the ruler of a provincial town, to serve as the commander-in-chief of the provincial forces ... to create for the provincial forces a command structure independent of the *Basorun* and the *Oyo Mesi*" (Law, 1971, p. 31).

19. Old Oyo's reliance on slavery which may have started before the eighteenth century intensified about then and lasted until its demise in the 1820s (Law, 1977).

20. The anchorage for participation in the affairs of the kingdoms provided by Yoruba lineages and the other segmental units at the local level was perhaps the one crucial element among several others that may have protected the citizens from the absolutism that could have resulted from the centralization of state power. The view that lineages, age-grades, local communities, etc. constitute trust networks that have always helped people to protect themselves from "unscrupulous rulers" and dispose society to democracy is the theme of Tilly's (2005) *Trust and Rule*. He points out that it is the trust that members of these networks repose in one another that disposes them to be more comfortable with one another in ways that empower them to stand together through thick and thin against absolute rulers.

21. Falola and Lovejoy (2003) defined pawnship as "a system in which individuals are held in debt bondage as collateral for loans" (p. 1). Both authors called pawnship

a centuries-old institution “at least along the Atlantic seaboard where it appears to have developed in tandem with the growth of trans-Atlantic slave trade, the expansion of slavery within Africa, and the greater commercialization of African economies” (Falola & Lovejoy, 2003, p. 1).

22. The lineage or *idile* is patrilineal and can rightly be described as the basic link in the political chain. Law (1971, p. 286) observed that “Chiefs were regarded, to some degree as spokesmen of lineage interests, and the lineage exercised some control over the policy of its chief”.

23. On military revolution which occurred in Europe, Lars Mjøset and Stephen Van Holde observed: “Starting in the mid-fifteenth century, European states and armies began to be transformed. Such transformations centered on fundamental changes relative to the recruitment and structure of armies, the weapons they carried, and ultimately in the character of the states fielding those armies. By the end of the “long sixteenth” century, the groundwork had been laid for the even larger technical, political and social relations that army, state and society would see in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries” (Mjøset & Van Holde, 2002, p. 10).

24. In a period that spanned about 70 years (1813–1893), Yorubaland witnessed about 50 different wars (Johnson, 1921; Smith, 1969; Ajayi & Smith, 1971). The wars and upheavals that led to the decline and eventual collapse of the Old Oyo Empire altered some aspects of the prevalent authority patterns (Oguntomisin, 1981; Falola, 2003; Atanda, 1973b) and introduced militarism and despotism in the conduct of the business of governance particularly in some new states that were founded in parts of post-Old Oyo Yorubaland (Ajayi, 1965, pp. 72–81; Awe, 1973). Ibadan was one of the new states that were founded in southern Yorubaland by the influx of population of displaced groups from the Old Oyo Empire and the surrounding states (Ajayi & Smith, 1971, p. 11). Founded in 1829, it grew in all respects as a result of the dependence of its leaders on militarism for state building and state transformation (Ajayi & Smith, 1971; Awe, 1973). Ibadan broke with existing tradition by raising a standing army composed of professional soldiers who assumed extensive leadership roles in society. With the exception of two religious positions of authority, recruitment into all other positions in Ibadan was affected by the new norm, which made merit “the most important qualification for achieving chieftaincy titles” (Awe, 1973, p. 66). Ibadan became a Yoruba polity that extended a lot of recognition to soldiers and war commanders in the bid to retain their services (Awe, 1973, p. 66; Falola, 1985). Even then Ibadan could not completely reinvent the Yoruba authority patterns. Many crucial elements of indigenous Yoruba authority patterns still survived in Ibadan. Citizenship continued to be the most important qualification for recruitment into every leadership position in the polity. In fact, there were strict definitions of who was a citizen as opposed to a stranger (Awe, 1973; Falola, 1985). Thus, access to chieftaincy titles, which largely “constituted power in nineteenth-century Ibadan” (Falola, 1985, p. 55) was restricted to citizens of Ibadan alone.

25. The geography of the Yoruba homeland posed an insurmountable obstacle to state building. Rather than be dominated by autocrats, Yoruba groups fled into the forest and hills to found new polities (Clapperton, 1829; Lander & Lander, 1832; Gleave, 1963). Ibadan and Abeokuta are good examples of new states that were founded by dissatisfied Yoruba groups (Ajayi, 1965; Akintoye, 1966; Ajayi & Smith, 1971; Awe, 1973; Falola, 1985; Oguntomisin, 1981). Most towns in southern

Yorubaland, “were deliberately situated within a belt of forests (the *Igbo ile*) which was deliberately allowed to retain its undergrowth and was pierced only by narrow paths leading to the gates” (Ajayi & Smith, 1971, p. 23).

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POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF RUSSIAN CAPITAL OWNERS: WHAT MATTERS?

Nathalia Rogers

ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on an analysis of the factors that contribute to differences in political attitudes and political participation of Russian capital owners. Such factors may include different size and type of capital, the degree of past political socialization, the respondents' age and generational experiences, past/present well-being comparisons and education. The paper begins with a discussion of different theories that make hypotheses about the political behavior of capital owners. These hypotheses were tested in a small, exploratory study of Russian capital owners that I conducted in Russia in the late 1990s. The results of the study are then analyzed within two different but closely interrelated contexts: the wider historical context of social, political and economic changes of the first decade of post-Soviet transformation, and the micro-context of the respondents personal political, economic and social history. In the end, I return to the analyses of the original hypotheses and conclude with a discussion of which theory comes closest to predicting and explaining the results of the study.

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INTRODUCTION

The emergence of Russian capital owners as a new social group is one of the many important social changes that took place during the period of post-socialist transformation. Capital owners began to be officially recognized in Russia in 1990, when the first law dealing with private property rights was introduced. In 1991, the Russian government launched a massive, multi-step privatization program, which further contributed to the growth in the numbers of individuals who became capital owners: first, a large number of Russians received privatization *vouchers* – certificates which could be exchanged for shares in newly privatized state firms, with the majority of workers of formerly state-owned firms also receiving a small number of shares in their firms for a nominal price¹; second, the managers of formerly state-owned and now privatized enterprises, in most cases, received controlling packages of shares in those firms²; and third, those individuals who either had money accumulated in the course of their activities in the Soviet “black market” or through entrepreneurial activities during the first few years of economic transformation were given a chance to establish their own companies or to privatize small- and medium-sized companies which were owned by the state. In this paper I will focus on the analysis of political attitudes and political participation of the individuals who, in the late 1990s, belonged to the second and third groups described above.

Any new social group that forms in a society that is undergoing transformation is likely to consist of members who have made changes to their socio-economic identity. The question is whether a change in the relationship toward the means of production is accompanied by changes in individual political attitudes and political participation. In societies with relatively lengthy periods of past authoritarian rule, the studies of current individual variations in political attitudes within a new social group are especially interesting because of the factor of a relatively low variation in past political socialization. In Russia, for example, one’s initial political socialization trajectory was to be a Communist Youth League (*Komsomol*) member for nearly all young people, and after that, one could try to become an active Communist, a passive Communist, a Communist Party official or choose not to pursue membership in the Party. The high degree of past political ‘de-differentiation’ sets Russia apart from those societies in the past socialist block that had experienced a lesser extent and/or a shorter length of a single party rule such as the countries of Eastern and Central Europe or even the Baltic Republics.

The key research question that I will be exploring in this paper is the question of the relationship between the type and size of capital and the political attitudes and political participation *within* the newly emerged group of Russian capital owners. The type and size of capital, however, are not the only factors that may affect attitudes and participation: age, education and past political socialization also matter and, when juxtaposed with the type and size of capital, these factors may yield a picture of diverging attitudes and political behavior. To further complicate the matter, one must acknowledge that social actors are connected to their social environments and that the types of economic, political and social structure together with the degree of the strength of the state may also affect individual political choices. In the societies where democratic regimes did not emerge during the period of early industrialization, additional questions often arise about the historic specificity of 'political culture' and about the path-dependency of the political, social and economic transformation.

Different scholars diverge on the issue of which of the factors listed above may play a dominant role in determining outcomes of both individual and collective political behavior. At least five approaches, each emphasizing a different dominant factor(s), could be distinguished in the analysis of post-socialist transformation. The first approach places a strong emphasis on the effects of what is seen as deeply rooted, historically formed authoritarian cultural practices and views these as the key factor that determines almost all outcomes of social, political and economic behavior (Murray, 1996; Brzezinski, 2001). The proponents of this 'authoritarian culture path-dependence approach' argue, for example, that no matter how much one tries to redesign Russia's political and economic institutions, deeply ingrained cultural norms will strongly interfere with the pro-democratic progress. Thus, even if a new group of capital owners appears in Russia, their collective authoritarian cultural past will pre-dispose most of these individuals to favor a strong-hand approach to politics.

The second approach is similar to the first in its emphasis on a single, all-determining factor, but it substitutes culture with an economic notion of private capital ownership (Boycko, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1995). In this 'economic determinism' view, the past cultural values and past institutional constraints matter little, given that social actors will be able to change their identity from unmotivated workers for hire to private capital owners who have an economic and political stake in supporting an economically liberal and politically democratic regime. Capital owners, in such case, will almost automatically convert to supporters of pro-democratic political

regime because they will understand that supporting such a regime is in their best economic interest.

The third approach, the ‘structural–functional approach’, has its origins in the work of Seymour Lipset (1959), who argued that modern democratic regimes are sustained through the growth of the middle class. It is the growing numbers of educated, relatively well-off, politically moderate individuals who appreciate and understand the importance of and insist on maintaining a reasonable liberal economic and democratic political equality that play a key role in sustaining modern democratic regimes. The implicit outcome of the modernization was to change the social structure through improving the living conditions of a large group of individuals who were then able to show their appreciation for these relative improvements by supporting the (pro-democratic) political regimes that allowed the improvements to occur in the first place. When the ‘structural–functional approach’ is applied to the analysis of the changes in the social structure of the Russian society, various scholars (Silverman & Yanowitch, 1997; Cook, 2002) invariably note the decrease in overall social, political and economic equality. Such a decrease in equality, especially when it occurs in the society with a previously highly educated and a relatively economically equal (if somewhat poor) population may have ambiguous effects on the support for pro-democratic regime. One could imagine that those individuals who belonged to the middle class in the past and who have successfully transitioned to the new, relatively well-off middle class along with those individuals who successfully entered the new middle class from a lower social background will feel supportive of an emerging democratic regime. On the other hand, those members of the past middle class who have lost their economic position but maintained their educational level may have ambiguous feelings about the new regime, alternating between bitter feelings caused by the loss of economic and often social status and the educated viewpoint of the importance of supporting a democratic political regime. Similarly, those capital owners that transitioned at the same level or upward in terms of their education and economic and social status should be prone to support democracy, while those who transitioned downward or saw their opportunities for the upper mobility closed, should be opposed to the democratic politics.

The fourth approach to studying post-socialist transition emphasizes the political importance of cultural and social forms of capital that are acquired by individuals during early socialization. Bourdieu’s (1977a, b, 1990) concepts of position, space, trajectory and ‘habitus’ were used by Eyal, Szelenyi, and Townsley (1998) to argue that the best way to explain the social and political transformation in Central Europe is through understanding of how

cultural and social capital was converted into political capital by the managerial class.³ On a collective level, these individual social capital conversions have produced a political outcome of “the gradual separation of ownership from control [of capital]” (p. 52), and led to the rise of new managers and technocrats whose political orientation has shifted away from the power-grabbing, profit-oriented politics of capital owners. Instead, the new managers are striving toward the introduction of democratic political and liberal economic systems that will be managed in a way that would benefit a wider social base. In such a political order of “post-communist managerialism” (p. 54), capital owners will never gain enough political power that would allow them to effectively compete with technocrats and managers whose basis of power and authority lies in their know-how and their executive position. Eyal et al. (1998) discuss at length the culture of pre-war Central Europe’s alliance between a well-educated middle class and a relatively well-formed (if weak) propertied class, seeming to imply that a similar alliance is emerging in contemporary Central Europe where the majority of educated managers, who corrected their individual trajectories in order to adjust for a post-socialist society, chose not to become business owners.

Would this kind of ‘cultural and social capital conversion’ approach be useful for an explanation of the role that capital owners play in political transformation in Russia? I would argue that in the case of the late 20th century Russia Bourdieu’s concepts would be of a limited explanatory use.⁴ While such concepts could prove to be useful in analyzing the social and economic transition of various entrepreneurs, the notions of ‘habitus’ and ‘trajectory’ are best applied where there is a sufficient differentiation that could be found in the initial departure points of the trajectories or, to put it differently, a number of different ‘habituses’ could be distinguished to begin with. The political ‘de-differentiation’ of communist Russia, however, does not provide us with a great variety of political ‘habituses’ to start with. Thus, if there is an *intra*-class variation in political attitudes and participation of capital owners that one could register in the post-socialist period, it becomes difficult to explain this variation just on the basis of the trajectory of the conversion of an individual’s political capital. Additional difficulties arise when one needs to explain the success of those individuals who had little Communist party political capital to begin with but did well in business and/or politics after the transformation. Another question that remains unanswered has to do with the extent and the direction of social action. For example, would those capital owners who have successfully transitioned their Communist political capital to their post-communist social and economic capital be satisfied with their ‘transition trajectory’, or

would they attempt to gain further power and influence? And if they do attempt to gain further power and influence, how would we explain their motivation in cases when their actions do not fit with their projected trajectory calculated on the basis of their initial political ‘habitus’?

Perhaps, using the ‘political economy approach’ could prove more helpful in the explanation of how the juxtaposition of larger structural forces shapes individual political expectations. Karl Marx (1977) was the first to recognize the primary importance of the individual’s economic relationship to the means of production in determining one’s political position. Contemporary scholars further contributed to the discussion by pointing out additional factors that may mediate this relationship, such as the impact of the independent bureaucratized state on the collective political behavior of social actors (Skocpol, 1979). Referring to the possibilities of *intra*-class variations in political attitudes and behavior among capital owners, Moore (1966) suggested that capital owners who rely on an economic base independent from ‘the old state’ might be more prone to support liberal–democratic developments than those capitalists who have accumulated their capital with the help of ‘the old state’. Other authors (Therborn, 1977; O’Donnell, 1979; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, & Stephens, 1992; Jepson, 2003) distinguish between differences in the political behavior of those who own large capital and the owners of small- and medium-sized capital. Large capital owners, in many cases, have been opposed to the introduction of a fully fledged liberal democracy and have entered into alliances with repressive elements within and/or outside of the state, while owners of small- and medium-sized capital (petty bourgeoisie) have shown themselves to be more inclined to support the efforts of politically subordinate classes to achieve and uphold their right of full political participation.

When the ‘political economy’ framework of analysis is applied to the particular situation of post-socialist transformation, one may expect to find that owners of small- and medium-sized capital will display more pro-democratic attitudes, especially if their capital has been accumulated independently from the help of ‘the old state’, while the large capital owners whose assets were often accumulated during the rule of ‘the old state’ period and then transferred into their private ownership may feel the desire to support a more authoritarian and/or a more clientelist political model. The transitioning state may also play a role of its own in moderating the desire and the ability of various capital owners to engage in political participation. Describing the case of the Russian transformation in the early 1990s, Rueschemeyer et al. (1992), for example, predicted that the emerging class of the Russian capital owners “will be weak economically and politically” (p. 295), and foresaw

that capital owners will be unable to socially construct their class interests in a way that will effectively counterbalance the power of a massive state apparatus that will control privatization and the development of free market policies.

THE RUSSIAN CASE STUDY

The rest of this paper will discuss the design and findings of a small, exploratory study of political attitudes and participation of Russian capital owners that I conducted in Moscow during the 12-month period from May 1997 to May 1998. Unlike contemporary Russia where various authoritarian forces appear to continue to consolidate their political and economic power, the political direction of the Russian state in the early and mid-1990s appeared far from set. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and a short period when the Communist Party was prohibited from the political scene, a relatively vibrant (if chaotic) political climate was established with a multiplicity of political parties participating in elections and with the members of various factions of Parliament engaging in aggressive political debates that were televised across the country. The country's President regularly fought with the majority faction in the Russian Parliament, administrative controls were loosened with Russian regions gaining a significant degree of autonomy from the Federal State and the number of mass media outlets from newspapers to new TV Channels was increasing at a rapid pace. To put it differently, there was an air of political opportunity, an air of an unknown direction of political change. This uncertainty was not only felt by Westerners who came to study Russia, but also by the Russians themselves who often spent their time thinking about which political figure they should support and what the future composition of political forces would look like (McFaul, 2001; Colton & Hough, 1998; Hough, Davidheiser, & Goodrich Lehmann, 1996; Oleshchuk & Pavlenko, 1997).

One of the drawbacks that accompanied this process of rapid political change in Russia was the emergence of a 'floating' political party system.⁵ Many Russian political parties quickly emerged and disappeared, others changed their name but not their political platforms, yet others merged into new political blocks and shifted their programs. Indeed, of the eight parties that cleared the 5% threshold in the 1993 Duma elections, only three parties (the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, CPRF; Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, LDPR; and Yabloko) did so again and again in the 1995 and 1999 Duma elections. Two of these three parties, the

CPRF and LDPR, did not advocate either democracy or a liberal market reform. The center of the Russian political spectrum displayed the least stability with political parties emerging and dissolving at a rapid pace that mirrored the fates of Russia's leading politicians. For example, the movement Our Home is Russia (OHR), formed in 1995 to support the then Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, quickly disappeared as a major political force soon after Chernomyrdin left the government in 1998. Instead, the new parties Fatherland/All Russia and Unity were formed just before the 1999 Duma elections in order to promote the ambitions of new centrist presidential candidates.

The floating nature of the Russian political party system contributed to the minimal degree of the post-Soviet party-identified political socialization of most of the country's citizens. In addition, because many Russians were found to have inconsistent views on the desirability of the market economy, the merits of the old regime and the effectiveness of the transformation, some Russian parties chose to pursue a 'fuzzy focus' strategy of very wide political appeal, making it hard for the voters to clearly see what a particular party was standing for politically.⁶ Party leaders hoped that a 'fuzzy focus' strategy would bring the large number of undecided voters to their side. The centrist OHR, and later the Unity and Fatherland/All Russia parties adopted such 'fuzzy' positions on the legacy of the Communist regime and desirability of market reforms, while the CPRF and the Democratic Choice of Russia (DCR, later the Union of Right Forces) party had the most well-defined political platforms.

Method and Hypotheses

The initial key research question around which the study was designed drew on the 'political economy approach' notion of possible variations in political attitudes and participation among capital owners of different size and type of capital. The study design called for the selection of capital owners who owned companies of different types and sizes in various industry fields where private and newly privatized Russian businesses operated (see Drawings A1 and A2 in appendix for the distribution by industry of the respondents' businesses). A total of 60 respondents were selected according to a non-random, purposive sample with the goal of filling four 'purpose' groups⁷: owners of large capital of 'old state' origin (10 respondents), owners of large capital of independent origin (10 respondents), owners of small- and medium-sized capital of 'old state' origin (10 respondents), and owners of small- and medium-sized capital of independent origin (30 respondents).⁸

While the size of a respondent's business was relatively easy to assess as long as one was able to convince the respondent to disclose a company's yearly turnover and the number of employees,⁹ the classification of the origins of the type of capital presented a more challenging task, where, at times, a certain degree of subjective judgment was needed. Regarding the origin of capital, the distinction was introduced between the owners of independent-type capital, who had accumulated their original capital mostly independently from any special help, support or protection from the state, and owners of 'old state'-type capital, who had accumulated most of their capital as a result of a legal, semi-legal or illegal direct transfer of the state's property into their private ownership. Even though many of such transfers were officially called privatization, these were often characterized by the absence of actual payment transactions and the absence of competitive bidding for the property. In the case of financial-industrial groups (FIGs), many of which ended up with capital of both independent and 'old state' origin, it is strictly the type of their initial starting capital that was taken into consideration when identifying their origin as being of an independent or of an 'old state' type. Those FIGs that had begun their capital accumulation in banking, advertising or commodities trading and then acquired 'old state'-type resources during privatization tenders were classified as independent-type companies; on the other hand, those FIGs that started with 'old state' industrial assets, such as formerly state-owned oil and gas concerns, and then expanded into mass media outlets and their own banks, were classified as 'old state'-type companies.

During the course of the interviews the capital owners were asked numerous questions about the sources of their initial capital and about the subsequent dynamics of their capital growth or decline. Such extensive probing, for example, allowed for a meaningful distinction as independent of those capital owners who had little financial capital to begin with but primarily used their human capital and social networks in order to start and advance their business. Similarly, those capital owners who started their businesses by leasing state facilities or purchasing lists of clients that were serviced by the state were classified as independent as long as the sums that they paid to the state for the lease were not nominal but constituted a substantial part of firm's income.¹⁰

Four respondents in this study belonged to the group of capital owners who started their business independently but then established contacts with the state, which became one of their major clients contributing to the rapid expansion of their companies. Despite their ongoing cooperation with 'the new state' such respondents were classified as owning the capital of

independent origin, owing to the fact that they started as independent entrepreneurs. In the text below I note these ‘new state’ connections in cases where I believe that such a structural position may have influenced the political attitudes and/or the participation patterns of such respondents.

Hypotheses

The original question that the study was designed to answer was the question of whether there would be a variation in political views and participation of respondents who owned different types and sizes of capital. However, in order to move forward with an explanation of which factors may contribute to such variations, especially if these variations are found to exist *within* each of the ‘purposive’ groups, one must consider additional factors that could complement the ‘structural position’ perspective. Previous studies of political attitudes of the general Russian public have shown that the length of past political socialization (which, in most cases, directly correlates with age of respondents)¹¹ and the degree of the relative improvement of one’s well-being under the new regime may also correlate with the extent to which individuals are willing to support the consolidation of a pro-democratic regime.¹² For this study, we can similarly distinguish between two key sets of factors that may affect political attitudes and participation: (1) structural factors that have to do with the type and size of capital and the current relationship between an entrepreneur and the state; and (2) socialization-related factors that involve a respondent’s age and generational experiences, past political socialization and past socio-economic background.

Taking both sets of factors into consideration, we can proceed with the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1. Owners of independent-type capital will display more pro-democratic attitudes as compared to the owners of ‘old state’-type capital.

Hypothesis 2. Owners of small- and medium-sized capital will display more pro-democratic attitudes as compared to the owners of large capital.

Hypothesis 3. Younger capital owners who have experienced a shorter period of past authoritarian socialization will be more prone to display pro-democratic attitudes.

Hypothesis 4. Capital owners who felt that their subjectively defined well-being has improved as compared to their socialist past will be more prone to display pro-democratic attitudes.

Hypothesis 5. Most capital owners regardless of the type of their attitudes will not engage in active collective political participation.

In the next Section I examine whether the hypotheses outlined above were supported by the study's results.

POLITICAL ATTITUDES

Results

About one-fifth (22%) of the Russian capital owners who participated in the study felt that democracy would not constitute a suitable political regime for Russia. However, the respondents were more accepting of such democratic institutions as free elections (85%), freedom of mass media (85%) and freedom of speech (88%). The political institution of a multi-party political system, on the other hand, received the lowest approval rating: only 68% of respondents said that they support the existence of such system in Russia.¹³

Most capital owners who said that they are opposed to the consolidation of a democratic regime in Russia either felt that the Russian cultural and historical tradition of authoritarian rule will serve the country better because "Russian people are used to a strong-hand rule and that is the only rule the people will understand", and/or viewed the Russian democratic reform as "a great deception of people that brought chaos and lawlessness" and that allowed those who were in power "to illegally enrich themselves at the people's expense".¹⁴ Respondents who viewed democracy as unsuitable for Russia displayed four types of attitudes: (1) the old (Communist) regime was better (8% of all respondents); (2) Russia needs a monarch (5%); (3) Russia needs a strong-hand rule but not of a Communist or a monarchist type (7%); and (4) 'I do not trust any political regime' type of attitude (2%).

When probed during face-to-face interviews, many respondents also gave relatively clear explanations regarding discrepancies in their political attitudes in the instances when a respondent would view democracy as unsuitable for Russia, and, at the same time, he or she would advocate free elections and free speech. For instance, those capital owners who declared themselves to be monarchist sympathizers felt that governing bodies could be elected and then function under the monarch's supervision. It would have been tempting to conclude that these respondents wished for a constitutional monarchy of the kind that is found in Great Britain or Sweden. This, however, was not the case, because such respondents clearly wished for a leader who would exercise a much stronger political authority than that of

the largely ceremonial roles held by monarchs in established democracies. In a similar way, the respondents in the monarchist group felt that a multi-party political system and a freedom of speech should exist in a constitutional monarchy.

Some other respondents who rejected democracy, but who welcomed a number of democratic institutions were the proponents of the introduction of a reformed Soviet political system, in which free elections, free speech and a multi-party political system will be allowed “to a degree” that would not lead to a destructive political stalemate that could endanger the well-being of the nation. Even among the hardliners, who consisted of older respondents advocating the return of the unmodified Soviet regime, some viewed the introduction of free elections and free speech as effective tools that would allow the Communist Party to return to power. “If only people would have been allowed to vote in a truly free elections and make their choices without a massive propaganda campaign of the pro-Western mass media”, lamented one of my respondents, “the Communist party would be back in power in no time”.¹⁵

For those capital owners who viewed democracy as a suitable political regime, two qualitative findings stood out: (1) many respondents demonstrated a relatively sophisticated understanding of the relationship between the ideals of democratic institutions and the reality of the transformation of the domestic political system; and (2) some respondents reported a gradual increase in their political tolerance of more radical political forces. Probing on the issue of the discrepancies between the ideal of a democratic government and the imperfect reality of the performance of the Russian political system has elicited the following reply from one of the respondents:

Having an elected Parliament is what is most important to me. And if there are nationalists in our Parliament, that is fine with me, too. This means that they [nationalists] represent the interests of some social groups in our society. There are other deputies in our Parliament too, and they represent interests of other social groups. I think different social groups have the right to representation, but our Parliament would be better if deputies would try to compromise more and be less corrupt.¹⁶

Note that a preference for the ideal of representative democracy and the imperfect reality of the performance of the Russian Parliament, which at the time was dominated by Communist and nationalist forces, did not necessarily clash in the mind of this respondent.

Some respondents also mentioned that they have noticed that the range of their political tolerance was widening. Speaking about her attitudes toward a multi-party political system, another capital owner traced the dynamics of her views, which she described as gradually becoming more

tolerant and inclusive. In the early 1990s, this respondent felt excited about many parties entering the Russian political scene, but she also thought that certain parties such as the Communist Party and some radical left and right wing parties should be prohibited from participation in politics. But by 1998, her opinion had changed, first in regard to the Communist Party and then, more gradually, in regard to political rights of radical left and right wing organizations. As the respondent puts it:

It is better to have them [the radical left and radical right] in small groups in the open, than to force them to form clandestine organizations and commit terrorist acts. If they have their own, recognized political organizations they can release their steam there; and when they are on a national political level, they are also forced to follow some rules. The moment they declare themselves to be a political party, they are forced to present themselves as a more civilized bunch.¹⁷

From the opinions above, it appears that even when given a slow and imperfect transformation of Russian political institutions, the attitudes of some respondents became more liberal and inclusive. Yet, it would be naïve to think that this positive dynamic has affected everyone, or that the strengthening of pro-democratic views left little room for either ambivalence or the possibility of the reversal of liberal opinions. Ambivalence was a feeling that a number of respondents acknowledged when describing their political attitudes. In the words of one of such respondents:

Every time that I have to think about my own political decisions – I mean my own personal political choices for whom to vote, and which political organization I should support – I have this recurrent desire to support authoritarianism, a reasonable, balanced authoritarianism. Doing this may be in the interest of my business, for example. It may stabilize my market faster and may protect my company from being taken over by a foreign competitor. But, on the other hand, as a Russian person I know firsthand what authoritarianism can lead to. We must learn how to look further than our immediate economic interests. We absolutely need democracy. We absolutely need to defend economic and political freedoms and civil rights.¹⁸

Capital Ownership

When the type and size of capital ownership is introduced into the analysis of political attitudes, owners of small- and medium-size capital and owners of independent-type capital showed a stronger approval of the institutions of free elections and free speech. Owners of independent-type capital outnumbered the owners of ‘old state’-type capital by a ratio of 2:1 among the respondents who said that free elections are very important, and by a ratio of 3:1 among the respondents who said that the freedom of speech is very important for Russia’s future. Owners of small- and medium-sized capital as

compared to owners of large capital were almost twice as likely to say that free elections are very important, and one-and-a-half times as likely to say that the freedom of speech is very important (see Table A1 in the appendix).

On the issue of the importance of a multi-party political system, owners of large, independent-type companies turned out to be the most approving group, while owners of small- and medium-sized ‘old state’-type capital were the least likely to agree that maintaining a multi-party political system is important for Russia’s future. These preferences are hardly surprising: owners of small- and medium-sized ‘old state’-type capital were typically older individuals whose companies often struggled and who felt that the frequent legislative stalemates in the Duma should be blamed on too many political parties being involved. Owners of large independent capital, on the other hand, actively engaged in legislative lobbying on a national level and often needed to deal with MPs from as many political parties as possible in order to effectively lobby against the then Communist-dominated Parliament. As one of such respondents noted:

We work with everyone [in Parliament]. When we need to pass a law that would benefit our industry [advertising], we would approach various Duma members from different political factions. Nationalists are particularly good at doing business with us [are receptive to lobbying]. We even approach some Communists.¹⁹

Overall, it was the owners of large, ‘old state’-type capital who proportionally outnumbered all other groups of respondents among those who did not favor democracy as a suitable political choice for Russia. This group of respondents made up only one-sixth of the study’s sample but they accounted for almost one-third of the respondents who did not want Russia to be democratic.

Age, Education and Past Political Socialization

When the variable of age is introduced into the analysis (see Table A2 in the appendix), respondents who thought that democracy is not suitable for Russia were found in every age group. Capital owners aged 55 years and older were the least likely to think that democracy would be a suitable political choice for Russia. Among the respondents who were younger than 55 years, it was the oldest cohort of the capital owners, aged between 45 and 54 years, who were the most likely *to agree* with the opinion that democracy will make a suitable political choice for Russia. Groups of respondents who were aged between 35 and 44 years and between 25 and 34 years both featured a greater percentage of capital owners who viewed democratic

regime as unsuitable for Russia as compared to the group of 45 to 54-year-old respondents.²⁰

On the other hand, the correlation between the level of education and political attitudes of the respondents in this study did not yield any meaningful variations aside from the result that the majority of the respondents with five or more years of education displayed pro-democratic attitudes. This occurred partly because the level of education of the respondents who took part in the study was consistently high and displayed little variation: respondents with five years of college education made up 68% of the sample; the respondents with doctoral degrees, which required a total of 8–12 years of college training, comprised 23% of the sample.²¹

Past active Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) members and career CPSU officials were overrepresented among the respondents who thought that democracy was unsuitable for Russia: out of 18 respondents who were active CPSU members or career officials in the past, one-third (33%) viewed democracy as unsuitable. In the group of 42 respondents who were either passive CPSU members or non-members in the past, only 17% of capital owners shared the same outlook of being negative to democracy.²²

I will return to the analysis of these findings in the discussion section of the paper.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

While the research on the political attitudes of Russian capital owners is almost non-existent, more studies have been conducted that document the trends in political participation of business owners.²³ According to the Russian historian Alexei Zudin, the “first wave” political parties of entrepreneurs began to multiply in the period just before the 1993 elections of the Russian Parliament. In 1992, parties and movements such as Renewal (leader A. Volsky), the Party of Economic Freedom (K. Borovoi, I. Hakamada) and the Party of Consolidation (A. Tichonov) were formed. In 1993, Entrepreneurs for New Russia (K. Zatulin) party, the Party of Free Labor (I. Kivelidi²⁴), the Party for Democratic Initiative (P. Bunich) and the electoral block Transformation (*Preobrazhenie*, leaders V. Korovin, D. Sukhinenko and K. Bendukhidze) were established.²⁵ These parties were often organized around the individual “interests” of politically active businessmen and/or around the individual interests of “outside players” who were marginally related to the business world. The latter group included former bureaucrats and public figures aspiring to build their political capital with the help of capital owners as their major constituency. Zudin argued

that the weakness of the majority of political parties at that time, except for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), prompted the leaders of the “first wave” political parties of entrepreneurs to avoid cooperation with major political parties and pursue direct participation in political life. The same idea about the desirability of direct political involvement became a trigger for the establishment of many of the “first wave” business interest groups.²⁶ The Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RUIE), All-Russian Association of Privatized and Private Enterprises (AAPPE) and the Federation of Manufacturers of Russia (FMR) were the most politically active among these groups.

The emergence of various political organizations of entrepreneurs reflected the *intra*-group differences regarding desired political agendas. For example, the movement Renewal, the Party of Consolidation and RUIE represented the interests of former Soviet industrial managers or ‘red directors’, as this group of capital owners was often called. These three organizations were actively opposed to most of the policies of economic and political liberalization. On the other hand, many leaders and members of “first wave” pro-reform political parties and business groups were businessmen closely involved with the process of liberalization of the Russian economy, whose capital was invested in the emerging Russian financial sector.

All of the political parties of entrepreneurs that were established in 1992 and 1993 performed poorly in the 1993 Parliamentary elections. The most successful of these political forces, the (anti-liberal) electoral block ‘Civic Union’, which included the movement Renewal, and RUIE, gathered only 2% of the votes.²⁷ Each of the pro-reform political parties of entrepreneurs received less than 1% of the vote. Such poor performance did not come as a surprise: these parties had an extremely narrow social base due to the small size of the social stratum of entrepreneurs in general and to the parties’ organizational structure in particular. As Zudin notes, “The nucleus of such parties was based on pyramid-like structure, the unity of which was maintained through personal relationships with the leader of the party, and not through horizontal links between primary organizations of entrepreneurs”.²⁸

Other factors which contributed to the weak political performance of these parties’ included the presence of a number of parties with very similar political programs in competition with each other (e.g., the Party of Economic Freedom, the Party of Free Labor and the block Transformation all had very similar pro-reform and pro-capital political programs and basically competed for the same group of voters), the use by the parties’ leaders of “individualistic strategies” of political influence, i.e. direct access to and

negotiation with politicians on a one-to-one basis rather than the use of their political organizations in order to achieve their political goals, and the very narrow territorial base of the parties that, in many cases, included only the city of Moscow.²⁹

After the poor performance in the 1993 elections most of the political parties of entrepreneurs became inactive, while more politicized business interest groups such as the (anti-liberal) RUIE and the (pro-liberal) AAPPE continued their political activities although on a smaller scale. The businessmen, according to Russian sources, also altered their ways of political participation. Elite businessmen, i.e. owners of large capital, came to realize that the establishment of their own parties “of interests” did not bring desirable political results, and they either began to pursue individual political strategies, i.e. “individual oligarchic-type interactions between members of the economic, bureaucratic and political elites”, and/or delegated tasks of political lobbying to the already existing and more politicized business interest groups such as RUIE, AAPPE and the FMR.³⁰ At the same time, a small number of non-elite businessmen, feeling alienated by the oligarchic political participation approach of top businessmen, turned to participation in various business interest groups and political parties, including those of moderately radical nature such as the CPRF and the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). The majority of non-elite businessmen, however, remained politically inactive and were not involved with any political organizations in the mid-1990s.³¹

Results

Respondents' Participation in Political Parties in the Late 1990s by Type and Size of Capital, Age, Education and Past Political Socialization

Among the 20 owners of large capital that I interviewed, six businessmen said that they were members of an existing Russian political party and one other respondent was among the founders of an early political party of entrepreneurs (the currently inactive block “Transformation”). This level of political involvement of large capital owners reflected the highest number of active party members found among the different groups of capital owners interviewed. Four out of five owners of large capital who participated in anti-liberal political parties and movements (CPRF, APR, RUIP, RCDM³²) owned ‘old state’-type capital, were older than 55 years and in the past were politically active in the CPSU. Overall, owners of large capital who participated in political parties were a highly educated group with three respondents having five years of college education and another three

respondents having more than eight years of college education (post-graduate degrees).

Among the six owners of small- and medium-sized capital who were members of political parties, the two owners of 'old state'-type capital belonged to the anti-liberal CPRF and the RUIP, while the four owners of independent-type companies all belonged to different centrist political organizations (OHR; Women's movements). Both of the owners of 'old state'-type companies who belonged to anti-liberal parties were older than 50 years, and had a history of active and career CPSU participation in the past. All four middle-aged independent capital owners who belonged to centrist political movements had no history of past political participation. All six owners of small- and medium-sized capital who participated in political parties had the same educational level of five years of college education.

Respondents' Participation in Politicized Business Groups by Type and Size of Capital, Age, Education and Past Political Socialization

While the majority of capital owners who took part in the study did not participate in political parties, more than half of the respondents participated in politicized business groups (peak business associations).³³ The owners of large, 'old state' capital were active in both anti-liberal (RUIE) and pro-liberal (AAPPE, RTBR) groups, with all older cohort individuals (55 years and above) being involved with the anti-reform RUIE. One middle-aged owner of large, 'old state' capital, who was a passive CPSU member in the past, participated in the pro-liberal AAPPE; and another middle-aged capital owner, who had a previous career in the CPSU, participated in both the pro-liberal RTBR and the anti-liberal RUIE. Among the owners of large, independent-type capital, all younger aged (25–34 years old) respondents with no history of past CPSU participation were members of the anti-liberal RUIE, while respondents who participated in the pro-reform AAPPE and RTBR groups were between 40 and 51 years and had no history of active CPSU participation. All of the participating owners of large capital received five years of college education with the exception of three capital owners who had post-graduate degrees and received more than eight years of college education.

Among the owners of small- and medium-sized companies, only one respondent, a middle-aged businesswoman who owned an independent-type company and had no history of CPSU participation, chose to participate in the pro-liberal AAPPE. The rest of small- and medium-sized capital owners who participated in politicized business groups chose either the pro-moderate reform RADSБ (the Russian Association of the Development of

Small Business) or the anti-liberal RUIE. The educational level of the participating owners of small- and medium-sized capital was comparable to the educational level of participating large capital owners: all of the respondents have received five years of college education, with the exception of three capital owners who held post-graduate degrees and one respondent who graduated from a vocational school.

Overall, when participation in both political parties and politicized business associations is taken into account, middle-aged owners of small- and medium-sized companies were the least likely to participate. Compared to all middle-aged respondents, older (55 years and above) and younger (25–34 years) respondents participated more actively. Older owners of large, ‘old state’ capital were the most active in anti-reform political organizations, while older owners of small- and medium-sized companies opted to participate in moderate pro-reform parties and associations.³⁴ Among the group of young and the group of middle-aged respondents there were no pre-dominant patterns of pro-reform or anti-reform political participation, with different individuals from each of these groups participating in anti-liberal, pro-liberal or moderately pro-reform organizations.³⁵ Political attitudes of the respondents, for the most part, did correlate with their choices of the outlets for political participation (see Tables A3 and A4 in the appendix). The diversity of these choices, however, calls for a more in-depth look at the complex relationship between one’s structural position, age, and political motives, incentives and opportunities for participation.

DISCUSSION

Age, Political Attitudes, and Motives, Incentives and Opportunities for Participation

Older Capital Owners

Among the group of 14 capital owners who were 55 and older, six respondents owned large, ‘old state’-type capital, five respondents owned small- and medium-sized businesses of the ‘old state’ type and three respondents owned small- and medium-sized independent-type capital. The older capital owners sampled were more likely than not to own ‘old state’-type capital, and quite a few of them ended up owning controlling packages of shares and/or managing large formerly Soviet state-owned and now privatized enterprises. These owners of large capital were the older generation of what some scholars refer to as privatization ‘insiders’.

When assessing the possible gains that previously connected insiders may have made as a result of the privatization process that took place in the early and mid-1990s, Michael McFaul (1994) suggested that Soviet managers and directors had controlling power over the Soviet state long before the collapse of the Soviet Union. This power came from the directors' knowledge about the true production capacity of their enterprises. McFaul argued that this information was withheld by the directors from the officials of the state privatizing agency, resulting in enormous material benefits that the directors were able to gain during the privatization process through controlling the assessment value of their enterprises. But if the top managers were able to position themselves as the economic winners of privatization and if they were able to remain in command of their privatized enterprises, why would they want to engage in an anti-reform mobilization as was the case with older owners of large, 'old state'-type capital in this study? Longer past political socialization may be part of the answer to this question but it fails to account for the findings of attitudinal and participation differences within the cohort of older respondents, where a number of older owners of small- and medium-sized companies displayed pro-democratic attitudes. Would looking for comparative variations in the degree of past political power and status and the past-based expectations of political power sharing provide the necessary answer?

Writing about the program of the restructuring of the Russian economy, Laitin (2000) pointed out that the new Russian government instituted a program of three-dimensional economic restructuring that advocated the goals of economic liberalization, privatization and stabilization, but purposefully ignored the goal of the stimulation of the industrial production because the latter could interfere with the goal of stabilization. Indeed, Russian and Western neo-liberal economists feared that focusing on stimulating industrial production would have allowed the industrial directors not only to continue to request resources from the state in order to support their now privatized industrial enterprises, but would also have resulted in the industrial directors' gaining greater political and economic power in their relationship with the state. Such gains were to be avoided by any means, especially because the reformers chose to co-opt the majority of former Soviet institutions, including state enterprises belonging to the various former State Ministries, into the new political and economic order rather than dissolve these and build new institutions from the ground up (McFaul, 2001). The top Soviet industrial directors who managed to retain their key management positions in privatized enterprises were offered the choice of either getting along with the state's new policies and, as a result,

gaining political access to some top political actors through a newly formed pro-liberal business association groups, or economic and political survival at their own risk.³⁶ Indeed, the industrial directors who did not change their political alliances soon enough found themselves increasingly politically isolated. This gap between the directors' expectations of political power sharing (these expectations did result from their past political socialization) and the new reality of lack of influence with key power actors and the decreasing state support of former state-owned industrial enterprises led to strong political grievances, which partly accounted for the higher incidence of anti-democratic attitudes among the older owners of large, 'old state' capital as compared to other older respondents and other respondents in general. I suggest that these grievances, combined with previous experience of active political participation in the CPSU and still active social networks of former Soviet industrial directors, led to higher levels of anti-democratic political participation by this group of capital owners. To substantiate my argument with empirical data I would like to quote from one of such older respondents:

I am a very pragmatic person. Our state should be ruled by pragmatic people. Today we are ruled by politicians, who are all romantics and dreamers. Politicians have no idea how to govern our country. I am waiting for the time when pragmatic people will return to power. Politicians who made reforms in our country and those who are still making reforms today are very afraid of industrialists. Especially, those of us who come from the military-industrial complex. Reformers tried to make us look bad and to remove us from the leading positions in the economy. But reformers have no understanding of the industry whatsoever. They are economists and lawyers with little practical knowledge. Today they do not interact with anyone of us When I was a Deputy in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, we made important, informed decisions about how to govern the country. Today we have these useless props sitting in the Duma. We do not need the Duma. Politicians invented the Duma so that they could hide their lack of knowledge and inability to govern the country.³⁷

The fact that neither widespread anti-democratic attitudes nor high levels of participation in anti-liberal political organizations were found among older respondents who did not own large, 'old state'-type capital lends further support to the idea that unfulfilled expectations of political power sharing matter when it comes to choices in routine political participation. Older respondents who did not have the political and social experience of being a top industrial manager in the past did not report having strong grievances about the new economic and political order, focusing their moderate criticism instead on the practical matters of the malfunctioning of new political institutions, such as frequent legislative stalemates in the Parliament and the MP's allegedly high levels of corruption. Yet, as was previously mentioned,

they distinguished between the democracy as a desirable ideal and the reality of the re-structuring of imperfect political institutions. Those older, pro-democratic owners who chose to participate politically, did so by joining the moderately pro-reform RADSB. This choice was also a reflection of their instrumental rather than political aspirations as RADSB was known for helping business owners with loans and real estate rents if they pledged to become loyal supporters of Moscow's mayor Yuri Luzhkov, who patronized the organization.

Middle-Aged Capital Owners

Among the 40 respondents who belonged to the group of middle-aged capital owners (35–54 years old), four respondents were owners of large, 'old state'-type capital, seven respondents owned large, independent-type capital, five respondents owned 'old state'-type small- and medium-sized capital and the rest of the respondents (24) owned small- and medium-sized capital of an independent type. Middle-aged capital owners were more pro-democratic: proportionally, three times fewer middle-aged capital owners said that democracy is unsuitable for Russia as compared to the older capital owners. No owners of large, 'old state'-type capital in the middle age group thought of democracy as unsuitable for Russia, and only one owner of a large, independent-type firm said that he wished for a strong-hand rule. The highest concentration of anti-democratic respondents in the middle-aged group was found among owners of small- and medium-sized independent-type capital (see Table A2 in the appendix). Further data analysis reveals that *within* the group of middle-aged respondents, it was the capital owners in the younger cohort (35–44 years) who were more likely to have an anti-democratic pattern of political attitudes and participation as compared to the respondents in the group's older cohort (45–54 years). What factors should we consider in order to explain this finding?

Capital owners in the middle-aged group came from different socio-economic backgrounds, with many of the respondents changing their professional careers of engineers, scientists, and low and mid-level industrial managers to become business owners in their early and mid-30s. Because in each respondent's case there was a different combination of circumstances which either facilitated and/or hindered the development of one's business – for example, respondents with more extensive pre-existing social and professional networks, and those who established businesses in the field of their professional specialization often reported a higher degree of satisfaction with their current situation as compared to the rest of the respondents – capital owners indicated different degrees of satisfaction with their current

well-being as compared to their past. In particular, the respondents who felt that their careers developed in an unsatisfactory way under the Soviet regime because of the stifling political and economic conditions of an authoritarian society were often found among the capital owners who emphasized the importance of free elections and free speech. Respondents who belonged to an older cohort in the middle-aged group appeared to have especially strong feelings that their careers stagnated under the old regime. This may have occurred because the older respondents had longer career spans under the old regime and, respectively, had higher expectations of career mobility.

Overall, the respondents who most strongly felt that the new regime allowed them to improve their well-being appeared to be the most ardent proponents of democratic values.³⁸ These respondents were also more likely to participate in pro-democratic political organizations such as DCR and AAPPE, despite the fact that the amount of political influence that these organizations wielded was in decline due to the departure of politicians related to these organizations from key positions within the Russian state. When asked why they continued to participate in pro-democratic organizations given these organizations' decline in political influence, capital owners admitted that they view their participation as an obligation to support the ideals and political bodies that facilitated positive changes in their personal and their country's well-being.

Yet not all middle-aged respondents who owned businesses became very successful under the new regime, as well as not all middle-aged individuals felt strongly that their Soviet careers were completely unsatisfactory. Many capital owners, particularly respondents who owned small- and medium-sized businesses, felt that they had meaningful careers in the past and that the current political and economic situation, while allowing for more freedom, also forced them to constantly adjust to the changing economic and political environment, making their life rather difficult. However, the majority of these respondents did not appear to reject democratic ideals. The main difference between these respondents and the group which felt that their well-being has increased greatly lay in the fact that the capital owners in the former group engaged in a much sharper criticism of the inadequate transformation of Russian economic, political and social institutions, strongly criticizing what they saw as massive corruption and the general lawlessness of the transition. Below is a quote from the interview with one of such respondents:

By education I am a physicist. I did some very advanced things in science and I worked in a research institute and in the electrical company since graduating from college in 1977. I really liked my job. But in 1990 our State Research Institute went bankrupt. My

colleagues and I were receiving no salary so we decided to go into small business. We started with something that we knew – we made equipment to direct laser rays. But that sustained us only for a short period of time – when state enterprises still had money, those who used to work with us before ordered from our new private business. ... The privatization reforms led by Gaidar brought an end to this. There was no money for research or for heavy industry anymore. We certainly needed political and economic reforms, but Gaidar's reform was conducted in a stupid way. It led to the emergence of a whole class of people who do not know the value of money and who do not appreciate work. It was a disaster, because people really never got rid of their 'socialist infantilism' mentality: under the Soviet regime they expected to do nothing and get paid in roubles, and now, after the reform, they also expect to do nothing but get rich in dollars through connections to those who redistribute property. I think democracy is a great idea but it needs a less corrupt implementation. ... As to our company, we are doing well now. In 1993 we got lucky when Coca-Cola came to Russia and we won a tender to build lightweight kiosks to sell Coke in Russia. Now we have a whole array of foreign clients that includes Baskin Robbins and other large companies.³⁹

The group of the middle-aged respondents who thought that the democracy was not suitable for Russia consisted of four respondents who owned independent small- or medium-sized business, one respondent who owned a medium-sized, 'old state'-type business, and one respondent who owned an independent, large company. These respondents either felt that democracy would never take root in a country that is so 'culturally specific' and corrupt, and/or said that they felt that the nation and their business would benefit from a more authoritarian government. Interestingly, all four anti-democratic respondents in the younger cohort of the middle-aged group graduated from Russia's elite higher education institutions. Indeed, it seems that these respondents, all of whom came from the privileged Soviet families, expected that the graduation from elite institutions combined with their families' connections would easily propel them into the ranks of the Soviet elites. The arrival of political and economic reforms was something that disrupted such plans of an easy ascension in status, forcing some of the formerly well-connected individuals to work hard and sometimes struggle in order to achieve economic success and to gain higher social status.

Young Capital Owners

All young respondents in my sample owned independent-type capital, with half of the respondents owning small- or medium-size capital and another half owning large-size capital. Out of this group, two capital owners displayed anti-democratic attitudes, and three respondents, all owners of large, 'independent'-type capital, participated in the anti-liberal RUIE. Another two respondents, both owners of a small- and a medium-sized 'independent'-type companies, participated in the modestly pro-reform RADS and

OHR. Why would young capital owners, who had experienced little authoritarian political socialization in the past and who had materially benefited from recent political and economic reforms, cultivate anti-democratic political views and/or participate in an anti-democratic political organization? The additional evidence from the interviews with young respondents shows that those of them who held anti-democratic political views also held pro-market economic views, and that the respondents who participated in an anti-democratic political organization (RUIE) did not necessarily hold anti-democratic political views (only one out of three respondents did). I will first focus on the young respondents who held anti-democratic views.

In order to understand why some young capital owners held anti-democratic views one has to look beyond the relatively narrow concept of positive changes in material well-being. As the quote below indicates, anti-democratic young respondents were very successful in generating and accumulating a great deal of material wealth. As a result these capital owners were neither afraid of poverty nor did they lack access to politicians. What appeared to bother them most was the lawlessness of the transformation period which resulted in high levels of criminality and corruption that, according to the respondents, felt like a reduction in their individual freedom as compared to the lifestyle in the late Soviet period. In the words of one of these respondents:

We have so much money, we do not know what to do with it. So, they are just sitting in the bank. In Russia, there exist little opportunities for good investment. At least, we see very few opportunities. ... Of course, we do have to work on keeping our share of the advertising market. Foreign competitors can be problematic even though they do not have the same local networks that our company has developed. I am the Vice-President of the Russian Association of Advertising Agencies and a member of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. And I am also a special adviser to Zhirinovskiy [the leader of anti-liberal LDPR]. ... We work very actively with the members of Parliament trying to get through the Parliament changes in laws that will benefit us

Personally, I am fed up with the criminal aspect of our transformation. We need the state that would be capable of enforcing laws and maintaining order. I am tired of all this corruption and of constantly having bodyguards with me. I think we need a really strong Minister of Interior, who would put everyone nasty behind the bars. ... Maintaining order should be our top priority.⁴⁰

Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfner (1997) found that citizens who felt that their individual freedom has increased under the current regime were much more likely to trust pro-democratic institutions. The findings of my study show that different respondents viewed different aspects of individual freedom as being the most important. Even though the majority of Russian capital

owners operated under the constraints of a lawless and criminal environment of the transformation period,⁴¹ most respondents, while acknowledging the difficulties of operating a business in such an environment, viewed this as a temporary, if serious, problem that should be coped with within the larger, more positive context of economic and political gains. Younger anti-democratic respondents, however, were different from others in the sense that they viewed the high levels of criminality as a key threat to their well-being and resented a democratic state that was 'soft' and did not enforce strict order. One can argue that young respondents were in their late teens when the transformation began and, at the time, they had neither started their professional careers, the stifling of which may have made them to be more appreciative of life in a democratizing society, nor had they encountered a situation where they had to worry about their physical safety and economic survival. Thus, to some young capital owners democratic freedoms seemed to be less important than their need for an orderly political and economic environment where the capitalist state would serve as a client and protector to those business owners who were willing to work with it.

Yet, past/present comparison of the degree of individual freedom was not the only factor that may have affected the young capital owners' attitudes and/or their choice of participation. The extent to which their business relied on dealings with the state as a customer and/or as a supplier, and the extent to which some young capital owners wanted to seek social status though being included in capital owners' organizations, also seemed to matter. Indeed, while all three respondents who participated in the anti-democratic RUIE started their companies independently using their own skills and initial capital, the rapid expansion of their companies took place after they started working with a government agency as either a client and/or as a supplier (i.e. they had the 'new state' type of capital connection). For example, the respondent who owned the largest Russian-owned advertising company worked closely with the two state-owned television channels when placing advertisements; another respondent who owned a financial services company received a contract from the Moscow government to place Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) on various municipal properties; and the owner of a commodities trading company depended on supplies of grain from state-owned farms. For each of these capital owners the stakes grew higher as their companies' business with the state expanded. This may have been one of the reasons why they chose to participate in an organization (RUIE) that promised to lobby for the interests of the companies like theirs, the companies that wanted to maintain or strengthen their ties with the state that would not be too liberal in allowing a fully competitive economic

environment that may prevent the rapid growth of ‘well-connected’ companies by granting access to public goods to their competitors. In addition, at least one young capital owner who participated in RUIE did respond to active recruiting efforts of the organization whose program did not necessarily corresponded to his personal political views, because the organization offered him a formal title of the Vice-President.⁴² Such offers were part of RUIE’s strategy to attract and retain successful young capital owners. When asked why such an offer would matter to a young successful capital owner, the respondent, who came from the lower status Soviet family, replied that despite his economic success he felt excluded from both the old and the new elites. Joining the RUIE made him feel that he belonged.

CONCLUSIONS

The results reported above come from a study that was small, non-random and exploratory in its nature. It was carefully but not perfectly designed and was conducted during the time when the characteristics of the general population of capital owners were not accessible due to various factors such as poor record keeping, changing company registrations and plain lack of cooperation from the Russian officials. The purposeful nature of the sample, however, did allow for comparisons of the relationship among the factors such as size and type of capital, age, generational experiences and past political socialization.⁴³ These comparisons, although representative of the sample, should be considered exploratory, and require further research that would use random samples of a larger population of the Russian capital owners.

The quantitative data from the study showed that the majority of the respondents held pro-democratic attitudes, while qualitative data provided a picture of individuals who display a complex understanding of the differences between the ideals of the democracy and the imperfect reality of the transformation of Russian political, economic and social institutions. The findings also pointed to a complex interrelationship among the factors that influence individual political views and participation. These factors were discussed at length in the sections above. In the concluding section, I would like to return to the study’s hypotheses and to discuss how the study’s results fare against the larger theories introduced in the beginning of the paper.

The first two hypotheses focused on the relationship between political attitudes and the type and size of capital. In both cases the results of the study showed that, indeed, owners of independent-type capital and owners

of small- and medium-sized capital, on average, displayed more pro-democratic views as compared to the groups of owners of large capital and of the 'old state'-type capital. There was one exception to this pattern: in the case of support for a multi-party political system, on average, capital owners of small- and medium-sized capital were less approving of this political feature as compared to large capital owners. I argued that this was partly due to the respondents' structural position of owning companies that were directly affected by the frequent political stalemates among representatives of different political parties in the Russian Parliament.

The third hypothesis emphasized the importance of the length of the past political socialization. The evidence from the study does not allow us to provide decisive conclusions regarding the group of young respondents. Because the group was so small (six respondents) as compared to the size of other age groups, one has to be careful in making any comparative generalizations. Two findings, however, were clear: not all young respondents displayed pro-democratic attitudes and, among the respondents older than 55 years, there were individuals who displayed pro-democratic attitudes. For the young capital owners without an authoritarian past political socialization, the perception of a current reduction in individual freedom and the structural position of owning large, 'new state'-connected companies both seemed to affect political attitudes. For the older (55 years and older) capital owners who displayed pro-democratic attitudes, it appeared that their current structural position of owning small- and medium-sized companies mattered more than the effects of the past political socialization.

The fourth hypothesis dealt with the changes in subjectively defined well-being. The data did show that the respondents who felt that their well-being has improved were supportive of pro-democratic political developments that were introduced by the Russian government at the time of the study. More interestingly, different capital owners evaluated their well-being according to factors that drew on different aspects of their past socialization. Older capital owners who used to manage large Soviet enterprises in the past viewed their well-being as declining mostly due to the loss of political power that they used to have; some young capital owners felt that criminal elements limited their degree of individual freedom and wished for the less criminal 'old times'; and, on the positive side, many respondents in the older cohort of the middle-aged group felt that their careers were not stifled anymore by the lack of their connections within state-run organizations. It is important to note that neither the pure economic position of the respondents before and after the transformation nor the pure transfer of one's social status did come through as the key evaluating factor. For the former 'red

directors' group, for example, their social status remained almost the same, but it is their degree of political power that has changed. And in the case of pro-authoritarian young respondents, whose social status was certainly higher than the one they had in pre-transformation period, it was the issue of personal security and/or the ability to secure large state contracts that seemed to matter.

The fifth hypothesis proved to be correct for all groups of capital owners with the exception of the owners of large, 'old state'-type capital who combined their strong power-loss grievances, their old Soviet networks and their past socialization experience in order to participate collectively. The evaluation of the effectiveness of such participation in the late 1990s will require another study. Overall, the patterns of participation that the study has uncovered reflected the mostly instrumental needs of capital owners who joined political parties and business associations that promised greater business benefits for the particular type and size of business that the respondents owned. After all, even the owners of large, 'old state' capital spend a great deal of their collective participation time advocating additional subsidies from the state to their privatized enterprises.

Moving to the analysis of results within larger theoretical frameworks, both the 'authoritarian culture path-dependence approach' and the 'economic determinism approach' were not supported by the data. No doubt, this has partly to do with sweeping generalizations that these approaches make about the power of either one's historical and cultural environment or the uni-dimensional political implications of one's economic relationship to the means of production. In my study, the majority of capital owners have displayed pro-democratic attitudes and there were also respondents who, despite being capital owners, did not support the consolidation of a pro-democratic regime.

The data did provide support for the argument of the 'structural-functional approach' that educated middle class individuals will be more prone to support democratic leaders who advocate political moderation and relative social equality. Most capital owners, at least those who owned small- and medium-sized companies and who could be described as having a social standing that is closest to the middle class, did display pro-democratic, politically moderate attitudes. Yet, some scholars argued that post-socialist Russia has experienced the decline in the numbers of individuals who would fall into the middle class category, and aside from various entrepreneurs and business owners who became 'the winners' of post-socialist transformation, the ranks of the Russian middle class have declined and the overall social inequality has grown.⁴⁴

Moving to the ‘social and cultural capital conversion approach’ and Bourdieu’s notions of ‘habitus’ and ‘trajectory’, one has to note from the beginning that aside from a very few individuals who were engaged in a ‘black market’ activities under socialism, there was no capital owner ‘habitus’ to speak of in the former Soviet Union. Thus, most business owners became such by transitioning to entrepreneurship from a position of a salaried employee in a state-run organization. While some of the respondents transitioned to capital ownership in the same field in which they received their education and were previously employed by the state, roughly half of capital owners sampled did not do so (Rogers, 2006). Regarding the conversion of social networks that were acquired by capital owners as a form of political capital while they were members in the Communist party, the majority of the respondents simply did not have those networks. Some older ‘elite’ owners of large capital who did have such networks were able to use these to retain their ‘trajectory’ of managing a large enterprise, but many of these respondents were unhappy with pro-democratic political developments even if their social status remained high and they were able to interact within their networks. On the other hand, ‘elite’ young capital owners who started with no political connections were able to quickly establish these with the ‘new state’ bureaucrats. It seems that, in the case of this particular study, the ‘social and cultural capital conversion approach’ is useful in explaining of only a small fraction of findings where a respondent’s early entrepreneurial and/or political ‘habitus’ was retained through a ‘trajectory correction’. Most capital owners in the study, however, did not neatly fit into such a framework. I would argue that this was because of the influence of structural factors on the attitudes that the respondents may have acquired as an outcome of earlier socialization-related mobility.

The final approach to consider, the ‘political economy approach’, emphasizes the importance of such structural factors as type and size of the capital, the power-sharing expectations of the capital owners, and their ability to act collectively and to create alliances with other classes vis-à-vis the state. While the data clearly showed that the type and size of one’s capital does not automatically determine one’s political attitudes and one’s choice of political participation (indeed, respondents with different types of attitudes and participation were found within each of the purposive groups of capital owners), the earlier discussion of how the data fared against the study hypotheses pointed to results that mostly confirmed the hypotheses about the correlation between type and size of capital and the respondents’ political attitudes.

What really seemed to matter was that many capital owners had expectations of power sharing with the state through the support of a more equitable, pro-liberal regime that would allow its citizens to participate democratically in political decision making. It was the powerful state, however, that, in the respondents' minds, had the mandate to lead in the pro-democratic direction. Building class alliances and joining pro-democratic organizations in order to counteract the state, should it turn increasingly authoritarian, did not seem to be on most respondents' minds, at least, at the time of the study. This fact lends further support to an early prediction made by Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens that the Russian capitalist class will be weak and will be unable to recognize its own class interest and to organize around it. As shown by the most recent criminal trials of a few large capital owners who wished to become political challengers to key Russian political actors, capital owners who wish to individually challenge the state's authoritarian shift are rendered powerless. Because the state is able to manipulate and backdate the rules of privatization, tax collection, etc., it is also able to exercise its power to strip the contenders of their accumulated economic resources that these contenders hoped to use in order to finance their rise to political power. All of which does not fare well for those capital owners who were wishing for a power-sharing, pro-democratic political regime: small in numbers and with a limited economic base, not politically aligned with any other social groups, and facing a strong and increasingly authoritarian state, they are unlikely to gather the collective resources that are needed to ensure that true democratic power-sharing would take place in Russia.

NOTES

1. According to Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1995, p. 2), the number of Russian citizens who owned shares in privatized firms and mutual funds reached 40 million in 1994.

2. Over three-fourths (78%) of all Russian state companies chose to be privatized according to Variant II. Under Variant II, the insiders had a right to purchase up to 51% of a firm's shares, and the firm's management was guaranteed a controlling package of options, which usually consisted from 5% to 20% of the total amount of shares. In addition to these advantages, insiders were able to use their vouchers to pay for their preferentially acquired shares, and had a right to acquire additional shares with funds from the so-called 'personal privatization accounts' to which their enterprises transferred a portion of their after-tax profits. Most importantly, the nominal price of the shares purchased by insiders was determined in relation to

the book value of the enterprise, which was not adjusted for inflation. As a result, all other discount features were of no great importance, since the shares were nearly free to insiders (Frydman & Rapaczynski, 1994, pp. 180–181; Aslund, 1994, p. 104).

3. Eyal et al. (1998, p. 22) interpret political capital “as a special case of social capital – that type of social capital which was institutionalized through the practices of the Communist Party”.

4. For a more general critique of the applicability of some of Bourdieu’s concepts see Van den Berg (1998).

5. While in an ‘accountable’ party system the supply of competing political parties remains constant, in a ‘floating’ party system “the parties competing for popular support change from one election to the next, thus making accountability difficult, because voters can neither reaffirm nor withdraw their support from the party they voted for in the previous election” (Rose, Munro, & White, 2001, p. 420). Rose et al. (2001, pp. 422–423) provide the following data that clearly demonstrate the instability of the Russian ‘floating party system’: in the 1993 Duma elections 13 political parties were on the list ballot, in the 1995 elections there were 43 parties and in the 1999 elections there were 26 parties. Out of these, in 1993 six parties did not clear 5% threshold in order to be awarded Duma seats; in 1995, 39 parties failed to do so, and in 1999 there were 20 parties unable to gain at least 5% of the votes. Of the 13 parties that contested list seats in 1993, five disappeared in 1995 and three more by the 1999 election. Of the 43 parties contesting list seats in 1995, 35 had disappeared by the subsequent election.

6. Rose et al. (2001, p. 430).

7. A purposive sample should not be confused with a snowball sample in which the respondents are often self-referred and/or self-selected. This study’s purposive sample did not contain any self-referred respondents and the sampling procedure was randomized in those blocks where conditions allowed for randomization. The randomization technique was used when selecting respondents from the lists of four largest peak business associations in Moscow: The Moscow Chamber of Commerce, The Russian Association for the Development of Small Business (*Rossijskaya Assotsiatsiya Razvitiya Malovo Biznesa*), the All-Russian Association of Privatized and Private Enterprises (*Vserossijskaya Assotsiatsiya Privatiziruemyh i Chastnyh Predpriyatij*), and the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (*Rossijskij Soyuz Promyshlennikov; i Predprinimatelei*). Other respondents were selected in a randomized way among the participants of the largest convention for small- and medium-sized businesses in Moscow. All of the capital owners who agreed to participate in the study were then interviewed at length at the business or production facilities of their companies. It is toward the end of the data collection process that randomization came to a halt due to the need to fill the ‘gaps’ in purpose groups. To fill such gaps in this study, business directories that indicated type and size of businesses were used as well as a few business respondents were interviewed who participated in the previous studies of business owners conducted by the Russian colleagues from the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Such colleague-referred respondents constituted about 5% of the sample, and accounted for the respondents who represented such ‘hard-to-access’ industries as ‘security and protection services’ and financial service companies.

8. There were 30 business owners in the sample group of owners of small- and medium-sized capital because these owners are by far the majority among Russian capital owners. While owners of financial-industrial groups number in the hundreds and owners of privatized large- and medium-sized enterprises (when only management and not workers are taken into account) number in the tens of thousands, owners of small- and medium-sized independent-type companies number in the hundreds of thousands. There are no Russian or Western statistics available on the exact numbers of capital owners in Russia, but there are statistics about the number of existing private and privatized enterprises (see Blasi, Krumova, & Kruse, 1997, p. 129). The other three sample groups of capital owners included 10 owners each for the reason of easier statistical analysis of the data. It must be noted here that it was the owners of large independent-type capital and the owners of 'old state' small- and medium-sized companies who were among the least numerous respondents and also the hardest to find. There were very few owners of large independent-type capital in Russia because the accumulation of many of large private fortunes was usually closely tied to the owner's connections to the state (see, for example, Klebninkov, 2000). As to the owners of small- and medium-sized capital of the 'old state' type, their numbers were small not only due to the fact that few small- and medium-sized enterprises existed in the former Soviet economy which was dominated by large-scale enterprises, but also to the fact that few of these firms survived the post-privatization elimination of state subsidies (small- and medium-sized privatized firms were the first to see their state subsidies eliminated mostly due to the lack of social and political leverage that was possessed by the large privatized enterprises) and the intense competition with independent type start-up firms.

9. Russian capital owners were distinguished on the basis of the size and the origin of their capital. Firms with a yearly turnover of up to \$200,000 US were classified as small businesses, firms with a yearly turnover from \$200,000 US to \$25 million US were classified as medium-sized businesses and firms with a yearly turnover higher than \$25 million US were classified as large businesses. In Russian firms at the time of the study, many employees worked off the official books because some business owners wished to avoid paying very high pension and other taxes. But even when I was successful in convincing a business owner to disclose the real number of employees that his/her company employed, this number would sometimes not be truly indicative of the scale of a company's operations: for example, in one financial firm there were 36 employees but the firm's turnover was in the billions of dollars, with profits measuring in the hundreds of millions. There were similar cases like this, which prompted me to rely solely on turnover measurement of company's size. The number of employees was used as a supplementary, but not a formally decisive criterion for the classification of the size of the business that a respondent owned.

10. Some may argue that capital owners of independent type could not exist in Russia because all of the existing economic assets were owned by the state, and that means that all capital owned by entrepreneurs is of the 'old state' origin. The data from my study does not support such an oversimplified view of the development of Russian business. For further evidence disputing this view, see Rogers (2006).

11. A number of studies have found that younger people in post-communist societies, on average, display more pro-democratic attitudes than older population

groups. For the results of such studies see Colton and Hough (1998); Gibson (2001); and Colton and McFaul (2002).

12. Higher gains in economic and other forms of well-being have been shown to correlate with stronger support for democratic norms. For the results of such studies see Rose et al. (1997); Gibson (2001); and Colton and McFaul (2002).

13. These results closely mirror the results of the nationwide representative attitudinal polls on the attitudes to democracy and democratic institutions that were conducted at the time that the research took place. Such polls typically found that about one-fifth of Russians are opposed to democracy, with a higher approval ratings for the institutions of freedom of speech, freedom of mass media and free elections, and with a lower approval rating for a multi-party political system (see Colton & McFaul, 2002). Capital owners do not appear to have a significantly different overall distribution of attitudes as compared to the general Russian population.

It is debatable whether a sample of Moscow-based capital owners should be interpreted as the one drawing on the most liberal population of capital owners in the country. Although Moscow is by far the most urban and the most developed Russian city and is home to the most highly educated population in the country, the city also features the highest concentration of the conservative former party *nomenklatura* in the country. Many of these former party officials become co-owners and managers of newly privatized and private businesses. The reader should keep this dichotomy in mind when interpreting the results of the study.

14. Interview with an owner of a large, 'old state'-type company on March 11, 1998.

15. Interview with an owner of a large, 'old state'-type enterprise on November 25, 1997.

16. Interview with an owner of a medium-sized, independent-type firm on December 7, 1997.

17. Interview with an owner of a small, independent-type firm on December 7, 1997.

18. Interview with an owner of a medium-sized, independent-type firm on February 27, 1998.

19. Interview with an owner of a large, independent-type company on December 17, 1997.

20. Readers should view the above statistical results with caution due to the small number of young respondents (only six capital owners). Indeed, if only one of the young capital owners would have changed its opinion regarding democratization, it would be the group of the young capital owners who would have displayed the least pro-democratic attitudes. The statistical results that reflect the distribution of the attitudes among young respondents, although precise for this sample of the respondents, should be viewed more as indicative of the diverse patterns of the respondents' opinion rather than exact measurements of the strength of the comparative statistical relationships among the respondents' groups.

21. By comparison, the available data on the educational level of Moscow businessmen who owned small companies, which were collected and published by the Moscow government in 1997, show that 75% of businessmen have graduated from at least five years of college, and 5% of businessmen had post-graduate (doctoral)

degrees (*Malyi Biznes Moskvy* – 1997, 1997, p. 58). Three reasons for a higher educational attainment level of respondents in this study when compared to the Moscow government data come to mind: (1) highly educated capital owners were overrepresented in the study's sample; (2) when owners of large capital are sampled along with the owners of medium-sized capital and the owners of small capital, the overall proportion of respondents with advanced levels of education goes up; (3) small-business owners with low levels of education who operate in the most criminalized areas of small retail and small consumer services were underrepresented in my sample because these individuals were exceptionally difficult to access for interviewing (it is very likely, however, that the Moscow government data on small businessmen also do not provide an accurate account of this type of businessmen because these individuals preferred to remain unaccounted for by various governmental agencies).

22. I classified former members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union into three different groups in relation to their commitment to the Communist idea and their level of participation in the party's institutionalized bodies. Passive CPSU members were those who joined the party mostly out of career necessity rather than of strong communist ideological convictions. They paid lip service to ideological commitment, but even if required to serve on the party's ideological committees, they regarded participation in ideological meetings as a waste of time, and were not sorry when the party was dissolved. By contrast, active CPSU members viewed membership as a greater service to their country and its people and strongly aspired to participate in the party's numerous committees and governing bodies mainly because of their ideological convictions. They also strongly believed in the Communist ideology and in the leadership of the Party. The respondents who were active CPSU members in the past would almost always launch into an ideological argument during an interview, insisting on the superiority of communist ideological values and conduct. Finally, career CPSU officials were people who have spent part or all of their previous career as paid Party officials.

23. See Bunin (1994), Babaeva and Chirikova (1995), Avilova (1995), Tichonova (1997) and Wittenberg (1995).

24. As was the case with Mr. Volsky, Ivan Kivelidi was a businessman who became both the leader of the "first wave" political party (Party of Free Labor) and the leader of a powerful "first wave" business interest group (Round Table: Business of Russia). Mr. Kivelidi was later assassinated, and his assassin(s) has never been found.

25. See Zudin (1995/1996).

26. Sometimes the same person would become a leader of both a political party and a business interest group. Such was and is the case of a former top *nomenklatura* member Arkady Volsky: he is the leader of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, the former leader of the Civic Union party and of the political movement Renewal (*Obnovlenie*), and also is the current leader of the Russian United Industrial Party.

27. Lentini (1995, p. 46).

28. See Zudin (1995/1996, Vol. 13, p. 6).

29. *Ibid.*, Vol. 13, pp. 6–7.

30. See Zudin (1995/1996, Vol. 15, pp. 6–8).

31. See Bunin (1994, p. 411), Avilova (1995, p. 32), Tichonova (1997, p. 56), and Wittenberg (1995, p. 208).

32. APR, Agrarian Party of Russia; RUIP, Russian United Industrial Party; and RCDM, Russian Christian-Democratic Movement.

33. When considering these results, readers must be aware of the fact that the sampling procedure in which about a half of all respondents were selected with the help of business interest groups has undoubtedly affected the outcome. Nonetheless, for those respondents who were selected independently from the lists of business interest groups, the finding that business interest groups were their preferred form of political participation over various political parties still stands. This trend has been also confirmed by Russian sources (see Avilova, 1997, p. 63).

34. For more detailed analysis of political participation of capital owners who took part in this study also see Rogers (2004).

35. In this part of the paper I use words “reform” and “pro-liberal” interchangeably as the meanings of these two words were very closely associated with each other in the minds of my respondents due to the strong pro-liberal initial character of reforms in Russia. These meanings and the direction of reform began to change in the end of the 1990s.

36. Interview with Gennady Tomchin, head of the AAPPE, on February 25, 1998.

37. Interview with an owner of a large, ‘old state’-type enterprise on November 25, 1997.

38. This finding of the study is similar to findings from large quantitative studies that research the reasons of support for pro-democratic political regimes. Drawing on data from the New Democracies Barometer, a representative, quantitative study of political attitudes in a number of post-communist countries, Rose et al. (1997) found that the stronger was the individual’s past negative experience with communism, the more likely these individuals reacted in favor of current pro-democratic governments (evaluation of current political performance on the basis of early socialization). Citizens who felt that their individual freedom has increased under the current regime were much more likely to trust pro-democratic institutions.

39. Interview with an owner of a small, independent-type firm on March 5, 1998.

40. Interview with a young owner of a large, independent-type company on December 17, 1997.

41. Much has been written on the topic of the lawlessness of the Russian business environment. For examples, see Radaev (1998) and Volkov (2002).

42. According to interviews with the members of the organization, RUIE featured numerous VPs.

43. As already mentioned in one of the footnotes above, the factor of education was relatively stable for the majority of the respondents. This did not allow for any meaningful comparisons of variation in education.

44. For further details see Silverman and Yanowitch (1997) and Cook (2002).

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
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
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APPENDIX



Drawing A1. Distribution of Owners of Large Companies by Industry (n = 20).



Drawing A2. Distribution of Owners of Small- and Medium-Sized Companies by Industry ($n = 40$).

Table A1. Attitudes toward Free Elections, Free Speech and Multi-Party Political System by Type and Size of Capital ($n = 60$).

Question/Answer	Large Capital ($n = 20$)		Small and Medium-Sized Capital ($n = 40$)	
	Independent ($n = 10$)%	Old State ($n = 10$)%	Independent ($n = 30$)%	Old State ($n = 10$)%
How important do you think is having free elections for the Russia's future?				
Very important	40	10	50	40
Important	50	50	40	50
Not important	10	30	10	10
Do not know/no answer	0	10	0	0
How important do you think is having free speech for Russia's future?				
Very important	30	20	47	10
Important	50	60	53	60
Not important	20	10	0	40
Do not know/no answer	0	10	0	0
How important, do you think, is having a multi-party political system for the future of Russia?				
Very important	10	0	3	0
Important	80	60	70	40
Not important	10	40	23	60
Do not know/no answer	0	0	3	0

Note: In one cell percentages do not add up to a 100 due to rounding.

Table A2. Attitudes toward Democracy as a Suitable Political Choice for Russia by Age and Type and Size of Capital ($n = 60$).

Answer	Type and Size of Capital	Age			
		25–34 (%)	35–44 (%)	45–54 (%)	55 and older (%)
Democracy is a suitable political choice for Russia	<i>Large capital</i>				
	Independent	33	10	20	0
	Old state	0	15	0	14
	<i>Small and medium-sized capital</i>				
	Independent	33	45	55	14
	Old state	0	10	15	29
Democracy is not a suitable political choice for Russia	<i>Large capital</i>				
	Independent	17	0	5	0
	Old state	0	0	0	29
	<i>Small and medium-sized capital</i>				
	Independent	17	15	5	7
	Old state	0	5	0	7
Total % (n)		100 (6)	100 (20)	100 (20)	100 (14)

Note: In some columns percentages may not add up to a 100 due to rounding.

Table A3. Participation in Political Parties and Movements and Politicized Business Groups by Type of Political Attitudes and Type and Size of Respondent's Capital ($n = 60$).

Type of Political Attitudes	Large Capital				Small and Medium Capital			
	'Old State'		Independent		'Old State'		Independent	
	Part.	Non-part.	Part.	Non-part.	Part.	Non-part.	Part.	Non-part.
	<i>n</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>n</i>
Pro-liberal political and economic reform	2	0	1	1	0	1	4	10
Moderately pro-democratic, pro-market reform	2	1	4	1	4	2	7	6
Authoritarian state with capitalist economy	0	0	2	1	1	1	2	1
Anti-democratic and market reform	3	2	0	0	1	0	0	0
Participation % (Total <i>n</i>)	70% (10)		70% (10)		60% (10)		43% (30)	

Table A4. Political Participation by Respondent's Age and Respondent's Political Attitudes ($n = 60$).

Type of Political Attitudes	Age (Years)							
	25-34		35-44		45-54		55 and older	
	Part.	Non-part.	Part.	Non-part.	Part.	Non-part.	Part.	Non-part.
	<i>n</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>n</i>
Pro-liberal political and economic reform	1	1	4	3	2	8	0	0
Moderately pro-democratic, pro-market reform	2	0	5	6	4	3	5	2
Authoritarian state with capitalist economy	2	0	0	2	3	0	1	0
Anti-democratic, anti-market reform	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	2
Participation % (Total <i>n</i>)	83% (6)		45% (20)		71% (14)		71% (14)	

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DEVELOPMENT AND COLLECTIVE ACTION IN CHILE'S NEOLIBERAL DEMOCRACY[☆]

Paul W. Posner

ABSTRACT

This paper argues that structural and institutional reforms imposed by the military regime and accepted by the Concertación impose substantial impediments to collective action among Chile's popular sectors. In particular, labor market and social welfare policies exacerbate social stratification, deprive the public of vital resources, reinforce workers' vulnerability to market forces and undermine social trust. These dynamics and the state structures that perpetuate them indicate the state's role in either facilitating or impeding collective action among subordinate segments of the population. They further suggest the negative impact neoliberalism has on the quality of democracy by constraining popular participation.

[☆]The term "neoliberal democracy" is not meant to conflate distinct though related processes of economic and political liberalization. Rather, it is intended to indicate that neoliberal economic policies impose significant and deleterious constraints on the practice of democracy in contemporary Chile. In a more general sense, the use of the term is founded on the understanding that economic and political systems are profoundly intertwined. Accordingly, the term "neoliberal democracy" is intended to convey a particular type of relationship between economics and politics, distinct from other forms of political economy such as social democracy, for example.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Over the past decade, the preoccupation of most students of Latin American politics has shifted from how democratic regimes can be established and sustained to how they can be improved. In this regional quest to improve democracy, researchers and policymakers confront a significant challenge – how to enable traditionally marginalized segments of the population to share in the benefits of economic and political reform. This issue is particularly pressing for at least two reasons. First, even in countries which have experienced commendable growth under neoliberalism, inequality has increased and poverty remains a substantial, if not growing, problem (Korenciewicz & Smith, 2000). Second, the persistence of high rates of poverty and inequality, coupled with other issues of concern – government corruption, continued human rights abuses and the persistent lack of accountability of civilian and military leaders, to name but a few – calls into question the ability of these new democratic regimes to protect and promote their citizens' welfare (O'Donnell, 1993). To the extent that these regimes are unable to deliver essential public goods, their democratic legitimacy becomes increasingly dubious.

Strengthening democratic legitimacy and reducing poverty and inequality will ultimately depend in large measure upon increasing the capacity of marginalized segments of the population to promote their interests through effective collective action. The disadvantaged and marginalized will be unable to share in the benefits of development unless they can participate in the political system in a manner that motivates political leaders and policymakers to address their concerns. Accordingly, the problem of marginality is related to the issue of collective action.

The earlier literature on transitions and democratization paid insufficient attention to these issues, focusing instead on the role of elites in demobilizing civil society and in establishing new democratic institutions (Avritzer, 2002, pp. 32–35). Subsequently, scholars attempted to understand the great diversity of postauthoritarian regimes by either “stretching” the concept of democracy, applying it to cases for which it was inappropriate, or developing an enormous number of subtypes (Collier & Levitsky, 1997, pp. 430–431). More recently, however, scholars have begun to overcome this lack of conceptual clarity, and to bridge the divide that emerged in academic debate over procedural versus substantive notions of democracy, by shifting focus to the qualitative dimensions of democracy. O'Donnell (2004), for example, has expanded the debate from a narrow focus on the institutional structure of political regimes to a broader emphasis on the extent to which states ensure

citizens' rights and freedoms through enforcement of the rule of law. Similarly, [Diamond and Morlino \(2004\)](#) have advanced consideration of the quality of democracy by identifying and assessing key dimensions on which democracies vary, including, among others, participation, competition and vertical and horizontal accountability. With regard to participation, they note that

democratic quality is high when we in fact observe extensive citizen participation not only through voting but in the life of political parties and civil society organizations, in the discussion of public policy issues, in communicating with and demanding accountability from elected representatives, in monitoring official conduct, and in direct engagement with public issues at the local level (pp. 22–23).

Rather than abandoning a minimal definition of democracy for a more substantive one,¹ these authors have helped to advance scholarly debate by making the connection between the quality of democracy and its durability, legitimacy and likelihood of consolidation (*ibid.*, p. 20). From this perspective, participation can help strengthen democracy by building regime support among citizens through enhanced political accountability and representation.

Yet, though the value of effective political participation may now be clear, the road to its realization in contemporary Latin America is not. Despite the emergence of democratic regimes across the region, scholars increasingly observe a connection between the rising economic hardship and social dislocation wrought by neoliberal reforms and the compromised capacity of subaltern groups to mount effective responses in their defense ([Lechner, 1998](#); [Roberts, 2002](#); [Kurtz, 2004](#); [Weyland, 2004](#)). This research attempts to understand this contradiction through an in depth look at the Chilean case. It builds upon previous research by articulating the connections among the transformation of the state's linkage to civil society, the recasting of its political institutions and social policy, and the structure of political opportunity confronting the popular sectors. It emphasizes how changes in the labor code, social welfare provision and the structure of local government have not only exacerbated growing economic inequities but also undermined the popular sectors' incentives and capacity for collective action.

As such, this analysis challenges the assumption prevalent in much of the political economy literature and promoted by advocates of market-oriented reform that the state under a market-based economy plays a minimal, if not neutral, role in structuring economic and political opportunities. Critics of state interventionist development models such as [Olson \(1965, 1982\)](#) and [Krueger \(1974\)](#) have argued that distributional coalitions promote state

intervention in order to secure rents for themselves, the consequence of which is to impede economic efficiency and growth. It is on this basis that these critics advocate scaling back state intervention and expanding market liberalization. However, as Schamis (1999, 2002) and Teichman (2001) observe, economic and political elites have colluded in the process of market liberalization and state retrenchment in Latin America to create new market reserves and a new set of economic winners and losers. Control over the state and its policies has been central to this project.

Drawing upon this perspective, this paper argues that market-oriented state reform in Chile, implemented by the military regime and perpetuated by democratically elected governments, imposes substantial impediments to collective action among Chile's popular sectors. The state's implementation of neoliberal policies and programs perpetuates the subordination of workers to a labor market predicated on flexibilization in order to ensure international competitiveness. Labor market and social welfare policies exacerbate already high levels of social stratification, deprive the public of vital resources, reinforce workers' vulnerability to the vagaries of the market and undermine the popular sectors' incentives for collective action. Social programs such as FOSIS and the state's housing program, ostensibly intended to provide targeted assistance to marginal groups and promote the development of social capital, are utilized as means to control popular sector constituencies much like the practice of *asistencialismo* common during Latin America's populist era. Yet unlike their populist era predecessors, today's targeted assistance programs promote divisive competition among popular sector constituencies rather than mass organization and mobilization. These dynamics, and the state structures which perpetuate them, emphasize the importance of examining the role of the state in either facilitating or impeding collective action among historically disadvantaged segments of the population.

The analysis substantiating this argument is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a critique of theories postulated to explain popular sector collective action in Latin America. Subsequent to this critique, it presents an alternative understanding which emphasizes the state's role in promoting or impeding the popular sector collective action. Section 3 offers a brief historical analysis of Chile's metamorphosis from statist to neoliberal democracy, establishing the logic and intent behind the military regime's market-based reforms with respect to their impact on the organization of civil society. Section 4 then examines the nature and impact of reforms related to the electoral regime, the labor market, the social welfare system and local government, assessing their impact on the popular sectors' propensity and

capacity for collective action. Finally, Section 5 concludes with some reflections on the relationship between neoliberalism and democracy in Chile and elsewhere in Latin America.

2. THE STATE AND COLLECTIVE ACTION

Over the past several decades, scholars have produced a voluminous amount of research addressing the issue of collective action on the part of subaltern groups in Latin America and other regions across the globe. Significant diversity in research agendas and theoretical and methodological approaches continues to exist among those engaging in such research. Yet, increasingly, consensus has emerged over the dynamic interrelationship between the state and civil society in shaping the propensity and capacity for collective action among different segments of society (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 1997). Historical events and empirical research have steadily eroded the plausibility of theories and conceptual frameworks which posit some sort of rigid dichotomy between state and society, modern and traditional social sectors or capitalist and pre-capitalist economic sectors.

Thus, for example, recent research on political economy in Latin America counters the notion of the state's neutrality in the context of a market economy, suggesting instead that powerful economic forces in civil society are able to shape state institutions and policies to their ends (Schamis, 1999, 2002; Teichman, 2001). Similarly, while much of the early literature on new social movements (NSMs) eschewed consideration of structural and institutional constraints in favor of emphasis on the autonomous development of culture (Evers, 1985; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Slater, 1985), more recently analysts have begun to consider the interrelationships among state institutions, economic structures and the development of culture and social movements in civil society (Schild, 1998; Slater, 1994, 1998). Likewise, researchers engaged in the study of social capital have challenged earlier presumptions that state intervention is necessarily antithetical to the development of social capital. To the contrary, they have documented cases in which such intervention has greatly facilitated the development of social capital and have identified conditions under which states and actors in civil society can work synergistically toward its creation (Evans, 1996a; Fox, 1996; Heller, 1996; Ostrom, 1996; Kumlin & Rothstein, 2005). This research indicates that an essential factor in the formation or destruction of social capital is not whether the state is engaged in the organization of civil society but how (Evans, 1996b, pp. 1124–1127).

The preceding critique strongly suggests, then, that if we are to better understand state–society relations in general and popular sector collective action in particular, we need a more sophisticated understanding of the linkages between civil society and the state. Accordingly, rather than view the state as more or less autonomous or separate from civil society, this analysis views the state as both a reflection of power and resource differentials in civil society and a prime agent in the construction of such differentials. In other words, it views states as embedded in a set of social relations which shape state structure and policies. In turn, state institutional structures and policies have a formative impact on the structure and organization of civil society, shaping the capacity and propensity for collective action among various segments of the population (Evans, 1995, pp. 12–13, 1996a; Migdal, 2001).² In short, embeddedness shapes state structure and policies, which in turn shape the structure of political opportunities for various actors in civil society.

Political opportunity structure, though a generally accepted concept by the 1990s, has been defined by scholars in a variety of ways. Attempting to explain the outbreak of urban protest in the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Eisinger (1973) originally defined political opportunity structure as “the degree to which groups are likely to be able to gain access to power and to manipulate the system” (p. 1). Subsequently, Tilly (1984), in describing the development of modern nation states and thus the potentially national scope of social movements, suggested that the political opportunity structure “corresponds to the process by which a national political system shapes, checks and absorbs the challenges which come to it” (p. 312). Tarrow expanded upon this definition by including the degree of openness or closure of the polity, the stability of political alignments, the presence or absence of allies, divisions within the elite or its intolerance of protest and policy-making innovations by government itself (Tarrow, 1989, p. 429; 1998, pp. 18–20). While Brockett (1991) has developed a more generic definition of political opportunity structure in order “to take into account the uniqueness of particular cases,” (p. 254) he nonetheless emphasizes many of the same key variables as does Tarrow. Most important for the purposes of this analysis are the presence of meaningful access points in the political system, the presence of allies and outside support groups and the level of elite fragmentation or cohesion (*ibid.*).

Owing to its emphasis on the pivotal role of policy in shaping opportunities for collective action, Skocpol’s structured polity approach provides a useful complement to the concept of political opportunity structure as developed by Brockett, Tarrow and others. According to this approach, the

“institutional arrangements of the state and political parties affect the capabilities of various groups to achieve self-consciousness, organize and make alliances” (Skocpol, 1992, p. 47). The strength of Skocpol’s approach is its recognition of the transformative impact of state policies on politics. As she notes, “because of the official efforts made to implement new policies using new or existing administrative arrangements, policies transform or expand the capacities of the state. They therefore change the administrative possibilities for official initiatives in the future, and affect later prospects for policy implementation.” Moreover, “new policies affect the social identities, goals and capabilities of groups that subsequently struggle or ally in politics” (*ibid.*, p. 58).

Coupled with the notion of embeddedness, the political opportunity structure and structured polity approaches described above provide a useful conceptual framework for understanding the popular sectors’ propensity and capacity for effective collective action in contemporary Chile. As will be developed in detail below, General Augusto Pinochet’s military regime, in alliance with economic elites in civil society committed to a neoliberal economic agenda, radically transformed both the embeddedness of the Chilean state and its structure and policies. These reforms, imposed by the military regime and bequeathed to the Concertación, erect substantial impediments to collective action among Chile’s popular sectors. Institutional arrangements weaken key actors such as organized labor, resulting in persistently low unionization levels, a fragmented labor movement and precarious employment. Social welfare reforms promote either individual solutions to welfare issues (as in the case of the individual capitalization of retirement funds) or, as with the government’s housing program and social solidarity programs (FOSIS), competition among popular sector constituencies, thereby subverting incentives for concerted action. Electoral reforms and related changes in the party system have reinforced these conditions by limiting the ability of the Concertación to enact beneficial legislation and thus increasing the parties’ reluctance to respond to popular sector demands. This reluctance, coupled with the Concertación’s continued inability to enact progressive legislation, act as disincentives for popular sector collective action. A consensus among a broad spectrum of political and economic elites on the desirability, if not necessity, of the market economy, coupled with a distancing of center and left political party representatives from their traditional constituencies reinforce these institutional dynamics. A brief sketch of the evolution of the Chilean state from statism to neoliberalism will enable us to discern these interrelationships among economic structure, state structure and popular sector organization.

3. FROM STATISM TO NEOLIBERALISM

The statist phase in Chile's development correlates with the onset of the Great Depression. With the collapse of the international market for Chilean exports, working- and middle-class groups pressured the state into taking a greater role in industrialization and economic development. Thus, through the expansion and manipulation of a centralized state bureaucracy, successive governments adopted measures to expand, or in some cases create, the industrial sector according to a strategy of import substitution industrialization (ISI). The center-left Popular Front alliance consolidated this development strategy shortly after its electoral victory in 1938 by creating a state development corporation, *Corporación de Fomento* (CORFO), which assumed responsibility for the state's role in production and the deliberate planning of the national economy (Bergquist, 1986, p. 73). With this state-centered development model solidly in place, all members of the statist alliance – the internally and externally oriented bourgeoisie, civil servants and middle-class professionals, the military and organized labor – were able to form part of the state and to extract benefits from it. Therefore, changes in Chile's pattern of economic development both shaped and were shaped by a metamorphosis of the Chilean state, which in turn permitted the inclusion of previously excluded segments of society.

The class compromise upon which the interventionist state was founded resolved some developmental problems while creating others, which ultimately proved irreconcilable within the prevailing development model (ISI). The political and economic incorporation of organized labor initially facilitated increased economic development and social stability. However, Chile's rate of industrial growth was never sufficient to keep pace with the growing numbers of under and unemployed in the urban areas, many of whom had migrated to escape the rural economic stagnation which an overemphasis on industrialization had produced. The struggle among center and left parties for control of the state motivated their competition for the support of these marginalized segments of the population. In essence, party competition resulted in the mobilization of these previously politically unincorporated and inactive groups. Such mobilization was facilitated by state reforms, including the establishment of *juntas de vecinos* (neighborhood associations), legalization of agrarian unions, expansion of suffrage to illiterates and expansion of housing and social welfare subsidies (Garretón, 1989, p. 12). These reforms and the mobilization efforts of center and left parties ignited an explosion of popular demands which the state could not fulfill, even when it was willing to threaten the interests of economic elites by

nationalizing key industries and expanding the state's role in production and investment. Under these circumstances, economic stagnation, hyperinflation and political polarization ensued, ultimately precipitating the military coup of September 11, 1973.

Following the coup, the Pinochet regime reacted to Chile's economic and political crises in two ways. First, through armed repression, the shutdown of democratic institutions, and the banning of political activity, it attempted to eliminate all channels of individual and collective political expression. Second, the regime attempted to stabilize the economy and dismantle the statist policies and programs adopted under previous administrations. Military economic and social policy was initially fragmented with neither policy area dominated by neoliberals. Ultimately, however, this initial fragmentation gave way to a coherent set of neoliberal policies in both economic and social spheres (Kurtz, 1999; Silva, 1996b). The convergence of economic and social policy along neoliberal lines occurred between 1979 and 1982. The success of neoliberal policies in taming inflation helped persuade military leaders that market-oriented policies might be effective in other policy areas as well (Kurtz, 1999, p. 416). Thus, in addition to liberalizing the economy and privatizing most state-owned industries, military leaders, in cooperation with market-oriented technocrats (the 'Chicago Boys') and a pragmatic coalition of business interests, restructured the social welfare system and rewrote the labor code in ways which would increase the susceptibility of workers to economic competition and the vagaries of the international market. Along with export producers, the neoliberal technocrats in charge of social policy within the Pinochet regime viewed the state's labor code and social welfare system as a drag on competitiveness. "They represented a new phase in rightist political economy in the world, in that they actually used their privileged positions in the state apparatus to devise and apply a policy package aimed at dismantling, and then restructuring, civil society in accordance with their radical market views" (Stepan, 1985, p. 323).

The core constituency that supported these reforms consisted of a coalition of diversified economic conglomerates, which concentrated their investment in those areas in which Chile had a comparative economic advantage. Thus their firms focused on manufacturing in internationally competitive industries such as food processing and paper and export activities such as mining, fishing and agriculture. The transformation of the state's core constituency under the military government led to a shift in development focus from industrialization and production for domestic consumption to an emphasis on the export of primary and manufactured

products. This shift undermined the economic, and thus the political, leverage, which workers had enjoyed under the previous mode of development. Since the domestic market is insignificant for the forms of enterprise in which the large conglomerates concentrated their investment (e.g. copper, fruit production, wood pulp and timber and fish meal), state planners and policy makers within the military government had little incentive to be concerned with raising wages or social benefits. Instead, the primary pre-occupation of the Pinochet regime and its business sector supporters was minimizing the popular sectors' demand making and organizational capabilities so that they would not impede the implementation and smooth functioning of Chile's new export oriented development model (Lagos, 1983, p. 64; Cortázar, 1993, pp. 2–4). The regime's efforts in this regard severely weakened organized labor and in general made the popular sectors much more heterogeneous and fragmented (Angell, 1991, pp. 189–198; Díaz, 1993, pp. 1–2).

Initially, the large economic conglomerates were able to ensure the representation of their interests through a revolving door relationship with the military government. Many important executives and directors from firms controlled by these conglomerates joined the government after the military took power, mostly in second tier positions. Over time, however, they assumed positions of greater importance (Schamis, 2002, pp. 54–55). Thus, "key policymakers of the Pinochet government served on the boards and in the executive offices of large economic conglomerates before and after holding cabinet and central bank positions, leading to collusion between economic and political power" (*ibid.*, p. 65). José Piñera, a Chicago trained economist and executive at the Cruzat-Larraín conglomerate before joining the military government in 1978, best personified this collusion. As minister of labor and social security, he designed the military regime's labor code and oversaw the privatization of social security.

This cozy relationship between big business and the military government initially appeared to work well for the conglomerates and the economy as a whole, leading to the rapid growth of economic sectors in which Chile had a comparative advantage. However, the evaporation of cheap foreign credit in the early 1980s exposed the weaknesses of this economic arrangement and led to a severe economic crisis. The fallout from this crisis led, in turn, to a change in relations between government and business that would serve to perpetuate business' dominant influence in policy making through the democratic transition to the present.

Rather than investment in production, the export-oriented conglomerates built their phenomenal expansion on highly leveraged buyouts, a strategy

that worked as long as international liquidity was high and interest rates were low. However, when in the early 1980s liquidity dropped precipitously and interest rates spiked, overindebtedness led to a wave of bankruptcies across the country (Silva, 1996a, p. 307). The ensuing economic crisis provoked a political crisis for the regime, which faced massive popular protests beginning in May of 1983 and opposition from business sectors deprived of privileged access to policymakers before the crisis and disenchanted with orthodox neoliberalism. Primarily through Chile's dominant interest association, the *Confederación de la Producción y el Comercio* (CPC), they demanded greater flexibility in policymaking and more inclusive access to policymakers.

To counter the influence of the Chicago boy radicals, the leadership of the CPC sponsored a series of meetings during the 1982–1983 economic crisis designed to build a consensus among Chile's business leaders over a national economic policy, which would stimulate investment and economic recovery. The proposals that emerged from these meetings departed only moderately from neoliberal orthodoxy, indicating the business community's acceptance of the fundamental elements of the military regime's economic policy. The more significant change reflected in the outcomes of these meetings was an emphasis on unity among Chile's diverse business sectors. Major lobbying efforts had to be conducted in the name of the CPC rather than individual sectoral organizations lest government technocrats reject them as too narrowly defined and thus threatening to the general health of the economy. Pleasing government technocrats became increasingly important since by 1985, once Chile's economic and political upheavals had subsided, the military government recruited top economic policymakers almost exclusively from the ranks of experienced technocrats rather than business leaders. As a result, it became increasingly necessary to present policy proposals in terms of their likely impact on the economy as a whole rather than the benefits they might produce for specific economic sectors (*ibid.*, pp. 309–310).

The consultation and coordination of economic policy between business and government established at this time set the pattern for business–state relations which have continued through the democratic transition to the present. These relations were founded upon a business community that was highly unified and committed to using its political clout to protect its economic interests. These interests were defined first and foremost in terms of the perpetuation of neoliberal economic and social policy and a strong desire to prevent any reversion to statism. The increased cohesion of the business community, and its increased autonomy from state control in the context of a liberalized economy, gave it considerable leverage over

government policy (Silva, 1996b, 2002). The return to electoral politics, first with the 1988 plebiscite and then the 1989 elections, strengthened this leverage by putting added pressure on government to work with business to ensure positive economic outcomes in terms of employment and growth. Meanwhile, the ascending power and influence of business were mirrored by the relative decline and fragmentation of the labor movement and popular sector opponents to neoliberalism. Thus, over the course of the dictatorship the Chilean state's embeddedness had been transformed in a manner that would pose substantial obstacles to popular sector collective action even under democracy.

The Chilean state under democracy is substantially the same as it was under authoritarianism. Though the three Concertación governments who have held office since the transition have increased social spending, the state's economic model continues essentially unchanged, the organizational strength and influence of labor on the state and state policy remains severely compromised while business maintains its privileged position, and the welfare regime continues to promote individual capitalization and the stratified delivery of social resources among the nation's neediest. Indeed, the only major element of the Chilean state that has changed since the transition to democracy is the political regime. And although this change is by no means insignificant, electoral institutions over represent the right while linkage between political parties and the popular sectors remains weak, giving the popular sectors limited influence in the political arena. The following section will elaborate this argument more fully by examining in detail key policies and institutional arrangements.

4. NEOLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE DISORGANIZATION OF THE POPULAR SECTORS

The obstacles to collective action Chile's neoliberal democracy present for the popular sectors are numerous and substantial. To understand the persistence of these impediments, we need to consider the manner in which Chile returned to democracy. The 1990 democratic transition was the product of a pact between leaders of the military regime and the democratic opposition (Posner, 1999). Two primary factors combined to determine the nature of this pact. First, the democratic opposition had failed in its attempts to oust Pinochet from power either with force or through mass mobilizations. Consequently, the Chilean military was in a position to determine the conditions under which it would hand over power to its civilian

counterparts. Second, during the period between the Chilean military's overthrow of Allende's Popular Unity government and the time at which the democratic opposition entered into negotiations with the military in efforts to bring about a transition, the elites and parties leading the opposition movement had gone through a process of political renovation (Roberts, 1998; Walker, 1990). This renovation facilitated a convergence between the constraints that the military regime wished to impose upon Chile's new democracy and the steps the democratic opposition was willing to take to ensure the new regime's stability.

The leaders of the parties comprising the democratic opposition had concluded that ideological polarization and overpoliticization of the state and civil society precipitated the breakdown of Chilean democracy. Therefore, they reasoned that they could assure future democratic stability only by depoliticization. Practically speaking, this meant significantly increasing the role of the market, and proportionally decreasing the state's role in running the economy. It also meant reducing the role of political parties in organizing and mobilizing groups in civil society. Consequently, the renovated democratic opposition was willing to demobilize its mass opposition movement and to accept the military regime's neoliberal economic model and 1980 Constitution as preconditions to redemocratization (Oxhorn, 1995). The opposition's acceptance of these preconditions as well as its commitment to depoliticizing civil society determined that many of the essential elements that defined state/society relations under the dictatorship would remain intact after the democratic transition. It also meant the institutionalization of reforms designed to preserve the status quo and to perpetuate the fragmentation and disarticulation of the popular sectors. We see the institutionalization of such reforms and their impact in the electoral regime, the labor code and the social welfare regime. Considering each of these aspects of governance in Chile's new democracy gives us a broad picture of the impediments to collective action, which the popular sectors face.

4.1. The Electoral Regime

Beyond the lingering effects of Chile's pacted transition, the institutional impediments that limit the political system's responsiveness to the popular sectors are evident in the electoral regime. The most important of these are the designated senators in Congress and the binomial electoral system itself. Pinochet's 1980 Constitution stipulates the appointment of nine senators every eight years, allegedly for the purpose of "safeguarding" democracy. Before he stepped down as president, Pinochet filled these nine senatorial

seats with officials closely connected to the authoritarian regime. Although one designated senator died during his term and was not replaced, the remaining eight in the right wing's voting bloc transformed the Concertación's slight majority of 21–17 senatorial seats, won in the 1993 congressional elections, into a 21–25 majority for the right. Similarly, the appointment of a new set of designated senators after the 1997 congressional elections transformed the Concertación's slight legislative majority of 20–18 into a 22–25 majority for the right. With this majority, the right effectively blocked any attempts by the Concertación to amend the Constitution, which requires a two-thirds majority in both chambers of Congress, or 31 senators and 80 deputies (González Moya, 1991a, pp. 75–77).

Over time, however, as new designated senators have been appointed, they have become more moderate politically. Simultaneously, the constitutional provision that allows presidents that have served for at least six years to become lifetime senators has strengthened the position of the Concertación. As a result, the present group of designated senators, along with the more moderate segments of the right, has agreed with the Concertación to terminate the practice of designating senators in March 2006 when the current designated senators' term expires.³ Thus, the termination of this provision presents new possibilities for positive reform. Nonetheless, as we shall see in the discussion of labor reform below, the role of the designated senators has been significant in preserving Pinochet-era reforms and the state–society relations these reforms have helped to produce.

While the designated senators are due to step down in 2006, Chile's binomial electoral system continues in force and thus compounds and perpetuates the unfair electoral advantage the designated senators has conveyed to the right. According to this system, a party or political pact is guaranteed a seat in any electoral district in which it wins a minimum of 33.4 percent of the vote. This percentage unduly rewards second-place finishers and, not coincidentally, is roughly equivalent to the vote percentage historically received by the Chilean Right. Thus, in congressional races, for example, in order for a party or voting bloc to gain both seats in a given district, it must win more than two-thirds of the district vote, or double the number of votes received by the second-place party or pact (the 66 percent majority clause) (Caviedes, 1991, p. 90). Such stringent requirements cost parties or pacts opposing the Right four Senate and eight Chamber seats in the 1993 elections and three Senate and six Chamber seats in the 1997 elections.

Andrés Allamand, former head of the right-wing Renovación Nacional (RN), acknowledges that these two institutional arrangements, “have objectively favored the parties of the military regime (read the present opposition),

granting to them greater political and legislative power than would have otherwise arisen from electoral results” (Allamand, 1999, p. 182; author’s translation). These impediments have limited the Concertación’s ability to enact beneficial legislation (for example, labor code reform) or democratic reforms (for example, amending or terminating the binomial electoral system) and thus increase the parties’ reluctance to respond to popular sector demands. This reluctance, coupled with the Concertación’s continued inability to enact progressive legislation, acts as disincentives for popular sector collective action. These disincentives are most apparent when we consider the Concertación’s attempts at labor reform.

4.2. The Labor Code, Precarious Employment, and Social Disarticulation

Nowhere is the Concertación’s inability to enact reforms beneficial to the popular sectors more evident than in the area of labor legislation. While all three Concertación governments have attempted to enact substantial labor reform, each has failed. Their failures have resulted from a confluence of factors: (1) the electoral arrangements described above, which overrepresent the right, giving it veto power over proposed reforms; (2) the increased influence of business associations with political leaders and policymakers, cultivated under authoritarianism and perpetuated under democracy; (3) an attendant decline in the influence of organized labor; and (4) the preoccupation of political leaders with maintaining macroeconomic stability and Chile’s comparative advantage in an open economy.

With respect to the issue of macroeconomic stability, Lindblom (1977) has noted the unique political leverage economic elites possess in market-oriented systems. Governments in these systems accept the responsibility to do what is necessary to facilitate private sector profits high enough to maintain employment and growth (*ibid.*, p. 174). Accordingly, “[a]ny government official who understands the requirements of his position and the responsibilities that market-oriented systems throw on businessmen will therefore grant them a privileged position” (*ibid.*, p. 175). Of course, different economic systems function according to different logics and thus impose distinct constraints on political leaders, policymakers and political systems. Under a Keynesian form of class compromise, for example, business elites maintain control over private investment and production, but the power and resource disparities between capital and labor are minimized. These disparities are minimized through union and collective bargaining rights, a substantial role for labor in macroeconomic policymaking, a strong social safety net, and an agreement among business, state and labor that state

manipulation of the macroeconomy will be geared toward generating sustained growth, secure employment and rising real wages. In contrast, economic elites under neoliberalism promise to generate growth, employment and rising incomes in exchange for the private control of investment and production, subordinate class exclusion from state policy-making, and highly restricted social and labor rights (Barrett, 2002, p. 63). By definition, this “neoliberal elite pact” increases the leverage of economic elites and their interest associations and diminishes the relative influence of organized labor.

The struggle over labor reform in Chile over the past 15 years exemplifies this inequity of power and influence between business and labor under neoliberalism. Labor reform efforts in all three Concertación governments have followed a similar pattern: proclamations by government officials of the importance of labor code reform, the government’s emphasis on negotiations between business and labor in devising labor policy with a minimal role for the state (social concertation), intercession by the state when such negotiations collapse or fail to produce results, government’s scaling back of reforms in response to pressure from business associations and economic elites – despite vociferous protests from organized labor, and finally the passage of modest reforms, which do little to remedy the severe power and resource inequities between business and labor. While the Concertación’s lack of a legislative majority explains, in part, the failure of the Aylwin and Frei governments to pass meaningful reform, the Lagos government’s passage of only modest reforms despite possessing majorities in both chambers of Congress points to the primacy of another factor. The common thread among all three administrations has been the desire to protect political and macroeconomic stability by avoiding conflict with business associations, primarily the CPC and the *Sociedad de Fomento Fabril* (SOFAFA), and the economic elites whose interests they represent. The consequence has been the continued marginalization of organized labor in policy formulation and the preservation of a labor code and labor markets, which impose extreme obstacles to collective organization and action among the popular sectors.

To appreciate how little progress has been made on labor reform in Chile since the 1990 transition, we must first consider the major labor reform elements the military regime implemented through the 1979 *Plan Laboral*. The labor code’s more deleterious elements included the introduction of new bargaining entities inside firms, the so-called bargaining groups (*grupos negociadoras*), designed to compete with unions and thereby undermine the traditional structure of one union per enterprise. Additionally, the *Plan* prohibited workers from negotiating on any matters which interfered with the employer’s right to organize work and promoted precarious contracting

by allowing employers to modify work contracts without consulting employees. The new code further strengthened the employers' hand by allowing them to lock out workers and hire replacement workers during strike action (Decree Law 2758). Moreover, the law circumscribed the legal length of strikes to 60 days, after which time workers had to return to work or face dismissal (Haagh, 2002a, pp. 39–40; Martínez & Díaz, 1996, p. 60). Finally, the law gave employers the right to fire workers without providing justification, prohibited regulation of the workload as well as the work day, and drastically restricted the right to collective bargaining (Frank, 2002, pp. 41–42). The precipitous decline in unionization among Chilean workers, from a pre-coup rate of 35 percent to approximately 10 percent throughout the 1980s, epitomized the detrimental impact such reforms had on the labor movement (Roberts, 2002, pp. 15, 22; see Table 1 below for unionization rates 1986–2004).

Table 1. Rate of Unionization and Average Union Size – 1986–2004.

Year	Unions	Active Unions	Population Affiliated with Active Unions	Total Employed Labor Force	Rate of Unionization	Average Union Size
1986	5.391	**	386,987	3,862,850	10.0	72
1987	5.883	**	422,302	4,001,290	10.6	72
1988	6.446	**	446,194	4,285,440	10.4	69
1989	7.118	**	507,616	4,463,420	11.4	71
1990	8.861	**	606,812	4,525,530	13.4	68
1991	9.858	7.707	701,355	4,630,670	15.1	71
1992	10.756	8.323	724,065	4,877,430	14.8	67
1993	11.389	7.974	684,361	5,109,290	13.4	60
1994	12.109	7.891	661,966	5,122,760	12.9	55
1995	12.715	7.505	637,570	5,174,410	12.3	50
1996	13.258	7.476 (est.)	655,597	5,298,680	12.4	49
1997	13.795	7.446	617,761	5,380,190	11.5	45
1998	14.276	7.439	611,535	5,432,350	11.3	43
1999	14.652	7.057	579,996	5,404,480	10.7	40
2000	14.724	7.659	595,495	5,381,460	11.1	40
2001	15.192	7.410	599,610	5,479,390	10.9	39
2002	16.310	8.149	618,930	5,531,260	11.2	38
2003	16.987	8.967	669,507	5,675,130	11.8	39
2004	18.047	9.414	680,351	5,862,900	11.6	38

Source: “Compendio de Series Estadísticas 1990–2004, I. Sindicalismo” Gobierno de Chile, Dirección del Trabajo, Departamento de Relaciones Laborales, Cuadros 1 & 2, pp. 6, 9.

** indicates no data available for these years.

Prior to the transition, the *Central Unitaria de Trabajadores* (CUT) and the leaders of the Concertación were essentially in agreement over the necessity of reforming the Pinochet labor code to redress the extreme inequities the military regimes' neoliberal development policies had created. In practical terms, the center-left alliance and the CUT agreed on the need to expand worker participation rights, to promote investment in job training and to increase employment stability in exchange for wage variability (Haagh, 2002b, p. 93). However, this agreement proved to be short lived. Both the Concertación and the CUT had to contend with a business sector which was highly cohesive and fully committed to maintaining the fragmentation and evisceration of the labor movement which it had achieved during the dictatorship (Haagh, 2002a, p. 61). Through implicit threats of destabilizing the democratic regime, the business sector was able to extract from the Concertación legislative concessions on key labor-reform issues (Haagh, 2002b, p. 94). In the process, it precipitated division between the Concertación and the CUT. These dynamics are evident in the process of labor reform negotiations, which ensued under the transition government of President Patricio Aylwin.

The Aylwin government proclaimed as one of its primary objectives the achievement of "growth with equity." In other words, the Concertación would preserve the neoliberal model's emphasis on economic growth but it would also emphasize the promotion of greater economic and social equality by adopting social and labor policies aimed at improving conditions for Chile's poorest citizens. Reforming the more extreme elements of the military regime's labor code was an essential step in achieving this objective. Despite its good intentions, however, the Aylwin administration was able to enact only modest changes to the military regime's labor code. Its limited success resulted, in part, from its reluctance to antagonize the business sector by advocating on behalf of the labor movement. Rather than assume an activist role on behalf of labor to help compensate for its relative weakness vis-à-vis business, the government emphasized the importance of business-labor accords with minimal intervention from the state. However, soon after beginning negotiations in early 1990 the CPC and the CUT were deadlocked. The CPC opposed any proposals that would require a statement of cause for worker dismissal or that would enhance worker representation. Moreover, it rejected restricting collective bargaining to unions and resisted any attempts to limit employers' ability to modify work contracts granted to them in Article 12 of the *Plan Laboral*. Above all, the CPC remained steadfast in its opposition to any reforms that would facilitate the discussion of labor issues beyond the firm level (Haagh, 2002b, pp. 95–96).

Given this stalemate, the Aylwin government was forced to pursue separate negotiations with the CPC and the CUT. Ultimately, it presented its own set of legislative proposals, which were a watered down version of its 1989 Program. While the 1989 Program called for “profound” changes to restore workers’ rights and create equitable capital–labor relations, the government backed away from advocating such profound reforms once in office. It now argued that labor policy should be defined by the autonomous negotiation of workers and management. The sole form of state intervention was to be enforcement of compliance with the rules of the game. Moreover, in order to limit debate and minimize conflict, the government introduced the most important labor reform projects in the Senate, where, given the presence of the designated senators, the Concertación was in the minority. As a result, it succeeded in passing only modest reforms but was able to attribute culpability for the significant concessions it made to its rightist opposition (Barrett, 2001, p. 585).

The most important change adopted under the Aylwin administration relates to the employer’s last offer in contract negotiations. If this offer is identical to the previous contract and includes a wage adjustment at least equal to the inflation rate, the employer has the right to replace workers from the first day of the strike (Article 157) (Frank, 2002, p. 42). In what would appear to be a counterbalance to this provision, the law stipulates that even if striking workers have been replaced by strikebreakers, they should be allowed to return to their jobs after the strike. However, according to Volker Frank,

In practice ... this does not happen. The new law simply requires employers “to justify” the dismissal of a worker. This is usually done by arguing that it was “necessary.” An employer’s decision, furthermore, cannot be contested; the employer can only be forced to pay additional compensation. Thus employment protection during strikes is effectively eliminated by employers’ unrestricted power to fire workers. (*ibid.*)

The ineffectiveness of the aforementioned reform compounded the Aylwin administration’s failure to repeal much more egregious elements of the Pinochet labor code. For example, the Aylwin legislation failed to repeal the Pinochet labor code’s restriction on permissible issues of bargaining. Consequently, the new law proscribed any matters that “may limit the employer’s ability to organize, direct or administer the firm,” (González Moya, 1991b, p. 52). This provision perpetuated the most important provision of the 1979 code (Haagh, 2002b, p. 101). The new labor code’s preservation of bargaining groups reinforced employer dominance vis-à-vis labor. The Pinochet regime introduced bargaining groups to compete with unions and

to thereby undermine their power. These were groups of any number of workers that assembled for the purpose of bargaining and dissolved once a labor agreement was signed. Unlike unions, bargaining groups had no legal right to information. Moreover, these groups would typically sign a convention rather than a contract, the distinction being that conventions did not grant them the right to strike or other minimal rights normally entailed in collective bargaining. Worker use of bargaining groups and conventions increased substantially throughout the 1990s, resulting in a relative decline in the strength of unions (Haagh, 2002b, p. 103).

Labor code reforms under Frei did little to rectify these inequities. Shortly after assuming office in March of 1994, the Frei administration enacted legislation that recognized public employees' associations by granting them legal status (Frank, 2002, pp. 42–43). However, despite this positive development, the CUT severed relations with the administration in November 1994 in reaction to Frei's perceived slow response to its proposals for more expansive labor reforms. In attempts to placate the labor movement and counteract its pro-business image, the government submitted a second package of labor reforms to Congress in January 1995. The proposal package included reforms to expand collective bargaining, to end the employer's right to replace striking workers, and to adopt flexibility provisions that were less lopsided in favor of business (*ibid.*, pp. 43–45). Taken together, these reforms, if enacted, would have substantially improved protections for workers in Chile's labor market. Ultimately, however, the government failed to placate the CUT and antagonized the right. The rightist majority in the Senate immediately rejected the reform package while business launched a strident campaign attacking the CUT. Meanwhile, in response to the government's half-hearted attempts to pass the reforms, the CUT resumed its confrontational approach. The 1996 CUT elections, in which Socialist vice president Arturo Martínez defied his own party by negotiating with the Communist Party to help elect a Socialist as President and Communist as vice president, reflected the growing divide between the government and the labor movement (Barrett, 2001, pp. 591–592). The Frei administration's failed reform efforts in 1997 and 1999 did little to repair this divide.

The pattern of labor reform witnessed under the Aylwin and the Frei administrations has persisted under President Lagos. Like its predecessors, the Lagos government proclaimed the importance of significant labor reform early on in its administration and laid out an ambitious reform program, only to significantly scale back its proposals in response to opposition from business associations and employers. As a result, Lagos has passed only modest reforms, thereby appeasing the business community, exacerbating

the existing rift between the Concertación and the CUT, and leaving the labor movement with nearly as little influence and organizational capacity as it possessed prior to the democratic transition.

During the 1999 presidential campaign, Lagos and his team emphasized their commitment to passage of an ambitious labor-reform program that included a substantial increase in collective bargaining rights and the prohibition of employers from replacing striking workers. However, even before Lagos' inauguration, employers announced that they would oppose these reforms. In attempts to mollify this opposition and to avoid the pitfalls previous Concertación governments had encountered, the Lagos administration decided to reestablish direct negotiations between the CPC and the CUT. While the government was willing to move slowly and achieve reforms incrementally, Labor Minister Ricardo Solari made clear that it would not abandon "fundamental aspects" of the new reform, namely the prohibition on replacing striking workers and the right to collective bargaining of interenterprise unions (Frank, 2002, p. 50). By July 2000, however, only a few months after its original proclamations, the government had deemphasized the importance of these reform proposals. With respect to the replacement of striking workers, for example, Minister Solari asserted that though the law allows this practice, it had actually never occurred. This was, as Frank notes, an "astonishing" claim given that throughout the 1990s the *Dirección del Trabajo* regularly published reports substantiating and criticizing precisely this kind of employer abuse (*ibid.*, p. 51).

What was ultimately most influential in determining government labor policy was not data documenting employer use of replacement workers during strikes but pressure from business to keep this right intact. On September 7, 2000, in a meeting to discuss major economic issues, representatives from Chile's most influential employer associations asserted to Lagos and his top ministers that the stalled labor reform project was creating uncertainty and threatening reactivation of the economy. The next day, Solari announced that the government would drop from its reform proposal interenterprise collective bargaining and the prohibition against replacing striking workers (*ibid.*, p. 52). Although the government would reincorporate these provisions in December 2000 in response to pressures from the labor movement and parties within the Concertación, by January 2001 it had again abandoned them (Fernández, 2002, pp. 34–35).

Thus, once again, pressure from the business community had succeeded in forcing the Concertación to dramatically scale back labor reform, despite strong opposition from the CUT. The labor reform law that the Senate passed on September 11, 2001, did make some modest steps toward

addressing the inequities between business and labor. For example, unions or bargaining groups could now legally demand official financial information from firms several months in advance of collective bargaining negotiations. The law also reduced the number of workers required to form a union and no longer allowed firms to demand the dissolution of unions. In addition, the law established that, beginning in January 2005, the legal workweek would be lowered from 48 to 45 hours. Despite these advances, little progress was made on the issues of primary concern to the labor movement – collective bargaining and the use of replacement workers during strikes. The law maintained the established practice of allowing firms to decide voluntarily whether to engage in collective bargaining negotiations, perpetuating conditions under which only a small minority of the Chilean labor force enjoys the right to collective bargaining.⁴ And rather than ban the practice of hiring replacement workers during strikes, the law made the practice more costly for employers by requiring them to pay a bond for each replacement worker to be shared among the strikers.⁵ To register its dissatisfaction with these reforms, the CUT leadership declined to attend the government's signing ceremony announcing passage of the labor reform law (*ibid.*, p. 44).

Since the promulgation of the 2001 labor reform law and despite the passage of a second labor reform proposal, relations between the government and the CUT have shown little signs of improvement. The Lagos administration has continued its emphasis on economic growth, macroeconomic stability and labor flexibility as the proper means for improving conditions for Chilean workers. Meanwhile, the CUT continues to view the government as insufficiently attentive to labor's concerns. These divisions came to a head in 2003 as discussions of a second reform proposal dealing with labor flexibility were developing. In setting the stage for these discussions, President Lagos emphasized that economic growth remained the government's central objective and reaffirmed the necessity of maintaining the existing fiscal scheme (i.e. maintaining a budget surplus of at least one percent of GDP). Prominent business leaders, including CPC head Juan Claro, responded positively to the President's comments (*La Tercera (Santiago) online, 2003a, May 22*). In contrast, CUT President, Arturo Martinez, was highly critical of Lago's remarks. "In matters of labor flexibility," Martinez responded, "the government has not listened to the workers or the labor movement. This [reform] does not provide employment, only precariousness. We feel defrauded because in these types of matters only entrepreneurs are listened to" (*La Tercera (Santiago) online, 2003b, May 21; author's translation*).

In an effort to demonstrate its opposition to the government's position and to punish the business community for its lack of respect for existing labor standards, the CUT called a national work stoppage (*paro*) for August 13. Rather than demonstrate its strength to the government and the business community, however, limited support for the *paro* exposed the labor movement's weakness and internal divisions. As a result, rather than feeling pressured to address labor's primary concerns, the government has had more leeway to pursue labor reform consistent with its economic objectives. Accordingly, it successfully passed a second round of reforms on May 16, 2005. These reforms focus on reducing the lengthy delays in adjudicating workers' complaints against employers, from the norm of a year or more down to a few months. To accomplish this goal, the new legislation doubles the number of judges specializing in labor matters from 20 to 40 (*La Tercera* (Santiago) online, 2005a, May 16).

While these are positive reforms, their impact remains to be seen since they do not take effect until March 2007. More importantly, however, they do little to address the fundamental causes underlying the severe power and resource inequities which continue to exist between business and labor in contemporary Chile. The perpetuation of bargaining groups continues to undercut the negotiating power of traditional unions. Collective bargaining remains voluntary; given the antipathy of Chilean business associations and employers to the practice, its steady decline since the transition was to be expected (see Table 2). The original strictures of the military regime's *Plan Laboral* which prohibit workers from negotiating on any matters, which might interfere with the employer's right to organize work remain in force. The expansion of the judicial system to more efficiently adjudicate workers' complaints against employers may ensure that more workers are duly compensated for their dismissal. Nonetheless, employers retain the right to dismiss workers on the open-ended grounds that it is necessary for the efficient functioning of the firm. Moreover, employers retain the right to hire replacement workers during strikes; the new law merely requires them to pay a bond for each striking worker that they hire. Until the law goes into effect, it is impossible to determine if it will reduce employers' propensity and capacity to subvert the impact of strikes by hiring replacement workers. Yet given the relatively low level of strike activity since the 1990 transition, it appears that this powerful right wielded by employers has been a significant deterrent against workers engaging in strikes (see Table 3). Finally, the 2001 reform measure lowering the number of workers necessary to form a union may have actually weakened the labor movement. Since the reform went into effect, the number of unions has

Table 2. Rate of Collective Bargaining – 1990–2004.

Year	Salaried Employees	Salaried Employees Involved in Collective Bargaining	Rate of Collective Bargaining – Salaried Employees
1990	3,112,680	184,556	5.9
1991	3,199,030	252,385	8.0
1992	3,367,330	226,445	6.7
1993	3,554,240	255,226	7.1
1994	3,519,060	226,759	6.4
1995	3,592,890	210,089	5.8
1996	3,713,080	225,659	6.0
1997	3,787,620	192,256	5.0
1998	3,758,590	206,230	5.5
1999	3,740,110	161,834	4.3
2000	3,735,950	182,792	4.9
2001	3,759,320	160,197	4.3
2002	3,787,300	175,852	4.6
2003	3,872,630	137,985	3.6
2004	3,996,110	165,212	4.1

Source: “Compendio de Series Estadísticas 1990–2004, I. Sindicalismo,” p. 6, Cuadro 1 and “II. Negociación Colectiva” p. 5, Cuadro 2, Gobierno de Chile, Dirección del Trabajo, Departamento de Relaciones Laborales.

Table 3. Strike Activity – 1990–2004.

Year	Legal Strikes	Workers Involved	Total Days Duration	Average Days Duration
1990	176	25,010	2,643	15
1991	219	45,910	2,725	12.4
1992	247	26,962	2,975	12.0
1993	224	25,098	2,578	11.5
1994	196	16,209	2,640	13.5
1995	187	24,724	2,324	12.4
1996	183	25,776	1,795	9.8
1997	179	19,278	1,850	10.3
1998	121	12,608	1,204	10.0
1999	108	10,667	1,308	12.0
2000	125	13,227	1,121	9.0
2001	86	11,591	805	9.4
2002	117	14,662	1,363	11.6
2003	92	10,443	802	8.7
2004	125	13,013	1,586	12.7

Source: “Compendio de Series Estadísticas 1990–2004, III. Huelgas” p. 3, Cuadro 1, Gobierno de Chile, Dirección del Trabajo, Departamento de Relaciones Laborales.

steadily increased while the average number of workers per union has steadily declined, trends that indicate a diminution of the labor movement's collective strength (see Table 1).

The labor code further weakens the position of workers by continuing to allow employers to arbitrarily modify work contracts, thereby perpetuating precarious employment. The precarious nature of employment in Chile is evident in both urban and rural sectors as well as the formal and informal sectors. Given the ease with which companies can dismiss employees, they have adopted labor practices that emphasize flexibility through subcontracting rather than cultivating a stable labor force through the provision of long-term contracts. Employees who do hold stable positions tend to be men while subcontracted and part-time employees tend to be women (Martínez & Díaz, 1996, p. 128). On the other hand, many men are subject to the same degree of employment instability as women, a condition that does not necessarily diminish when economic growth spurs increased employment opportunities. Rather than finding full-time positions during periods of economic expansion, workers engaged in subcontracting more typically find an increase in these sorts of opportunities. Thus, a worker who is accustomed to subcontracting for only one firm may now find such opportunities at a number of firms or a number of different jobs within the same firm. It is important to note that these subcontracting arrangements are established through agreements between individuals and employers without state oversight or collective bargaining (*ibid.*, p. 114). In fact, less than 12 percent of the Chilean workforce is unionized (see Table 1), a rate only marginally better than what it was during the dictatorship and significantly lower than the pre-coup high of approximately 35 percent (Roberts, 2002, pp. 20, 22).

The repercussions resulting from these impediments to collective action are striking. While unemployment in Chile remains low relative to many of its neighbors, income inequality has increased, signifying the transformation of Chile over the last 25 years from one of the most equitable societies in Latin America to one of the most inequitable not only in the region but in the world.⁶ In this context, it is not surprising that 41 percent of the two lowest income quintiles in Chile – nearly half the nation's poorest citizens – are employed in the urban formal sector. Such figures illustrate the fact that wages are so low in Chile that for many Chileans formal employment is not necessarily an escape from poverty (Martínez & Díaz, 1996, pp. 126–127). The state has not been neutral in the establishment of such labor market inequities but rather has acted as the central protagonist in their creation and perpetuation.

4.3. Social Welfare, Stratification and Popular Sector Disarticulation

The state has played a similar role in creating and maintaining a social welfare regime which exacerbates the already substantial obstacles to collective action present in the labor market. Indeed, Chile's highly segmented and stratified welfare system is the functional counterpart to the stratified wage system and labor market of which precarious employment is a product. As such, the Chilean liberal welfare regime epitomizes the liberal welfare regime model conceptualized by Esping-Andersen (1990).

According to Esping-Andersen, liberal welfare regimes, such as the one instituted by the Pinochet regime, militate against broad-based, multi-class support for the welfare state at the same time that they reinforce the stratified class relations out of which they evolve. They do this, first, by subsidizing private social welfare schemes which primarily benefit the middle classes and the more privileged segments of the working classes. In this manner, liberal welfare regimes effectively thwart the convergence of middle and working class support for a more comprehensive welfare state. In short, to the extent that economically privileged citizens are able to provide for their own needs in the private sector, they are likely to be reluctant to subsidize those who have been less successful in the marketplace. Second, citizens who are compelled by their precarious economic circumstances to request public assistance are subjected to stigmatizing means testing as a prerequisite for obtaining benefits. Through the employ of these administrative mechanisms, liberal welfare regimes are able to significantly limit access to, as well as inhibit demand for, benefits. And finally, liberal regimes often compound the effects of the foregoing administrative arrangements by implementing complex sets of differentiated programs, which by creating diverse, sometimes competing constituencies subvert working class unity (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 27).

The liberal welfare regime implemented by the military regime and preserved under the present democratic regime has institutionalized the stratifying dynamics described above. Such dynamics are evident in the social security system, the health care system, and in the state's distribution of subsidies at the local level through "targeted assistance." With respect to social security reform, the military regime replaced the original system, which was based on combined contributions from workers, employers and the state, with a privately managed pension system in which benefits are based on individual characteristics and contributions. Although the private sector now manages the bulk of pension funds, the state continues to play a significant role in financing transition costs to the new system as well as

providing guarantees and regulatory mechanisms. Thus characterizing the new system as purely “private” in contrast to the old “public” system is inaccurate (Gillion & Bonilla, 1992). A more accurate characterization of the new system focuses on the manner in which it distributes risks and benefits as well as the (dis)incentives it provides for solidarity among workers. When considering these features of the new system, we see that employers and better-positioned workers reap the greatest benefits, economic risks have been transferred to individuals, and the manner in which the system distributes benefits and risks exacerbates already high levels of stratification among workers on the basis of occupational and gender differences.

The manner in which employers benefit from the new system is twofold. First, they benefit from no longer having to make contributions to pension funds on behalf of workers. And second, the significant reduction in wage costs that this change has produced facilitates employers' increased competitiveness in the global economy.⁷ Some analysts also assert that pension fund privatization greatly increases the domestic savings rate, thereby providing more capital for private investment. However, empirical evidence suggests that the increased savings rates observed in Chile in the late 1980s resulted from the 1984 tax reform rather than privatization (Kay, 2000, p. 191). On the other hand, privatization has generated substantial transition costs, which will continue to burden what remains of the public pension system into the foreseeable future. In order to entice workers to transfer to the new system, the military regime permitted them to transfer their contributions to the old system into the profit-making entities which manage the new system, the Administrators of Pension Funds or AFPs. These transfer payments consume a quarter of the state's annual social budget, usurping funding for other social needs. Moreover, this systematic transfer of state resources to the private sector has had a devastating impact on the old social security system, generating a deficit of nearly five percent of GDP (Vergara, 1997, p. 213).

At best, the new system has generated only modest gains for workers while it will generate a fiscal burden for the state for decades to come. When we factor in commissions charged by AFPs, the average worker entering the system after 1990 received negative annual returns through 1998 (Kay, 2000, p. 198). Moreover, the reduction in administrative costs that advocates of privatization argued the AFPs would produce has not occurred. The three AFPs with the largest number of insured, covering approximately 78 percent of all workers participating in the system, have not systematically charged the lowest commissions nor paid the highest capital returns. Enticements by

AFP salesmen or promoters (who earn commissions on the workers they sign up) and the insured's lack of information and/or skill in choosing the best administrators impede the realization of lower costs and higher returns that were to be achieved through competition among AFPs (Mesa-Lago, 2002, p. 1314).

The failure of efficiency gains to materialize for workers is mirrored in the failure of the privatized system to produce a reduction in fiscal costs for the state. In addition to financing the transfer of workers from the old system (an obligation which will continue until the last of these workers has passed away), the state is obligated to provide a minimum pension for those workers who have 20 years of contributions and who have reached the appropriate age (65 for men and 60 for women) but whose personal funds fall below a specified minimum. Additionally, the state provides a limited number of public assistance pensions to the elderly destitute who have no other means of support (Gillion & Bonilla, 1992, p. 180).⁸ Between 1981 and 2000 fiscal costs related to these state obligations increased from 3.8 percent to 6.1 percent of GDP. Though fiscal costs are expected to decline over time, they are expected to still consume 3.3 percent of GDP in 2040, six decades after the reform was initiated (Mesa-Lago, 2002, p. 1318).

Despite the state's obligations noted above, workers who experience the most vulnerability to market fluctuations in the labor market are also the most vulnerable with respect to retirement benefits. For example, workers in the informal sector or who rely primarily on subcontracting for employment will be the least able to make consistent contributions to individual pension funds. This is particularly problematic since only workers who make 20 years of contributions to AFPs are eligible for minimum pension subsidies from the state. Workers who are most subject to periods of un- and underemployment will thus be doubly punished since they will be the very workers most likely to be unable to meet the 20-year requirement. Moreover, the high transition costs involved in converting to the new system as well as the substantial obligations the state will likely be forced to fulfill under less than favorable market conditions means that there will be fewer state resources to provide subsidies to the most needy. Not surprisingly, many of the most needy are women since in comparison to men they are more likely to work in the informal sector and experience higher rates of unemployment, greater labor instability and lower incomes. Also, working women tend to experience more interruptions in their careers than men as a result of marriage and child bearing. Consequently, women more so than men will be unable to meet the requirements to receive a minimum pension subsidy from the state. And even when they do meet the 20-year

requirement, their pensions will on average be lower than their male counterparts' due to their lower incomes and greater life expectancy (Arenas de Mesa & Montecinos, 1999, pp. 22, 29).

Thus inequities in the pension system in terms of class and gender are both a reflection of – and reinforce – stratification in the labor market, thereby making it that much more difficult for workers to identify and organize around common interests. The privatized nature of the system compounds these problems by dramatically reducing the role of political parties in adjudicating these issues. While under the statist development model political parties organized and mobilized popular constituencies around retirement resources, under neoliberalism this is no longer the case. Thus despite widespread dissatisfaction with AFPs, with only 29 percent of the public expressing confidence in them (CERC, 2005, p. 2), they have not become the basis upon which to organize popular sector collective action.

Patterns of inequity similar to those in Chile's pension system are evident in the nation's reformed health care system. As with the retirement system, the military regime created a private health care system, the for-profit Institutions of Provisional Health (*Instituciones de Salud Previsional* or ISAPRES, comparable to HMOs in the US). The ISAPRES cater to workers with higher incomes and drain substantial resources from the public system. They are only open to those workers whose incomes are high enough to afford the private coverage, while the public system, the *Fondo Nacional De Salud* (FONASA) is available to all citizens, including those who are covered in the private system. The military regime transferred huge resources from the public system to the ISAPRES. Allowing workers with higher incomes to divert to the private system contributions that previously would have gone to the public system exacerbates this problem. The inequities caused by this arrangement are substantial. For example, in 1990 the ISAPRES covered 14.6 percent of the population but used 39.1 percent of all benefit expenditures in the health care system (Gillion & Bonilla, 1992, p. 178). Over 80 percent of Chilean families in the two lowest income quintiles belong to the public health insurance system (Sapelli, 2004, p. 260). This inequity is further compounded by the practice of the ISAPRES to exclude from coverage elderly people, the chronically infirm, those who suffer from preexisting conditions and individuals with large families. Additionally, most ISAPRES affiliates cannot afford plans that cover costly health problems or diseases.

As a result, many of those with the most severe health problems or greatest health care needs are forced to turn to the public health care system for care, further straining a system which is increasingly underfunded,

understaffed and underequipped (Vergara, 1997, p. 213). Moreover, the FONASA reinforces the social stratification produced in the private sector by segmenting affiliates of the public system into four distinct categories – A, B, C and D – on the basis of income level. The poorest affiliates, those in category A, are not obligated to pay for the care that they receive, while affiliates in the other three categories are expected to pay progressively higher fees for medical treatment based upon their greater income levels.⁹

The Lagos government has touted its health care reform plan, Plan AUGE (*Acceso Universal de Garantías Explícitas* or Explicit Guarantees of Universal Access), as an effective remedy to the inequities that exist between the public and private health care systems. Since the program went into effect in July of 2005 and will not be fully operational until 2007, it is not possible to make a definitive assessment of this claim. Nonetheless, the structure of the program suggests that it will not adequately address the problems specified above; it may, in fact, exacerbate them. The plan guarantees coverage in a specified amount of time for a delimited set of health conditions. On the positive side, such guarantees establish health care as a right which the state has the obligation to fulfill.¹⁰ The establishment of such a right may provide the basis for collective action among affected constituencies if they perceive that the state has failed to meet its obligations. However, the delimited nature of the program – some diseases and treatments are covered while others are not or are given lesser priority – belies the suggestion that it is universal in scope. Indeed, the plan may further undermine social solidarity by creating or reinforcing competing and unequal constituencies on the basis of (1) the ability to pay (as with the previous system, those with greater means are expected to pay more), (2) diseases covered and not covered; which, in turn, exacerbates existing inequities on the basis of (3) age and sex.

Under circumstances in which there are insufficient resources or there is insufficient political will to provide full universal coverage, targeted assistance may be the next best option; ideally it will insure that those least able to pay will receive the greatest support. Yet for this arrangement to be effective, taxation and program funding must be sufficient. Unfortunately, the Lagos government has been only partially successful in ensuring that Plan AUGE and other social welfare reform programs have sufficient funding. While Congress approved an increase in the value added tax from 18 to 19 percent in July 2003, the rightist opposition in the Senate rejected the government's proposal for an increase in taxes on alcohol and diesel fuel. As a designated senator, former President Frei was in a position to break the deadlock between the government and the opposition. Yet he abstained,

effectively defeating Lagos's proposal. As a result, the government was left with a \$100 million shortfall in revenues necessary to cover its social welfare programs (La Tercera (Santiago) online, 2003c, July 4). Such dissension between the government and members of its own coalition on these issues reflects the continuing struggles over achieving growth with equity in Chile and lessens the likelihood that Plan AUGE will be a significant improvement over the existing health care system.

4.4. *Local Government and Social Welfare*

Inequity and increased stratification are also characteristic of social programs administered at the municipal level of government. We can see this through examination of two key programs – FOSIS (Fund for Solidarity and Social Investment), a program intended to develop social capital, and the government's housing program. Though slightly modified, the current housing program is essentially the same as that which was originally designed and implemented under military rule. The dictatorship, in order to preempt the politicization of housing, which occurred under Frei and Allende, restructured the allocation of housing resources in a manner designed to promote competition among potential recipients. Thus within each *población* or shantytown, it established a lottery system in which groups of no more than 50 families would compete against one another for the same limited pool of housing subsidies. Each group was awarded points on the basis of a set of criteria established by the central government but assessed at the municipal level. In other words, assessors from the municipal government would evaluate the housing needs of each family in the municipality according to a standardized set of criteria. On the basis of this evaluation, the municipal government would assign each family a score meant to reflect its relative need. The municipality would then tally the scores of all families in each competing group to derive the group's ranking in the housing lottery.¹¹

By replicating this method of administration, the post-transition governments of the Concertación – like their authoritarian predecessors – have effectively subverted the unifying potential of the historically volatile housing issue. Municipal administration of the housing program inevitably deflects attention away from the central government's role in establishing eligibility criteria and funding levels. It severely constrains the capacity of grassroots leaders to build popular organizations devoted to the housing issue which can surmount municipal boundaries. Government housing policy further subverts the potential for collective action by barring those who participate in land seizures, a common tactic which marginalized groups

used under Frei Montalvo and Allende to acquire land and government subsidized housing, from participating in the current housing program. And perhaps most importantly, by imposing relative rankings upon families and the groups in which they participate, the government has successfully institutionalized competition at the local level.

The element of competition is introduced into the housing distribution system in two ways: (1) by providing easier access to subsidies and a greater variety of subsidy options to *pobladores* (shantytown dwellers) with greater savings and savings capacity and (2) by the manner in which the relative need of individuals and groups is determined. In the first instance, shantytown dwellers who have greater savings and earning power are eligible for private sector mortgages which are subsidized by the state and are eligible for housing which is more than twice the size of the housing available to the neediest residents of the shantytowns (i.e. 100 vs. 42 m²).¹² In the second instance, state-imposed means testing stratifies low-income citizens according to relative need, determining in the process their eligibility for limited state benefits. The manner in which the state determines relative need and the targeted nature of access to housing subsidy benefits promotes competition and distrust among potential recipients.

The state determines relative need on the basis of a survey instrument originally adopted under the military regime, the Ficha CAS-2. The instrument, which derives its name from the *Comités de Asistencia Social Comunal* originally established in the 1970s, was designed by the military regime to target resources at the most needy in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. In other words, the state would promote efficiency by delivering resources at the lowest level of government possible and with the ultimate objective of facilitating marginalized citizens' participation in the private market. The military regime introduced the original survey instrument in 1980 (Ficha CAS-1) and updated it in 1987 (Ficha CAS-2). The regime's survey instrument and resource allocation strategy are still in force today. Accordingly, municipal officials administer the survey instrument, which assesses a variety of factors including the condition under which low-income residents live. On the basis of this assessment, these officials assign a score intended to reflect the residents' relative need – the lower the score the higher the need. Individuals with lower scores have a greater likelihood of receiving state subsidies.¹³

In order to enhance their relative eligibility, residents of the shantytowns compete to portray their respective living conditions to municipal assessors in the neediest light possible, a practice which tends to cause resentment and distrust among neighbors. As one grassroots leader put it, "This policy

divides the community. It encourages dishonesty and competition among families. If a family has a television or a wooden floor or anything that gives the appearance of being better off than its neighbors, in order to receive a higher ranking it will remove these things when the officials come from the municipality. Neighbors become suspicious of one another. Under these circumstances we can no longer build unity.”¹⁴

Other social leaders dealing with the housing issue voiced strikingly similar observations. For example, Sabina, leader of the *Comité de Allegados* in the shantytown La Pincoya in the municipality of Huecheraba, stated, “I do not agree with the way the needs of poor people are being assessed ... people hide all their material possessions when they are visited by social workers. This assessment system is not good since it leads people to lie. Therefore, the scores are not fairly assigned to poor families.”¹⁵ Another social leader involved with the housing issue, in the shantytown of Yungay in the municipality of La Granja, expressed a similar criticism: “this is not a fair system since social workers are very subjective when assessing people’s housing needs. For example, if they see that the *pobladores* have certain material possessions that they acquired with great effort, they might think that they are not in need of a house.”¹⁶

Such obstacles to popular unity are not exclusive to social programs, which originated during the dictatorship. For example, FOSIS, perhaps the most highly acclaimed social program for alleviating poverty devised and implemented by the Concertación, reinforces central government control as well as popular competition and stratification not unlike what occurs in the government’s housing program. The Aylwin government set up FOSIS within the Planning Ministry (MIDEPLAN) to respond to low-income communities proposals for social welfare infrastructure and credit and technical support for productive activities, such as microenterprises. The FOSIS administrative staff awards small grants to local governments and non-governmental organizations on the basis of proposals which are evaluated according to specific technical criteria (Graham, 1991, p. 22). Although in theory the program is designed to encourage local participation in grassroots development projects free from partisan control, there are several practical constraints that hinder the achievement of these objectives.

Perhaps the most obvious of these constraints is the limited funding that the program receives – less than one percent of total social spending despite being targeted at a subsector of the economy which comprises not less than 25 percent of the total labor force (Vergara, 1997, p. 211, 1994, pp. 251, 257). Moreover, beyond budgetary constraints are the elaborate procedures involved in writing and submitting successful grant proposals, the complexity

of which favors those communities and organizations with greater resources and higher levels of technical expertise. As might be expected, these communities are frequently not the ones most in need of development assistance and resources. Finally, despite the central government's claims to the contrary, many grassroots leaders assert that FOSIS grants are awarded on the basis of political connections which favor those communities and organizations most closely affiliated with the government. Such criticisms are not limited to the base, as a sociologist working in the MIDEPLAN office charged with overseeing the operation of FOSIS, Service of Technical Cooperation (SERCOTEC) intimated that "the vast majority of the FOSIS grants are awarded not according to need and technical merit but in a manner which promotes the political interests of the dominant party in government."¹⁷ Interviews of shantytown dwellers across the political spectrum lend support to this assessment.

Local residents and their elected representatives are divided over the usefulness of this program and the fairness of the manner in which grants are awarded. Many on the right viewed the program as a source of patronage for the ruling Concertación. For example, Alfredo Galdames, national director of the Unión Demócrata Independiente's (UDI) project to build support among *pobladores*, asserted, "in the case of FOSIS, the Christian Democratic party controls everything. Some other resources are controlled by the left ... clientelism still prevails today."¹⁸ These views were echoed by a party official from the right-of-center RN, "If you look at the FOSIS projects that have been approved you will not find a person from RN or the UDI. FOSIS projects exist mainly to benefit the leaders of the Christian Democratic sectors."¹⁹

As might be expected, *pobladores* affiliated with the PDC generally presented a more positive assessment of FOSIS; a number of interviewees indicated that they or someone they knew had received funding through FOSIS. However, similar to criticisms by those on the right, even some PDC members were critical of the way that the distribution of resources at the local level could be politicized. As one such grassroots leader put it, "In a way, we need to beg constantly [for resources]. In order to get a project approved, we have to submit it to either FOSIS or the municipality. The central government gives one of these two the money and then they give the money to the people who developed the project in the shantytown ... and if the municipalities act in a political way, all the different organizations will have to act likewise."²⁰

Thus this analysis suggests that FOSIS is a hybrid program, possessing both populist as well as neoliberal elements. On the one hand, it represents a

throwback to the practice of state patronage most characteristic of Chile's populist period. On the other, it promotes competition and stratification among communities and groups competing for the same pool of limited resources, as is characteristic of many neoliberal programs. Ultimately, the character of this program suggests that the *asistencialismo* of the statist era and today's emphasis on targeted assistance and the cultivation of social capital share much in common, including, most importantly, the objective of political control of the popular sectors.

Taken as a whole, we can see that Chile's social welfare system conforms quite well with Esping-Andersen's conceptualization of liberal welfare regimes. The substantial public subsidization of private pension and health care systems undercuts the likelihood that those groups who benefit the most from this arrangement – the upper and middle classes and better-positioned workers – might join with less fortunate workers to push the state for greater and more equitable benefits. What is more, the practice of individual capitalization in the pension system impedes the ability of workers to recognize common interests and common difficulties since the system encourages them to perceive their economic fate to be of their own making. In this regard, the system reinforces economic disparities between formal and informal sector workers as well as between men and women. Aggravating these social cleavages only intensifies the difficulty of uniting diverse segments of the popular sectors around common welfare concerns. Such cleavages are further aggravated by the means testing and competitive nature of resource distribution in social programs such as the state's housing program. Finally, while the Concertación has touted FOSIS as an effective means of stimulating the growth of technical expertise and social capital, its greatest function may be as a source of patronage and political control for the governing coalition.

In this regard, it bears mentioning that the institutional structure of local government facilitates such clientelistic practices and reinforces the divisive nature of social welfare programs such as FOSIS and the government's housing program. In particular, the law governing neighborhood associations (*juntas de vecinos*), enacted by the military regime just prior to the 1990 transition and continuing in force today, allows the formation of several neighborhood associations within one territorial unit. Many grassroots leaders affiliated with either the Concertación or the Communist Party are highly critical of this provision, asserting that it reinforces partisan divisions and limits popular unity (Posner, 2004, p. 70). The position of social leaders and party representatives on the right is more mixed. Some argue that the presence of several associations in the same neighborhood increases choice,

allowing *pobladores* to join the *junta* which is most effective in representing their interests. Others observe, however, that this system facilitates the distribution of resources on the basis of partisan affiliation. As a party official with the RN noted, "There are some neighborhood associations that have more resources than others. For example, if the mayor is from the Christian Democratic party, he will benefit the leaders of the *Juntas de Vecinos* formed by the Christian Democratic members."²¹ To the extent that this practice prevails, it undermines the *pobladores*' capacity and propensity to unite in pursuit of their common interests.

5. CONCLUSION

This analysis draws upon the prior theoretical insights of Evans, Migdal, Brockett, Skocpol and others to suggest that the manner in which the state is embedded in civil society – and the policies it adopts as a result – shapes the political opportunity structure for competing segments of the population. As the Chilean case illustrates, the state is reflective of conflicts and competing interests within civil society and also seeks to shape and control the development and expressions of these interests through its policies and institutional mechanisms of control. The adoption and perpetuation of a neoliberal economic model in Chile, and the changes in state structure and policies which have accompanied it, have greatly enhanced the economic and political leverage of business elites in Chile while simultaneously erecting substantial impediments to popular sector collective action. Accordingly, this analysis contradicts the assumption prevalent in much of the political economy literature and promoted by advocates of market-oriented reform that the state under a market-based economy plays a minimal, if not neutral, role in structuring economic and political opportunities.

To the contrary, the state's actions are driven by dominant groups in civil society in collusion with state managers. At critical junctures in national development, state managers and their allies in civil society are in a position to radically reshape the institutional structures of the state. Their aim is to reconfigure the state's institutional structures in a manner conducive to the fulfillment of their particular ends and to thereby shift the balance of power among competing forces in society. In the process, they redraw the boundaries of debate regarding the proper structure of the state and the appropriate uses of state power and resources. The transition from state-led to market-oriented development in Chile must be understood in this light.

The evolution of ISI in Chile, spurred on by external events such as the Great Depression, established a relatively privileged position for the Chilean labor movement and the popular sectors more generally. The confluence of statist economic policies, a political regime which gave due recognition to leftist parties and a welfare regime which progressively expanded the provision of benefits created an environment which gave the popular sectors both the incentives and means to promote their collective interests. However, these conditions ultimately proved politically and economically unsustainable and provoked violent reaction from the right.

Once in power, the military regime, with the technical expertise of neoliberal technocrats and support and input from the business community, radically redesigned the Chilean state in a manner intended to undermine the popular sectors propensity and capacity for collective action. Chile's mode of transition to democracy, along with its new electoral regime, ensured that these state reforms would remain intact and that the business community would continue to have privileged access to policymakers and privileged influence over policy formation. Consequently, the state's neoliberal policies and programs continue to perpetuate the subordination of workers to a labor market predicated on flexibilization. Labor market and social welfare policies exacerbate already high levels of social stratification, deprive the public of vital resources, reinforce workers' vulnerability to the vagaries of the market and undermine the popular sectors' incentives for collective action. Thus analysis of the Chilean case indicates the importance of looking beyond the political regime to these elements of the state in order to accurately assess the popular sectors' capacity for effective collective action. It conveys the importance of looking at state structure and its impact on popular participation in assessing the quality of democracy. If, as Diamond and Molino (2004) suggest, participation can help strengthen democracy by building regime support among citizens through enhanced political accountability and representation, then clearly institutional and structural arrangements that impede or compromise such participation can have a deleterious impact on democracy.

We have already considered in detail the negative effects state structures and policies have had on the labor movement and upon relations among citizens at the local level. Recent public opinion polls and voting behavior suggest that these negative effects may be impacting Chilean democracy more broadly. Warning signs can be seen not only in the low public appraisal of economic institutions such as the AFPs and ISAPREs (29 and 20 percent respectively; CERC, 2005, p. 2) and in the public's view that there is an imbalance of power between business elites and unions (92 percent, *ibid.*)

but also in the extremely low opinion that the public holds of political parties and key political institutions. Only 22 percent of the public has confidence in the Chilean Senate, 20 percent in the judiciary, 18 percent in the Chamber of Deputies and an abysmally low 9 percent in political parties (*ibid.*).

The public's exceptionally low estimation of political parties reflects the view of the overwhelming majority of Chilean citizens that the political parties do not share their concerns (85 percent) and only preoccupy themselves with the people at election time (92 percent) (CERC, 2002a, p. 6). The public perceives a clear disjunction between its concerns and the state's policies, with 83 percent indicating that the state allocates insufficient resources for healthcare, 70 percent holding the same view with respect to education, 67 percent with respect to public safety and 60 percent with respect to housing (CERC, 2002b, p. 2). More broadly, 67 percent consider social equality more important than individual liberty, a perspective clearly at odds with neoliberal ideology, political economy and social policy as it has been adopted in Chile (CERC, 2004, p. 3). Despite the public's continuing support for egalitarian ideals and state intervention, however, the stratifying and fragmenting impact of neoliberal reforms appear to have weakened the trust which is the building block of social capital and essential for collective action. Only 9 percent of Chileans indicate that they trust most people, a decline of 10 percent since 1988, while 90 percent expresses the view that "one can never be too careful in dealing with others," an increase of 12 percent over the same period (CERC, 2002a, p. 7).

The public's disenchantment with economic and political institutions, and political parties in particular, are having a negative impact on electoral politics in Chile. Voter turnout and voter registration as percentages of the voting-age population have fallen significantly in the post-authoritarian period while the casting of spoiled or blank ballots, non-compliant abstention and non-registration have become highly common. For example, in Chile's 1997 legislative elections, 40 percent of Chileans decided to cast blank and spoiled ballots, to abstain, or not to register. Similarly, only 56 percent of eligible Chilean voters voted for a party in the 2001 legislative elections compared with 82 percent who did so in the 1989 legislative elections (Carlin, 2004, pp. 1, 5). Among the most significant factors explaining these trends are distrust in institutions and political alienation, in which voters do not identify with any of the parties or ideological tendencies within the political system. In other words, many of those who shirk mandatory voting laws or spoil their ballots do so in protest against the system. Others do not vote or fail to even register to vote because they have not been motivated by

a political party to do so (*ibid.*, pp. 19–20). This trend is consistent with Roberts' (2002) argument that under neoliberalism, parties previously closely aligned with organized labor and engaged in grassroots mobilization efforts have distanced themselves from labor, retreated from ideological appeals and eschewed the kind of mobilization efforts in which they previously engaged. Under these circumstances, voters who wish to protest the state's policies or to support an alternative development model are left without attractive electoral options.

To the extent that this trend pervades Chilean politics, it reflects the emergence of a vicious cycle, which does not bode well for the quality of the nation's young democracy. In essence, those citizens most in need of political representation are increasingly discouraged or impeded from taking the actions necessary to achieve it. The more they withdraw from the realm of electoral politics and the less they are capable of engaging in effective collective action, the less able they are to hold public officials accountable. And the less beholden these public officials feel to those alienated from the political system, the less likely they will be to enact policies that address their concerns. If this dynamic continues, policy will in all probability continue to be skewed in favor of the business community's interests, leading to further alienation within the popular sectors and thus the likelihood of their increased electoral retreat. With the perpetuation of this pattern, the quality and legitimacy of Chilean democracy will rest on increasingly shaky ground.

Only time will tell if this pattern will come to dominate Chilean politics. In the meantime, additional research is needed to assess the extent to which lessons learned from the Chilean case are applicable to other countries in Latin America and elsewhere. Given the Pinochet regime's successful implementation of radical neoliberal reforms well before the return to democracy, the Chilean case is unique in the region. In most other Latin American countries, the adoption of such reforms has often been much more contested and less sweeping. Moreover, in light of the ongoing economic crisis in Argentina and the ever-present threat of the spread of economic contagion across the region, the gospel of neoliberalism is increasingly viewed as apocryphal among Latin America's policy makers and citizens. Thus the notion of development – what it is and how it should best be achieved – may once again become a contested issue. In any event, we can be sure that no matter what models of development emerge to challenge the Washington Consensus, the state will play a key role in determining the capacity for meaningful political and economic participation of Latin America's most vulnerable citizens.

NOTES

1. It is generally agreed that a procedural minimum definition of democracy requires effective guarantees of civil liberties such as freedom of speech, assembly and association and presumes free and fair contested elections.

2. Migdal does not use the term “embeddedness” as does Evans. Nonetheless, he asserts that, “The autonomy of states, the slant of their policies, the preoccupying issues for their leaders, and their coherence are greatly influenced by the societies in which they operate” (Migdal, 2001, p. 56).

3. This constitutional reform, along with a reduction of the presidential term from six to four years and the right of the president to appoint or retire commanders of the different branches of the armed forces, among others, is scheduled to be approved by the Chilean Congress in plenary session on August 16, 2005 (*La Tercera (Santiago) online, 2005b, July 13*).

4. In addition to the fact that employers cannot be compelled to bargain collectively, there are a number of other factors that undermine workers’ capacity to bargain collectively. For example, workers in firms with more than 50 percent state ownership are barred from collective bargaining. Moreover, unions that operate beyond the plant level, including interenterprise and transitory unions created by the 1979 Plan Laboral, do not have the right to bargain collectively. As a result of restrictions such as these, only 10–12 percent of the Chilean labor force enjoys the right to bargain collectively (Frank, 2002, p. 41).

5. The bond was to be equal to four *unidades de fomento*, approximately 17,500 pesos or about \$125.00 at the current rate.

6. In the early 1970s, only Argentina had a more equitable distribution of income when compared with Brazil, Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela (Sheahan, 1987, p. 28, Table 2.2). Today, however, the only Latin American countries with a worse income distribution than Chile are Brazil and Colombia. Globally, Chile has the ninth worst income distribution in the world (World Bank (2005), *World Development Report*, pp. 258–259).

7. According to Kay (2000), overall payroll taxes have declined about 10 percent in Chile (p. 190).

8. These pensions are limited by statute to 300,000 and involve severe means testing. There is a long waiting list for these pensions whose monthly benefit is only about \$36.00 US (Gillion & Bonilla, 1992, p. 188).

9. See Ley 18469, *Regula el Ejercicio del Derecho Constitucional a la Protección de la Salud y Crea un Régimen de Prestaciones de Salud* (1985), Atriculos 29 and 30.

10. See Ley 19.966, *Régimen General de Garantías en Salud* (2004), particularly Artículo 2.

11. The system was not a lottery per se since the Housing ministry had ultimate jurisdiction over which groups in which communities received the housing.

12. See Saball (1994) for a description of the different subsidy options available and the different requirements pobladores must meet to be eligible for these various subsidies.

13. For a discussion of the historical background and present functioning of Ficha-CAS-2 see Ministerio de Planificación (<http://www.mideplan.cl>) as well as Vergara (1990, pp. 52–55).

14. October 25, 1993 interview with Soledad Araos, Communist Party militant and president of the neighborhood association in población La Victoria in the municipality of San Miguel, Santiago, Chile.

15. Interview with author, June 23, 2001, in the municipality of Huecheraba, Santiago, Chile. Comites de Allegados, roughly translated as Committees of Friends and Relatives, are groups established to compete for housing subsidies. Their name originates from the practice, common in Chile given the housing shortage, of multiple families living together in one small dwelling or those with dwellings taking in friends who would otherwise be homeless.

16. Author's interview with Carlos Ramirez, June 19, 2001, in the municipality of La Granja, Santiago, Chile.

17. November 19, 1993 interview with sociologist Marcelo Monsalves.

18. Interview with author, June 8, 2001.

19. Author interview with Mauricio Esquivel Alcaide, RN representative, June 9, 2001.

20. Author's interview with Carlos Ramirez, June 19, 2001, in Yungay población, the municipality of La Granja, Santiago, Chile.

21. Author interview with Mauricio Esquivel Alcaide, RN representative, June 9, 2001, Santiago, Chile.

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**PART II:
OPPOSITION POLITICS IN
AMERICA: PAST AND PRESENT**

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THE CIO AND THIRD PARTY POLITICS IN NEW YORK: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CIO–ALP

Stuart Eimer

ABSTRACT

The Congress of Industrial Organizations' (CIO) choice to build a labor party in New York was facilitated by an unusual institutional context that permitted unions to back a labor party while simultaneously endorsing other party's candidates. Though the CIO–ALP (American Labor Party) became a major political force in New York, CIO links to the party were ultimately severed after factions in the CIO–ALP opted to back a third party presidential candidacy. The rise and fall of the CIO–ALP highlights the need to be attentive to institutional context when explaining organized labor's “exceptional” choice to forgo building a national labor party in the United States.

INTRODUCTION

As is well known, the degree to which workers have developed class-based political movements has varied greatly across space and time, with the United States noteworthy for its lack of a viable socialist political party. This absence has given rise to an immense literature as academics from many

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fields have offered explanations for what has come to be known as “American Exceptionalism.” Research by sociologists has pointed to a variety of reasons for the failure of socialism in the United States including the prevalence of anti-class values (Lipset, 1974), ethnic antagonisms (Aronowitz, 1992), employer resistance (Voss, 1993), the sectarianism of American socialists (Bell, 1967), and the ability of capital to exit working class communities (Lembcke, 1995). A list stretching further back and across disciplines would offer many more reasons, such as the separation of work and community (Katznelson, 1981), the prevalence of machine politics (Shefter, 1986), high levels of social mobility and the early granting of male suffrage (Foner, 1984; Korpi & Shalev, 1980; Rogers, 1990).¹

The plethora of explanations led Marks (1989) to suggest that the literature on American Exceptionalism is “so replete with probable causes that we may be justified in thinking that we have hit upon a bogeyman of systematic social explanation – a nonoccurrence that is vastly overdetermined” (p. 197). To overcome this problem, Marks narrowed the question from “why no socialism in America” to “why no labor party in America,” hoping that this might be more precisely answered. He then argued that such factors as the composition of American unionism, the structure of political constraints, and the strategies of American socialists explained the absence of a labor party in the United States (Marks, 1989).

In this article, I follow Marks in shifting the question of American Exceptionalism from “why no socialism” to one that focuses on the issue of a labor party. However, in order to draw attention to the circumstances within which unions have been willing to build a labor party, I change the question from “why no labor party in America” to “why a union backed party in New York?”² More specifically, I explore two interrelated questions. First, what explains the fact that the Congress of Industrial Organizations’ (CIO) largest central labor council, the Greater New York Industrial Union Council (GNYIUC), officially committed to building the American Labor Party (ALP) for a period in the 1940s? Second, given the political success of the ALP, why did CIO support for the party come to an abrupt end in 1948?

In what follows, I argue that CIO leaders who believed that a labor party was needed to advance the interests of organized labor were able to back a labor party in New York because they were embedded in an institutional context that offered an unusual menu of political choices. The legality of fusion, or cross endorsement, permitted the GNYIUC to support a labor party that could run its own candidates for local office while simultaneously supporting other party’s candidates in larger races at the state and national

level. This strategy allowed CIO unions to back the ALP without completely breaking ties and souring relations with the Democratic Party. In short order, the use of fusion permitted the ALP to become a major political force in New York State. Despite the success of the ALP, CIO backing for the party ultimately proved to be short lived. The GNYIUC's decision to back the ALP as the New York base for a national third party that would directly challenge the Democrats for the presidency in 1948 created an intra-class struggle within the CIO over the appropriate role of a labor party in the American political context. In the end, after a very public fight that pit left against right, and the National CIO against the GNYIUC, the National CIO revoked the charter of the GNYIUC, thereby ending CIO support for the ALP.

INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL STRATEGY

In the early 1990s, [Kimeldorf \(1991\)](#) took new labor historians to task for the turn their field had taken toward culture, language and experience. While acknowledging that the new "bottom up" history had revealed previously ignored sources of radicalism and resistance within different spheres of working-class life, Kimeldorf argued that this approach had marginalized "unions and other institutional forces" ([Kimeldorf, 1991, p. 91](#)). By neglecting institutions, the new labor history had generated a "one sided" portrayal of working-class life which emphasized the cultural without situating it within a broader social context. As a corrective, Kimeldorf challenged researchers to develop a "new old labor history" that would be more attentive to the "institutional embeddedness of working class experience" ([Kimeldorf, 1991, p. 99](#)).

The new institutionalism that has emerged in the social sciences lends itself nicely to Kimeldorf's challenge to bring institutions back into labor history.³ Though this tendency has manifested itself in slightly different ways in each discipline, [Goodin \(1998\)](#) argues that "the new institutionalism is at root a reminder of the various contextual settings within which social action is set" (p. 19). It directs researchers to be attentive to the institutional contexts within which social actors are embedded, and asks that we be sensitive to the ways that these contexts influence the strategies and choices of social actors. By focusing on the way social actors craft strategies and make choices within a given set of constraints, the new institutionalism integrates both human agency and social structure, thereby providing an alternative to overly deterministic or unduly subjective approaches to understanding social action.

For the study of American Exceptionalism, a new institutionalist approach demands that we situate the political preferences and choices of union leaders within the broader institutional context within which unions were forced to operate.⁴ By doing so, we can consider the way constitutions, election laws, state structures and other political institutions “act as filters that selectively favor particular interpretations either of the goals toward which political actors strive or for the best means to achieve these ends” (Immergut, 1998, p. 20). Recognition of the way that institutions filter goals and strategies forces researchers to acknowledge that at times union leaders might have possessed preferences that they did not pursue due to institutional configurations that constrained their realization or success. Given a different institutional context, these same social actors might have opted to pursue these preferences via different strategies.

Moreover, it is important to note that different actors within the same context might craft different strategies and make different choices. As Immergut (1998) notes,

institutions do not determine behavior, they simply provide a context for action that helps us to understand why actors make the choices they do. Facing the same sets of institutional hurdles, self reflective actors can make creative decisions about how to proceed. (p. 26)

Consequently, researchers need to be attentive to the processes by which different actors seek to convince others that particular interpretations, strategies and choices should be pursued. With regard to questions of American Exceptionalism and working-class mobilization, this means being attentive to the “intra-class” struggles that occur as “leaders, factions or parties, with particular theories, social objectives, and political/organizational strategies” seek to convince others that their interpretations and strategies should be followed (Stepan-Norris & Zeitlin, 1989, p. 504).

THIRD PARTIES IN AMERICA: OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS

Explanations of American Exceptionalism often gloss over the inconvenient fact that American unions and voters have at times not looked all that exceptional. Marks (1989) points out that in 1912 Eugene Debs “received 6 percent of the national vote, a share exceeding that received by any other socialist party in an English speaking democracy before 1914” (p. 198). Weinstein (1974) presents data showing that 74 towns and major

municipalities ranging from Winslow, Arkansas to Milwaukee, Wisconsin had Socialist Mayors between 1911 and 1920. Similarly, he notes that dozens of legislators were elected to state government around the nation during the teens. Davin and Lynd (1979) note that such political activity was also widespread in the 1930s when “a remarkable number of independent labor and farmer-labor parties sprang up between the years 1932 and 1936” in a wide range of cities including Springfield, Massachusetts, New York City and Sioux Fall, South Dakota (p. 43).

The periodic emergence of these parties well into the 20th century is important to note since their very existence suggests that third party initiative were not uncommon. The question remains, however, as to why most of these movements were unable to sustain themselves for more than a brief period of time, and why so few were able to successfully field candidates beyond the local level. To explain this, it is necessary to consider the way the rules governing American elections have made it extremely difficult for minor parties of both the left and right to develop the capacity to successfully compete over the course of several elections, particularly at the state and national levels.

Institutional Constraints

Among the most important reasons for the failure of third parties has been the widespread presence of single member winner takes all districts (SMWTAD) in the United States. Under such an election system, the party that receives a plurality of votes in a district wins a place in government. The losing parties, regardless of their vote share, are rewarded no seats in government, and are thus denied representation.⁵ While such a system denies representation to second place parties, it does not function to destroy these organizations. On the contrary, SMWTAD have historically served to secure their place in the party system since the defeated second place party is usually assured the “monopoly of the opposition.” This monopoly position is generated by the fact that mathematically, the second place party was closer to winning than any other party. This positions the second place party as the most likely one to overthrow the party in power during the next election. As Schattschneider (1942) explained,

The second major party is able to argue, therefore, that people who vote for minor opposition parties dissipate the opposition, that the supporters of the minor parties waste their votes. All who oppose the party in power are made to feel a certain need for concentrating their support behind the party most likely to lead a successful opposition. As a consequence the tendency to support minor parties is checked. (p. 82)

This monopoly position enables the second place party to proceed with its activity based on the prospect of future victory. Meanwhile, the other losing parties typically wither as they lose their activists, issues and voters to the second place party.

In some countries, for example Canada, minor parties have been able to overcome the obstacles posed by SMWTAD to become players at the national level by developing a strong regional presence.⁶ This raises the question of why regional parties in Canada have been able to sustain themselves as minor parties while the local and regional parties that have emerged in the United States have not. The key difference seems to be the presence of a parliament, in which the majority party or coalition elects the Prime Minister, thereby giving minor parties some leverage. In the United States, the president is elected via the Electoral College, which requires a candidate to piece together a combination of states in order to garner a majority of electoral votes. To do this, a party must have a national presence (Mazmanian, 1974; Schattschneider, 1942). Obviously, minor parties with strength in only one state or region enter this contest at a disadvantage. Unable to wage national campaigns for the presidency, these parties can either agree to run a candidate that has no chance of winning, or simply sit the election out. Either way, the party admits to being unable to compete for the most important elected office in the nation. In the long run, parties that can not compete for the presidency are likely to be marginalized or co-opted, ultimately “losing even their sectional support in favor of a major party which has a real chance of winning the supreme prize” (Schattschneider, 1942, p. 83).

Given the political context in the United States, American labor leaders have found themselves with very little room to maneuver. In certain times and places they were willing to engage in third party activity at the local level where they had the numbers to win a plurality in a SMWTAD.⁷ But in most instances, particularly in larger races for statewide and national office where they lacked the resources and votes to successfully field their own candidates in a SMWTAD, unions have fallen into line behind one of the major parties, usually the Democrats. It is interesting to note that this was the case even during periods like the 1940s when 65 percent of national CIO leaders and 56 percent of city leaders told C. Wright Mills (1948) that they believed gains for labor would eventually need to be made through a new labor party entirely separate from the two major parties (p. 212). Given the breadth of support for a labor party in the CIO, the question emerges as to why the CIO only opted to build a labor party in New York. The answer to that question lies not in the unique preferences of New York CIO leaders, but in the unusual institutional context within which the New York CIO operated.

Institutional Opportunities

Though not often acknowledged, at certain times and places, different election laws have permitted third parties in America to adopt strategies that allowed them to overcome the constraints imposed by SMWTAD and the Electoral College. One of the most important strategies has been fusion, which *Argesinger (1980)* defines as “electoral support of a single set of candidates by two or more parties” (p. 288). This practice was fairly widespread across the nation during much of the late 19th century as agrarian interest groups used fusion to forge a “temporary alliance between third parties and the weaker of the two major parties, usually the Democrats in the Midwest and West” (*Argesinger, 1980, p. 288*). This strategy allowed minor parties who had the capacity to win local elections, but who could not successfully field candidates in statewide or national elections, to place another party’s candidate on their own party line. Supporters of the minor party could then vote for the cross-endorsed candidate on their own party line. *Argesinger (1980)* argues that while this sometimes helped major parties destroy minor parties, it also helped “maintain a significant third party tradition by guaranteeing that dissenters’ votes could be more than symbolic protest” (p. 288).

In contrast to a wasted symbolic vote, a fusion vote for a major party candidate on a minor party line allows a voter to signal a preference for the program of a minor party while supporting the major candidate deemed closest to their interests. Because these vote are tallied on a separate line and transferred to the major party candidate, a fusion vote is neither “wasted” on a minor party candidate with no hope of winning, nor lost in the mass of votes cast for the major party candidate. A victorious candidate who receives a sizeable portion of their vote total on a minor party line knows that they have to be responsive to that party’s interests and program, or else risk a future challenge from the minor party that might peel off enough votes to throw the election to the opposition. This provides the minor party with a credible threat of exit, thereby increasing its voice and power in discussions over candidates and public policy. The power of fusion lies in the way it permits interest groups to form minor parties that can pursue what might be called an “inside/outside” political strategy. If a minor party can develop significant political capacity outside of the major party closest to its interests, and can use fusion to paint this capacity visible, it can increase its political power.

While never elevating minor parties to major party status, fusion did permit minor parties around the nation to become an important force in

politics during the late 19th century. [Argesinger \(1989\)](#) points out that “minor parties regularly captured a significant share of the popular vote and received at least 20 percent of the vote in one or more elections from 1874 to 1892 in more than half of the non-Southern states” (p. 289). He also notes that between “1878 and 1892 minor parties held the balance of power at least once in every state but Vermont, and from the mid-1890s they held that power in a majority of states in nearly every election, culminating in 1892 when neither major party secured a majority of the electorate in nearly three-quarters of the states” ([Argesinger, 1989, p. 289](#)).

Ultimately, fusion was deemed too successful by Republican controlled legislatures across the nation, and anti-fusion laws were passed with the hope of demobilizing minor party voters who had been lending support to Democrats. [Argesinger \(1980\)](#) suggests that these laws were quite successful and effectively ended “the importance and existence of significant third parties” (pp. 302–303). While he acknowledges that third parties would subsequently emerge, most were “short lived” and did not possess the “characteristics of 19th century third parties: local organization, voter identification, mass support in some areas and generalized regional strength, and especially tangible electoral success” ([Argesinger, 1980, p. 303, fn. 48](#)).

While the anti-fusion laws successfully reduced the power of third parties in much of the nation, fusion remained legal in New York and was actively used by interest groups and minor parties as they attempted to pressure the major parties. During the period considered in this article it was very common for congressional candidates to run on more than one party line ([Bone, 1946](#)).⁸ Given the widespread use of fusion in New York, union leaders and members with a preference for a labor party that could stake out political ground to the left of the Democrats had more electoral room to maneuver than their counterparts in other parts of the country. During the labor upsurge of the 1930s, many of these leaders would take advantage of their unusual institutional context to build the ALP.

Different Context, Different Strategy: The ALP

While most of the labor movement was busy providing organizational and financial support to the Democratic Party during the late 1930s, key unions in New York took advantage of the state’s election laws to chart a more complicated course which involved building a minor party to the left of the Democrats. This project began in the summer of 1936 when labor leaders from a number of AFL and CIO unions founded the American Labor Party

(ALP). By October, 300 unions representing 400,000 workers were affiliated to the ALP, with each making a 10 cent per capita payment in order to generate resources for the fledgling party.⁹ The most immediate goal of the party was to provide a way for New Yorkers who despised the city's infamous Tammany Hall political machine to support Franklin Delano Roosevelt without casting a vote for the Democratic Party (Bone, 1946, pp. 272–282; Waltzer, 1977, p. 157). To achieve this, the ALP crafted a program that positioned it to the left of the Democrats, calling for “planned utilization” of the natural resources that “belong to the American people,” and articulating what Meyer (1989) described as an “openly class bias” (p. 26). The ALP then employed a fairly standard fusion strategy, providing a means for voters to support Roosevelt while voting on the ALP line, thereby signaling their support for a labor party program to the left of the Democrats. On Election Day the ALP turned out a little more than a quarter of a million voters accounting for 5 percent of the vote statewide. Though impressive, the ALP votes were not needed for Roosevelt to carry New York since he secured 55 percent of the vote on the Democratic line (Carter, 1965, p. 453).

Following the election the decision was made to turn the ALP into a permanent organization and Alex Rose, president of the United Hat and Millinery Workers, became state party leader. The ALP quickly became involved in the 1937 New York City Mayoral race, backing Fiorello LaGuardia, a progressive Republican with a long history of using fusion. In the mayoral election, the ALP improved on its past performance, electing its own members to the city council and state assembly, and delivering almost 1/2 million votes to LaGuardia, without which LaGuardia would have lost the election. The size and importance of the ALP vote prompted the *New York Times* to run a front-page article declaring that the ALP held the balance of power in city and state politics (New York Times [NYT], November 3, 1937, p. 1). Obviously impressed with the ALP, LaGuardia changed his party affiliation to ALP, an affiliation he would keep for the remainder of his life (Meyer, 1989, p. 205, fn. 26; Carter, 1965, p. 455; Bone, 1946, p. 277).¹⁰

As Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate, the importance of the ALP continued to grow in 1938 and 1940 when the party provided the margin of victory for the Democratic candidates for Governor and President. In both of these races, the ALP tipped the election to the Democrats, thereby establishing the party as a formidable force in New York State that Meyer notes would come to “significantly shape New York State and City politics” (Meyer, 1989, p. 205, fn. 28).

Table 1. Major and Minor Party Vote Share in New York State for Governor, 1938.

	Democrat	Republican	ALP
NYC	50% (1,127,261)	35% (777,146)	10% (340,749)
Upstate	35% (844,046)	62% (1,525,359)	3% (79,230)
Total	42% (1,971,307)	49% (2,302,505)	9% (419,979)

Table 2. Major and Minor Party Vote in New York State for President, 1940.

	Democrat	Republican	ALP
NYC	51% (1,649,074)	39% (1,247,624)	10% (317,009)
Upstate	39% (1,185,426)	58% (1,779,854)	3% (100,409)
Total	45% (2,834,500)	48% (3,027,478)	7% (417,418)

Source: (Bone, 1946, p. 278).

It is important to note that although the ALP was able to win city council seats and occasional seats in the state legislature, the ALP's influence did not depend on its ability to win elections outright. Instead, the basis of ALP power rested on its capacity to generate enough votes to hold the balance of power in a given election. As Meyer (1989) reports, between 1938 and 1949, the ALP averaged 13 percent of the New York City vote, and possessed the ability to garner between 5 and 50 percent of the vote depending on the district (p. 26).¹¹ Fusion painted this capacity to mobilize progressive voters visible, since votes were tallied on a separate ALP ballot line instead of being lost in the sea of Democratic votes. As long as the ALP could turnout enough votes to keep the Democrats dependent on them, the ALP would possess a credible threat of exit, and the Democrats would be forced to be attentive to ALP interests and policies, lest they be faced with an independent ALP candidate that might spoil the election for their candidate.

The ALP's use of fusion, combined with its political capacity, quickly altered the traditional state of affairs in New York politics. According to David Dubinsky (1977), president of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) and a founder of the ALP, the Democratic Party was not happy about the rise of the ALP, and wished the party would "drop dead." As he recalled:

They insisted we were stealing their votes; we were convinced we were appealing to the great mass of independent voters in New York as well as the old-line Socialists. More important, we were acting as a liberal counterweight in the whole political process through our ability to tip the balance – in favor of the Democrats when they had a good candidate, against them when they put up clubhouse stumblebums. We could foul up their plans by nominating a candidate of our own or by endorsing a Republican if he was a man of character and independence. The Democrats didn't like that. (Dubinsky & Raskin, 1977, p. 272)¹²

The Dubinsky quote suggests that organized labor was quite consciously utilizing an "inside/outside" third-party strategy that sought to increase labor's voice and power in politics by developing ALP capacity outside the party. If the Democrats were attentive to the interests of labor they would benefit from ALP cross-endorsements. If the Democrats strayed too far a field or took labor support for granted, the ALP might run their own candidate in order to "teach the Democrats a lesson that labor would not blindly follow their lead" (Dubinsky & Raskin, 1977, p. 271).¹³ With real capacity and a credible threat of exit, the decision to use fusion to mobilize voters outside the Democratic Party enabled the ALP to increase the voice and power of organized labor within electoral politics in a way that would not have been possible had they just mobilized voters for the Democrats.

DIFFERENT CONTEXT, DIFFERENT STRATEGY: THE RISE OF THE CIO-ALP

In 1943, CIO President Phillip Murray appointed a committee to assess the CIO's political position. After a month of study, a report was issued calling for the establishment of a new CIO body to coordinate political activities. In July 1943, the Executive Board of the CIO heeded this advice and the Political Action Committee (PAC) was formed. With Sidney Hillman, President of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers (ACW) at the helm, the PAC was expected to build the CIO's political capacity for the 1944 federal elections. PAC was to be officially non-partisan, and would not

seek to establish a national third party (Foster, 1975, Chap. 1; Zieger, 1995, pp. 181–182). As Hillman stated in November 1943, when the PAC was presented to the CIO convention, “We have no desire to organize another political party ... because it would divide the forces of the progressives throughout the nation” (CIO, 1943, p. 243). Such division, Hillman and other leaders of the CIO were well aware, would function to the advantage of the Republicans, as a labor party would likely draw votes away from the Democrats.

While opposing a third party at the national level, PAC was interested in making the ALP, which was well organized and had proven itself quite capable of delivering the vote, its vehicle in New York. Toward this end, Hillman proposed that the ALP be reconstituted along different organizational lines (Waltzer, 1977, pp. 288–289). In the summer of 1943, Hillman released the details of a plan that invited trade unions to “affiliate themselves with the party and to pay a per capita tax based upon their membership in the State” (NYT, August 18, 1943, p. 21). Party decisions would then be “democratically determined by the vote of the representatives of the participating trade unions, based upon their per capita tax payments to the party” (*ibid.*). It was hoped that this plan, which would structure and govern the ALP in a fashion similar to that of the British Labor Party, would lead to a party in which state and county committees would “be made up primarily of representatives of the participating trade unions with a composition fairly representative of the numerical strength of such unions and pledged to carry out party policy determined above” (NYT, August 18, 1943, p. 21; Waltzer, 1977, pp. 288–289).

In floating his plan, Hillman made it clear that he would allow Communists and their allies, who had a strong presence in New York City, to participate in the ALP. As Hillman put it, “I am confident that there will be no room within the party as so reconstituted for the importation of ancient political feuds or the injection of extraneous issues which have as little place in the political as in the industrial activities of the trade union movement” (Daily Worker [DW], August 19, 1943, p. 8).¹⁴ Waltzer (1977) suggests that Hillman’s willingness to cooperate with Communists was based on the simple recognition that the CIO could not “build effective national labor unity and at the same time discriminate against the Communist-led unions in New York” (p. 290). Hillman’s biographer Matthew Josephson (1952) strikes a similar chord, suggesting that Hillman feared that failure to restructure the ALP in a manner that included left led¹⁵ unions might, leave “CIO left wing union members discouraged from making the most intense

efforts for the ALP election canvas” thereby leading to a Republican victory in November 1944 (p. 602).

The right in the ALP viewed Hillman’s proposal to restructure the ALP as a mistake that would marginalize ALP club members and liberals who were not union members.¹⁶ Moreover, they thought it was an open invitation for Communist domination of the ALP. As Norman Thomas, an ALP leader and past presidential candidate of the Socialist Party, wrote in a letter to the *New York Times*, “Many members of the right wing of the American Labor Party are strenuously opposing the Hillman proposal on the ground that it is intended to admit Communist or communistic sympathizers, who are well placed in local unions, to a considerable degree of control of their party” (NYT, September 7, 1943, p. 22).

The Greater New York City Industrial Union Council

Many of the unions that Thomas was concerned about were affiliates to the GNYIUC, which was the CIO’s largest local industrial union council (IUC). Like AFL central labor councils, CIO IUC’s were umbrella organizations to which local unions in a city or state affiliated. These bodies bore the responsibility of uniting local CIO unions so they could craft and pursue common economic and political objectives. One CIO leader summarized the mission of these councils as follows:

... workers and Labor Union members have many problems affecting their lives in addition to wages, hours and working conditions, and related matters involving the employer. These are the wide range of the citizen in the community. The CIO Council becomes the voice of the Labor movement about housing, public and personal health, child care, education, public and private welfare, city and community planning, recreating, and a large number of things which are the concern of the worker as citizen where he lives. (Silvey, 1948, p. 5)

During the 1940s, the GNYIUC was quite adept at pursuing these issues and Freeman reports that the council became a “significant force in local politics” that could coordinate efforts at a scale that was “staggering” (Freeman, 2000, pp. 52, 60–63).¹⁷

When faced with Hillman’s proposal to refashion the ALP, the GNYIUC indicated support for what they viewed as a push to broaden “the trade union base of ALP,” a move they felt would return control of the ALP to labor (GNYIUC MIN, August 5, 1943, p. 2). As part of Committee for a United Labor Party (CULP), which had formed to back the Hillman

proposal, the GNYIUC crafted plans to turn out rank and file members for the ALP primary that would determine the control and direction of the party. Thirty thousand posters asking members to “canvass for the CIO backed Committee for United Labor Party” were printed. Another set of 150,000 posters issued a “Call to Action,” informing members that a victory for the CIO backed ALP slate would give the CIO a “powerful machinery for re-electing President Roosevelt and putting labor’s candidates into office in the fall elections.” The poster went so far as to ask that CIO members, no matter what their party, sign up to canvass neighbors for the ALP (Ring Bells for Roosevelt, RWLA, SM, Box 2, Folder 15; Call to Action!, RWLA, SM, Box 2, Folder 15).

After a bitter campaign that drew in everyone from regular ALP members to President Roosevelt and the op-ed page of the *New York Times*, the CULP ALP faction was victorious.¹⁸ They garnered more than 60 percent of the vote, winning 60 of 62 assembly districts in New York City, and the vast majority of those in the rest of the state. All told, the CULP elected 570 of 850 state committeemen, with 302 of the committeemen coming from the CIO. Clearly defeated, the right ALP faction bolted and formed the Liberal Party.¹⁹ With their departure, Hillman assumed leadership of the state ALP, and the CIO unions came to dominate the state executive committee (DW, March 30, 1943, p. 1; [Waltzer, 1977, p. 297](#)).

The GNYIUC and the ALP

Following the primary, the GNYIUC set about formally linking itself to the ALP both organizationally and financially. At the neighborhood level, in an effort to “send all possible forces into the ALP,” the GNYIUC Executive Board adopted a resolution directing GNYIUC Community Councils, which had been organizing around community issues in neighborhoods throughout the city, to merge into the local ALP clubs (GNYIUC EBMIN, May 2, 1944, p. 2).²⁰ Former Community Council leaders were directed to take leadership positions in their assembly and election district organizations. At the city level, a joint CIO–ALP committee was created to insure that there would be “no overlapping or duplication of effort” between the organizations (DW, June 9, 1944, p. 5).²¹ Finally, to insure that the newly fashioned ALP would have adequate resources, the GNYIUC adopted a resolution that diverted some its PAC monies directly to the ALP. The plan called for the following division of each \$1 PAC contribution:

50 cents to be transmitted through the international union to National PAC; 50 cents to be contributed to local PAC agency operating in the area (in this case the Greater New York Industrial Union Council). Of Council's 50 cents, 25 cents is to go to ALP. (GNYIUC EBMIN, August 29, 1944, p. 2)

With approval of this funding system, the largest local labor federation in the CIO, with close to 200 affiliates representing 600,000 members, was officially supporting a labor party. This relationship constituted far more than the traditional ad-hoc relationships that develop between organized labor and political parties around election time, as organizational and financial mechanisms were put in place to formally link the two organizations. While the GNYIUC would still endorse members of other parties, there was a special emphasis placed on building the ALP and convincing CIO members to enroll in, work for and vote for the ALP. Future Political Action Program's issued by the council would unequivocally call for the GNYIUC to "Build the American Labor Party, the strongest voice for labor in city and state affairs," and would direct Political Action Stewards in workplaces across the city to "recruit shop members for active participation in the community activities of the American Labor Party ..." (*Greater New York CIO Council, 1946, p. 18*).

CIO-ALP, 1944: Vote Line "C"

Now that the ALP was the official political arm of the New York CIO, the GNYIUC coordinated its member unions in a massive registration drive in preparation for the fall 1944 elections. A sophisticated plan was developed which rested on the GNYIUC's ability to keep track of where CIO members lived, and whether they were registered. To do this, the council printed cards that were distributed by shop stewards to members. This card recorded a member's name, address and assembly district, and provided a space in which party affiliation could be recorded. After the member registered to vote, they returned these cards to the shop steward, who then forwarded it to the local union where registration would be verified. After the election, a card would be returned to the member that contained their name, election districts and elected representatives on it.²²

Developing the technical ability to locate and track members, which was no small feat in the pre-computer 1940s, was only one half of the election equation. The other half rested on the Council's ability to activate its grass roots. At the end of September, it invited all CIO shop stewards and union officers to a conference intended to put things in motion. The invite

suggested that the New York City vote would be an important factor in the national elections, and noted that the “unparalleled preparation thus far undertaken” would only be successful if the CIO could follow through to insure a large registration (CIO Conference on Wages, Full Employment and Political Action, RWLA, SM Box 2, Folder 15).

The conference, which drew more than 700 CIO members, adopted a 10-point program that outlined the concrete activities that needed to be executed if the CIO’s political efforts were to succeed. These activities called for multiple forms of outreach to members both in their workplaces and their homes. The Communist Party’s newspaper the *Daily Worker* succinctly summarized these plans, which called for:

Twenty thousand active door to door canvassers from CIO locals in every election district of the city; all union officials to concentrate upon the registration drive as their main union activity during the period; establishment of registration committees in every large shop with stewards for every small shop; volunteers from the shop to work in their own assembly districts in their spare hours; visits to the shops by organizers and business agents to aid in the drive and to stimulate voluntary contributions to PAC; a city CIO drive for a “10 for 1” volunteers for FDR drive in which shop volunteers will pledge to obtain 10 registered voters for FDR in their neighborhood. (DW, September 25, 1944, p. 2)

As in past GNYIUC campaigns, a radio campaign, street rallies, and literature distribution would complement these efforts (NYT, September 25, 1944, p. 18; CIO Conference on Wages, Full Employment and Political Action, RWLA, SM, Box 2, Folder 15).

Given the CIO’s new relationship with the ALP, the GNYIUC registration push placed special emphasis on enrolling CIO members into the ALP. In October, the *Daily Worker* reported that Mike Quill, who was head of the GNYIUC PAC and an ALP city councilor, declared registration and enrollment in the ALP as organized labor’s number 1 task. According to the article, he reminded his audience:

We are especially fortunate in New York State in having a well-established Labor Party through which labor and its friends have an opportunity to maintain and show their political strength not only for the importance of demonstrating that strength in the national elections in November but also to remind our representatives in city and state government that the political power of the people through the ALP is something that must be respected. (DW, October 4, 1944, p. 5)

Beyond speeches, the GNYIUC push for the ALP was found in its registration material. In a pamphlet titled “Insure Your Future: Register to Vote,” the GNYIUC answered common questions about registration and at the end urged in bold typeface “When you Register, ENROLL in the American Labor Party – labor’s non-partisan political organization in New York

State” (Insure Your Future: Register to Vote, RWLA, SM, Series II, Box 2, Folder 15).

As the election approached, the GNYIUC maintained a steady course of events hosting lunchtime rallies, ringing doorbells, and sending sound trucks throughout the city. GNYIUC literature directed members to cast their votes for President Roosevelt and other cross-endorsed candidates on the ALP’s “row C,” which they described as “labor’s line for Roosevelt.” To insure that there would be no confusion in the voting booth, GNYIUC pamphlets contained a drawing of the inside of a voting machine with text and an arrow clearly indicating how to pull the lever for the entire ALP line (The Man and the Record, RWLA, SM, Series II, Box 2, Folder 15).

On Election Day, the GNYIUC put over 22,000 people in the streets distributing leaflets, watching polls, and doing other election related activities (Mills to Carr, November 13, 1944, RWLA, SM, Box 2, Folder 15). These efforts paid off, and Roosevelt won New York by 316,591 votes, even though he only received 39 percent of his vote on the Democratic line. As Table 3 shows, both the ALP and Liberal Parties were instrumental in pushing the President to victory, leading the *New York Times* to declare that the Democrats could not win in New York State without minor party support (NYT, November 9, 1944, p. 1).²³

Beyond the presidency, four of the GNYIUC endorsed ALP fusion candidates were sent to Washington. The success of the ALP and Liberal Party prompted a post election *New York Times* analysis which concluded that the minor parties held the balance of power in “twenty three of sixty four assembly districts within the city, as well as six of the Congressional districts and twelve of the state senate districts ...” (NYT, November 29, 1944,

Table 3. Major and Minor Party Vote in New York State for President, 1944.

	Roosevelt	Dewey
Democrat/Republican	39% (2,478,598)	47% (2,987,647)
ALP	8% (496, 405)	
Liberal	5% (329,235)	
Total	52% 3,304,238	47% 2,987,647

Source: (Carter, 1965, p. 453).

p. 38). Pleased with this situation, Hy Blumberg, the state secretary of the ALP wrote to the GNYIUC indicating that the results demonstrated the possibilities of teamwork (DW, November 2, 1944, p. 4; [Waltzer, 1977, p. 304](#); DW, November 9, 1944, p. 13). The National CIO was equally impressed, and its own internal report on the elections described labor's efforts in New York City "as one of the most intensive campaigns ever carried on by organized labor to get voters registered and then get them to the polls to cast their ballots." The report also noted that the "American Labor Party was notably active in this campaign ..." ("What Really Happened in the National Campaign of 1944," Charles Ervin, WSU, CIO Secretary Treasurer, Box 202, Folder CIO-PAC 1944 Election, Analysis of).

Shortly after the 1944 election, Hillman announced the creation of a new campaign planning board that would be composed of representatives from the ALP, the New York State CIO, and the GNYIUC (NYT, January 31, 1945, p. 15; [Waltzer, 1977, p. 307](#)). In a statement released when the board was founded, Hillman advised that it was important that the ALP and CIO continue to work together to insure "maximum results," though he made it clear that the intent was not to foster an independent third party. As he saw it:

The political action program of the CIO is to make labor's influence felt in all political parties. In New York State, CIO-PAC supports the American Labor Party not as a narrow third party, but as a broad, popular political force fully expressive of labor's aims and aspirations. The ALP was not organized specifically for the purpose of electing its own candidates but to mobilize political support for progressive candidates of the two major political parties on a non-partisan basis. CIO-PAC considers the ALP the most effective community instrument of the CIO and all labor and progressive forces in NY State and urges increasing participation of CIO members and others in the ALP in their communities. (GNYIUC MIN, February 1, 1945, p. 1)

CIO-ALP: From Fusion to Local Challenger

While World War II raged in Europe, Hillman's position on a third party was the consensus view, as the left-led unions that dominated the GNYIUC were committed to political unity in the fight against Hitler. All seemed to agree that the primary function of the ALP was to be a state party that used fusion to keep the Democratic Party aligned with labor's interests, only challenging the Democrats at the city level, and when they forwarded unacceptable candidates for statewide or national office.

After World War II, however, differences began to emerge about the sort of party the ALP should be. In particular, the American Communist Party

(CP), having recently been chastised by a leader of the French Communist Party for its analysis and strategies, changed its leadership and direction. Earl Browder, who had led the CP into alliances that moved it toward the center of the political spectrum, and who ultimately dissolved the party in favor of the Communist Political Association, was replaced by William Foster. Foster quickly reconstituted the party and began to move it in a more militant, revolutionary direction, calling for the creation of new post war alliance that would unite workers, poor farmers, veterans, African American, progressive professionals and middle classes “in joint political action against the common enemy, monopoly capital, in such forms to culminate eventually in a broad third party movement ...” (Starobin, 1972, p. 123).²⁴

While the CP began to shift its orientation toward third party strategies, an opportunity developed for the ALP to compete with the Democrats over an open congressional seat in New York City. The congressional district had been a safe Democratic district and it was assumed that the party would easily elect a replacement. This assumption was quickly challenged when the ALP announced that it would run its own candidate for the seat.²⁵

The decision to run head to head against the Democrats was a controversial one. The Democratic candidate had a good record as a New Deal Democrat, and some feared that the ALP might play the role of spoiler, siphoning off enough votes from the Democrats to throw the election to the Republicans. Other ALP members worried that the challenge would foul relations with the Democrats and with unions that leaned toward the Democrats. Left wing members of the ALP defended the strategy as a low cost opportunity to show labor’s strength (Charney, 1946; Waltzer, 1977, p. 319). George Charney, a columnist in the CP political journal *Political Affairs* argued that the traditional strength of labor and the Democrats in the district made it a prime place to challenge the rightward drift of the Democratic Party that had begun when the war ended. He noted that there was little chance that an ALP candidate would spoil the election, and a significant chance that the ALP might actually win. Moreover, the fact that it was a by-election would allow the ALP and its allies in labor to concentrate their resources in one district in order to mobilize their core base of support (Charney, 1946, pp. 368–369).

In early February, the GNYIUC signaled its support for this interpretation by entering the fray on the side of Johannes Steel, the ALP candidate. In their press release, the GNYIUC stressed the need to send someone to Washington that would “provide leadership for the progressive forces on vital issues facing the nation today,” and who would “fight on the house floor, in the committee rooms and throughout the nation to assure

international unity and economic security” (DW, February 5, 1946, p. 4). The GNYIUC backed up its endorsement with its organizational might, putting its shop steward machinery into operation to insure turnout, and opening up a special election headquarters in the district to carry a house-to-house canvas (DW, February 4, 1946, p. 4; NYT, February 19, 1946, p. 1; NYT, February 20, 1946, p. 1).

Though only a local by-election, the race came to signify a much larger internal struggle regarding the direction of the Democratic Party. President Truman and the National Democratic Chairman tried to persuade the ALP to endorse the Democratic candidate, while Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace and former Mayor LaGuardia endorsed the ALP candidate (DW, February 14, 1946, p. 4; *Waltzer, 1977, p. 319*). With the battle lines being drawn, the race was soon framed as an “attempt by organized liberal-labor forces to show their strength to the administration” (*Markowitz, 1973, p. 152*). Addressing a rally of 2,000 people held on the Saturday before the election, Congressman Vito Marcantonio, a leader in the ALP, argued that the current administration had been elected because people had supported the path charted by President Roosevelt, and suggested that the election of Steel would serve notice to the Truman administration that it had better return to the program it had been elected on (DW, February 16, 1946, p. 4).

On Election Day, while the ALP did not win, it did put what the *New York Times* described as “jolt” into Tammany Hall. The final tally in the race, for which 40 percent of the electorate came out, found the Democrats with 17,366; the ALP with 13,505; and the Republicans with 4,359. Given that the Democrats had expected to win by a three to one margin, the narrowness of the victory was a shock. The *Times* attributed the show of ALP strength to two things. First, the Democrats simply “slipped as an organization.” Second, “the method of political action devised by the Congress of Industrial Organizations unions, particularly the left-wing ones, was extremely effective ...” (NYT, February 20, 1946, p. 1; DW, February 14, 1946, p. 4).

Though the ALP lost the election, party leaders were satisfied by the outcome. In a statement released after the election Marcantonio and ALP party leader Eugene Connolly advised that the “figures bespeak the fact that the American Labor party is now able to walk on its own legs” (NYT, February 20, 1946, p. 19). They went on to argue that the results were proof that people were dissatisfied both with Tammany and with the Truman administration’s appeasement of “greedy anti-labor corporations.” Whether or not the ALP’s turnout truly signaled voter dissatisfaction with Truman, it was clear that it signaled CIO and ALP strength in New York City. The

New York Times noted this and reported the ALP could “be expected now to ask a share, much larger than before, in the picking of candidates for public office” (p. 19).

CIO-ALP: From Fusion to National Challenger

In the summer following the Steel campaign, Sidney Hillman died, leading to questions about the future of the CIO-PAC. While the national CIO cast about trying to decide who would replace Hillman as head of the National PAC, questions emerged in New York State about the ability of the right and left wing factions to co-exist without Hillman at the helm. As the *New York Times* described the situation, “Hillman was the balancing wheel, keeping in line the increasingly restive Communist minority in the CIO and its group in the ALP, as well as others who were demanding political action independent of the Democratic Party” (NYT, July 11, 1946, p. 14). The *Times* predicted that with Hillman gone, the left would likely push harder for an independent party, noting that in “no other state is the CIO represented, as it is in New York, on the ballot by a legal political party,” making the question of an independent third party particularly salient in New York (p. 14).

Amidst the speculation about the future of the ALP and a national third party Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace was dismissed from his cabinet position after clashing with President Truman over domestic and foreign policy, particularly with regard to relations with the Soviet Union (Markowitz, 1973, pp. 178–193). Soon after his departure from the administration segments of the left he began to frame Wallace’s firing as a pivotal moment for the Democratic Party. At a GNYIUC gathering of 1,000 shop stewards, Marcantonio “termed the dismissal of Mr. Wallace the beginning of ‘the disintegration’ of the Democratic Party,” and went on to call for a new party backed by labor (NYT, September 23, 1946, p. 12). The same gathering adopted a resolution “protesting the dismissal of Mr. Wallace ‘as a repudiation of the desires of the American people for world peace and security’” (NYT, September 23, 1946, p. 12).

Through the remainder of 1946 and 1947, Wallace remained politically active, drawing large crowds as he toured the nation speaking on foreign policy issues. While at times hinting at the prospects of forming a new party, he would not commit to such a project. Meanwhile, Marcantonio continued to push the idea of an independent party with its own presidential candidate, and by the fall of 1947, after much vacillation on what the appropriate

strategy should be, the CP also came out in support of a Wallace candidacy (Starobin, 1972, pp. 155–177).

The CP decision was reportedly communicated to allies in the CIO in an October 1947 meeting held in New York City. In attendance were ranking CP officers and a number of CIO leaders including Mike Quill of the GNYIUC. In sworn testimony, Quill stated that the CP leaders at the meeting informed the unionists that the “Communist Party had decided to ignore the political action program of CIO and to create a third party – the Progressive Party, behind Henry Wallace.” Eugene Dennis, general secretary of the CP, told the group that “every attempt should be made by those present to get their various unions to endorse Wallace and work for him,” regardless of the decision made by the CIO at its 1947 convention in Boston to remain non-partisan” (National CIO 1950 Bd. Meeting, RWLA, UTWU, Box MJ Quill Intl. CIO 1947–1952, Folder MJ Quill Intl: CIO E.Bd 1950).²⁶ Quill reported that at a subsequent meeting he raised the possibility that forcing the Wallace issue would create a serious cleavage in the CIO. In response, he was told by Robert Thompson, New York State chairman of the CP that, “We have to vote for Wallace if we split the last CIO union down the middle” (National CIO 1950 Bd. Meeting, RWLA, UTWU, Box MJ Quill Intl. CIO 1947–1952, Folder MJ Quill Intl: CIO E.Bd 1950).²⁷

Whether it was due to the CP line or not, near the end of 1947 a number of left-led unions added their voice to the chorus calling for Wallace, setting the stage for clashes with unions that were opposed to a third-party candidacy. In New York, the first fight between pro- and anti-Wallace unions occurred at a tumultuous meeting of the State CIO Executive Board on January 5, 1948. In a 4-hour debate on a Wallace candidacy, the lines of argument were fairly predictable, with opponents of his candidacy arguing that it would lead to Republican victory, and proponents suggesting that it would advance the interests of workers (NYT, January 6, 1948, p. 17).²⁸ When the vote was called, the state Executive Board split evenly, 14 to 14. However, when a tally was calculated based on per capita dues payments, the anti-Wallace forces were victorious by a margin of 59 percent–31 percent (DW, January 6, 1948, p. 2).

The anti-Wallace statement adopted by the State CIO Executive Board was unambiguous in its attacks on third-party supporters. It declared that the state CIO was “unalterably opposed to this piece of political adventurism which can lead to nothing but disastrous consequences to all American People.” To make its case, the NY CIO quoted a speech Wallace had given in 1946 where he “declared that the formation of a third party would guarantee a reactionary victory by splitting the progressive vote because of

the various state election laws existing in the United States.” The resolution went on to suggest that nothing had changed since 1946 to “alter the accuracy of his prediction,” and argued that a Wallace candidacy would “increase the chances of a Republican victory ...” Beyond articulating reasons that third-party presidential runs were futile, the statement charged that Wallace backers sought to “promote reaction” in the U.S. because they knew that a strong American economy would serve as inspiration to those resisting “totalitarian oppression” around the world (Statement Adopted by the New York State CIO Executive Board at Albany, January 5, 1948, CUA, CUA-CIO, Box 14, Folder Z-235).

With the state CIO on record against a Wallace run, all eyes turned to the ALP where the various factions of the CIO would again meet to consider the issue. Instead of a skirmish and vote over the ALP’s political strategy, the meeting brought the resignation of leaders from the ACW and other right wing unions that opposed the Wallace candidacy. As for why these unions gave up the ALP without a fight, Carter (1965) suggests that they simply recognized that in “a showdown with the Left Wing, they were plainly outnumbered” and could not secure the needed primary votes to maintain control of the ALP’s state committee (pp. 322–323). Though the defection of powerful unions like the ACW weakened the ALP, it was “still a potent political force which had an organization consisting of assembly district and local clubs, staff, funds, volunteer workers and a sizeable body of potential support” (Carter, 1965, p. 326). This organization was now in the hands of the CP and the GNYIUC. Marcantonio assumed the position of state party chair, and a number of GNYIUC leaders were elected to the ALP Executive Committee. The new leadership proceeded to unanimously endorse Wallace, thereby insuring that he would appear on the ballot in New York State (Waltzer, 1977, p. 385; NYT, January 8, 1948, p. 1; DW, January 8, 1948, p. 3).

At its delegates meeting on January 8th, the GNYIUC considered the turn of events in the state CIO and the ALP. Secretary Treasurer Mills reported on the State CIO Executive Board meeting, intimating that it was “humiliating” to be asked to vote on a statement that was “viscous and insulting in tone.” He suggested, “regardless of differences, no organization or Board within a labor movement has the right to question the sincerity or motives of unions and their leaders who have chosen a political position.” Mills also noted that the decision to withdraw State CIO support from the ALP ran counter to the wishes of the 1,200 delegates at the last state CIO convention who had adopted a resolution in support of the ALP. He asserted that the State CIO Executive Board did not have the authority to make the decision, and then proposed a motion that rejected the statements

issued by the State CIO. The motion passed, positioning the GNYIUC in direct opposition to the State CIO (Greater New York CIO Council Digest Council Minutes, January 8, 1948, p. 3; RWLA, NG, Box 5, Folder 10).

Having recorded its opposition to the State CIO resolution, the GNYIUC faced the question of the Wallace candidacy per se. That day, CIO President Murray had sent out a telegram “urging that no affiliate of CIO take any action regarding support of any national candidate or party until after the meeting of the Executive Committee of the National CIO-PAC.” In light of this, Mills made a proposal on behalf of the GNYIUC Administrative Committee that would signal the Council’s position on the Wallace candidacy, without formally coming out in support of his candidacy. The resolution declared that a “large number of affiliates of the GNYIUC have already voted and publicly expressed their support for the independent candidacy of Henry A. Wallace,” and noted that “the majority of the delegates to the Greater NY CIO Council are in support of Mr. Wallace’s candidacy and are in favor of urging the National CIO Political Action Committee to endorse and support the candidacy of Wallace” (Greater New York CIO Council Digest Council Minutes, January 8, 1948, p. 3; RWLA, NG, Box 5, Folder 10).

Despite the urging of the GNYIUC, when the CIO Executive Board debated the matter on January 22nd and 23rd, a clear majority opted to vote against Wallace’s third-party candidacy (CIO EB, January 22–23, 1948). The logic behind the majority’s position was straightforward and succinctly stated by Emile Rieve, President of the Textile Workers: “the Third Party movement is going to take away enough votes in key states in order to permit the Republicans to get in ...” (CIO EB January 22–23, 1948, frame 400). Given the rules governing presidential elections, the majority of the CIO Executive Board reasoned that a third-party candidacy would have no chance of winning, making third-party votes “symbolic votes” that would in essence be wasted, functioning only to spoil the vote for the Democrats in key states. Consequently, as Joseph Curran, a former ally of the CP and past president of the GNYIUC stated, a third-party candidacy “assures the reelection of a Republican” (CIO EB January 22–23, frame 420).²⁹

It is important to note that though the vote on the CIO Executive Board was 33–11 against Wallace’s third-party candidacy, the 11 dissenting unions were in no way bound by the decision. The decentralized structure of the CIO granted national unions the autonomy to do as they saw fit. If they opted, and several left-led unions did, they could still support Wallace. In turn, locals of these internationals could then advocate support of Wallace in state and local IUC. In some cases, depending on how the math worked

out, pro-Wallace delegates constituted majorities in their local federations. As a consequence, many IUC, including the GNYIUC, remained sympathetic to Henry Wallace's bid for the presidency.³⁰

Different Contexts, Different Strategies: CIO vs. GNYIUC

In the midst of the tussle between CIO factions over Wallace's third-party presidential run, a special election was announced to fill a vacant Congressional seat in the Bronx. The *Daily Worker* fumed at the fact that only a few weeks notice had been given about the election, and deemed it an intentional act designed to keep the ALP from mounting an effective challenge to the Democrats. Despite the short time frame, the ALP found a candidate in Leo Isacson, a former ALP Assemblyman from the Bronx (DW, January 15, 1948, p. 3; DW, January 22, 1948, p. 12). The GNYIUC quickly announced its support for Isacson and indicated that it considered the special election a "full dress mobilization of labor's political strength" in the 1948 elections. The Council announced a master plan, which called for recruiting canvassers from all boroughs for doorbell ringing as well as special mailings, and neighborhood rallies (Press Release January 26, 1948, RWLA, SM, Box 4, Folder 1). Affiliated unions stepped up to the task, with several assigning full time staff to the campaign (Greater New York CIO Council Executive Board Minutes, January 27, 1948, RWLA SM Box 4, Folder 5). All told, the GNYIUC reported fielding between 300 and 400 canvassers on a daily basis, and over 2,000 volunteers on Election Day (Special to CIO News, February 18, 1948, RWLA, SM, Box 4, Folder 1).

To the horror of the Democrats, who had four times as many registered voters in the district, the mobilization paid off, and Isacson won the election by a landslide. The ALP tallied 22,697 votes to the Democrats 12,578. The GNYIUC press release on the matter stressed the important role that grass roots organizing, particularly the networks of block captains that did house to house canvassing had played in the victory. The release went on to suggest that the victory had "raised immediate doubt that Truman could carry New York State in 1948" (Special to CIO News, February 18, 1948, RWLA, SM, Box 4, Folder 1; DW, February 18, 1948, p. 1).³¹

In the wake of the Isacson victory, the anti-ALP CIO unions in New York crafted plans to develop their own political apparatus. On March 2, by a per capita vote of 302,000–165,000, the Executive Board of the New York State CIO decided to set up a new PAC to oppose Wallace and nominate and support pro-labor candidates for office (NYT, March 3, 1948, p. 1). In a press

release on the matter, Louis Hollander, an ACW leader and President of the NY CIO, announced that the “American Labor Party had ‘automatically ceased to represent the CIO’ by endorsing the Wallace candidacy” (New York State CIO Press Release, March 2, 1948, RWLA, SM Box 4, Folder 5).

The *New York Times* rightly pointed out that the creation of a state PAC made a clash with the GNYIUC inevitable, since the leaders of the state PAC announced that they would work in all localities including New York City (NYT, March 3, 1948, p. 1). Not surprisingly, the leaders of the GNYIUC objected to the presence of a dual PAC organization in the city, arguing that they possessed the “sole right to act for the CIO” in “designating Congressional and local candidates” (NYT, March 3, 1948, p. 1). Mills reported that it was the intention of the Council to continue cooperating with the ALP as it had in past elections. Anticipating events to come, Hollander argued that the GNYIUC had no right to follow policies that were in conflict with the National CIO, stating that while national unions “possessed the autonomous right to determine their own political positions,” this right did not extend to IUCs (NYT, March 3, 1948, p. 1).

While Hollander was asserting this position, the CIO Director of IUCs John Brophy was in Washington attempting to establish it as a CIO policy. On March 8, 1948 Brophy sent a letter to all IUCs pointing out that all IUCs had been made aware that the National CIO policy was “one of express opposition to any third party in 1948 ...” He went on to state that:

It is the obligation of all Councils to take a forthright stand in support of National CIO policies on these issues. No evasion or compromise on this score is permissible ... Rejecting, tabling or ignoring communications and statements from or by CIO officers, CIO-PAC, or the CIO Executive Board on these matters or the adoption of compromises or conflicting positions constitutes a rejection of the CIO communications and statements and is action in conflict with CIO policy. Action in conflict with CIO policy is expressly forbidden by Rule 8 of the CIO Rules governing Councils. (Brophy to All Industrial Union Councils, March 8, 1948, RWLA, SM, Box 3, Folder 15)³²

In New York, the Brophy letter was quickly followed by a letter from Jack Kroll, National CIO-PAC director. Kroll informed Mills that he had received complaints from “CIO members in New York City who desire to participate in political action along the lines of the policy established by the CIO Executive board,” but who could not since the Greater New York PAC was not in alignment with this program. Kroll went on to draw on CIO resolutions in an attempt to establish that local PAC bodies were subordinate to the national PAC. While the language Kroll drew on called for national PAC supervision and coordination of local PACs, it did not state that local PACs had to conform to national PAC endorsements. It was

likely a recognition of the fact that authority had never clearly been established, that led Kroll to end his letter with the following:

... apart from any technical or legal responsibilities which the Greater New York Political Action Committee bears in conforming its policies and conduct to those of the National CIO and the PAC, it is absolutely vital to the continuing effectiveness of PAC and to the effectuation of its fundamental purposes that its constituent bodies, which after all use its name, act in conformity with its policies. (Kroll to Mills, March 19, 1948, RWLA, SM, Box 3, Folder 10)

Upon receiving the letters from Brophy and Kroll, the GNYIUC called a special Executive Board meeting on March 16th. The letters were read, and while it was noted that Kroll's interpretation of the CIO constitution was dubious, the Council's Executive Board decided not to respond to him until the council dealt with the issues raised by Brophy. The response to the Brophy letter hinged on the notion that the National CIO was violating the democratic process. For Ruth Young of the United Electrical Workers (UE), the violation was of the rights of national and local unions. She reported that the UE Executive Board had already taken action on the letter, which she called an "infringement of the autonomy of local unions." As a representative from one of the GNYIUC's largest affiliates, she warned that the Council "cannot jam a decision down the throat of any affiliate." This basic position was echoed by a representative from the Teachers who suggested, "the Council represents its affiliates here in New York and is obliged to speak for them" (Greater New York CIO Council, Executive Board Minutes, March 16, 1948, Exhibit J, RWLA, SM, Box 4, Folder 5).

On March 18, 1948, a special GNYIUC meeting that drew over 340 delegates was held to discuss the matter. As in the Executive Board meeting, comments accused the National CIO of violating the democratic process. The UE began things by accusing Brophy's letter of hitting "at the root of trade union democracy," and they submitted a motion "rejecting the Brophy letter and calling upon National CIO to reaffirm its fundamental principles of trade union democracy." The motion received broad support from the floor as delegates from a number of unions reported that their local unions or executive boards had voted to reject the letter. Irving Potash of the Fur Worker's summed up the basic sentiment of the floor declaring, "a representative of CIO cannot dictate to millions of members how they are to think on political matters." He reasoned, "according to the Brophy edict, only delegates who agree with him can be representatives to this Council." Given that Fur Union "members overwhelmingly favored a Third Party" he believed that the GNYIUC should reject the letter. When the vote was called, this position won by a landslide, with only two of the 340 delegates in

attendance opposing it. Interestingly, the majority included unionists who were on both sides of the Wallace run, suggesting that there was a common opposition on principle to the moves of the National CIO (Exhibit "K" Greater New York CIO Council Digest Council Minutes Special Meeting March 18, 1948, RWLA Box, SM, Box 4, Folder 5).³³

To the pressure it faced from the national CIO and right wing CIO unions in New York, the GNYIUC soon had to add internal opposition from previously steadfast supporters. On March 26th, Mike Quill sent a one-sentence telegram to Saul Mills announcing his resignation as President of the GNYIUC (Press Release March 26, 1948, RWLA, SM, Box 4, Folder 1). The *New York Times* suggested that Quill stepped down because he did not think the GNYIUC was adequately considering the dangers of splitting the national CIO. As they put it, "Mr. Quill apparently came to the conclusion that the strength and unity of the CIO nationally was endangered through the threat of splits and fights between conflicting elements." It was his opinion that the "local council should support the national CIO," and he was said to resent the "lack of responsibility of officials representing unions with small memberships who stood on the council floor and "blasted" Mr. Murray." Quill's position "was that as the head of a union with 100,000 members, as the only member of the City Council on the Executive Board of the CIO, he had a greater responsibility and that where it came to a choice of standing with the national or local bodies, he supported the national" (NYT, March 27, 1948, p. 1).

Within a month, Quill also left the ALP, the party that he had worked with and represented for over a decade. In a letter to ALP state chair Marcantonio, Quill declared that he "did not intend to remain a member of the American Labor Party." His reasons were simple, as the "party is no longer the American Labor Party which was founded by such true representatives of the people as Charney, Vladcheck and Sidney Hillman." In Quill's estimation, the ALP was now the "prisoner of such crackpots as William Z. Foster" and other CP leaders whom he called "merchants of confusion" that could not command the respect of any large section of the voters of New York." He told Marcantonio that he had personal respect for him, but warned that he and the other "decent people" in the ALP would be unable to maintain the party as a broad people's party because the "screwballs and crackpots will continue to carry on as if the Communist Party and the American Labor Party were the same house with two doors" (Quill to Marcantonio, April 20, 1948, RWLA, UTWU).

The day after Quill left the ALP, Jack Kroll informed both Mills and Hollander that the newly formed New York Regional CIO-PAC would now

be exclusively authorized to serve as the political arm of the National CIO-PAC in New York City (Kroll to Hollander, April 21, 1948, RWLA SM Box 4, Folder 6; CUA PM Box 58, Folder CIO PAC, 1948.) Despite the letter, Mills stated that the GNYIUC would continue to operate its PAC as it had since 1940 (NYT, April 22, 1948, p. 18). The ability of the GNYIUC to maintain business as usual was challenged over the next several week as individual defections from the council gave way to the pull out of entire unions. On June 21, the ACW, which had not paid dues to the council for months, officially announced that it would pull locals representing 40,000 workers out of the GNYIUC because of the Council's failure to follow national CIO policy (NYT, March 20, 1948, p. 11; NYT, June 22, 1948, p. 12). The following day, Quill announced that TWU Local 100 would disaffiliate its 40,000 members and other locals would be urged to do the same (NYT, June 23, 1948, p. 1).

The End of the GNYIUC

By September 1948, the relationship between the two factions within the New York CIO had become completely poisonous and by mid-month 35 members of the New York State CIO State Executive Board met to consider what to do about the split within their ranks. After a bitter debate, a majority authorized State CIO officers to contact CIO President Murray about bringing formal charges against the GNYIUC.³⁴ In line with this directive, a letter was sent to the National CIO requesting that the GNYIUC charter be revoked. The letter alleged that the GNYIUC had continuously violated the CIO constitution and rules and provided several pages of specific charges (Charges Against Greater New York CIO Council, September 27, 1948, WSU, James Carey, CIO Secretary Treasurer Collection (JC), Box 108, Folder Industrial Union Councils: New York Charges Against, 1948).³⁵ Among these was the assertion that GNYIUC had thwarted "national CIO policy, as definitively expressed and enunciated by the CIO national officers and Executive Board ..." (Quill, Curran, Naughton, Robenstein and Altman to Murray, attached to Murray to Mills and Durkin, September 28, 1948, RWLA, SM, Box 3, Folder 11). The Council was also accused of continuously engaging in political activities in opposition to the New York State PAC, which had been organized to support Truman, and for attacking the State PAC when it followed National CIO policies.

On September 27, 1948 the National CIO issued a press release announcing that a group of New York CIO leaders had requested that the GNYIUC's charter be revoked. To see whether this demand was warranted,

a sub-committee of the National CIO Executive Board was granted the authority to put the GNYIUC on trial (Murray to Durkin and Mills, September 28, 1948, RWLA, SM, Box 3, Folder 11).³⁶ After hearing two days of tumultuous testimony replete with fist-fights that garnered front page headlines, the sub-committee drafted a report which recommended that the GNYIUC charter be revoked. The report concluded that the GNYIUC had “willfully and flagrantly disregarded and acted contrary to National CIO policy.” Such actions were not permissible because IUCs differed from national unions or local unions in that they were a “creature of the national CIO” that had to function in the interests of the National CIO. The GNYIUC had failed in this respect, as it had “without question acted contrary to and in plain disregard of National CIO policy and rules” (CIOEB, November 20, 1948, pp. 168–173). In November, a majority of the CIO Executive Board concurred with the findings of the trial, and by a vote of 34–5 the GNYIUC’s charter was revoked, thereby making it among the first left-led CIO organization to be officially purged from the federation (CIOEB, November 20, 1948, p. 294). With the expulsion of the GNYIUC, the formal relationship between the CIO and the ALP came to an end.³⁷

CONCLUSION

In the 1940s, C. Wright Mills (1948) found that a majority of CIO leaders believed that organized labor needed its own labor party. Yet despite these preferences, the institutional configuration of American politics led CIO unions across the nation to pursue their political interests via the Democratic Party. In New York, however, unions were embedded in an unusual institutional context that facilitated minor party formation. This context permitted union leaders with a preference for a labor party to develop a strategy that involved officially committing the GNYIUC to the ALP without completely breaking labor’s ties with the Democratic Party. From 1944 to 1948, the CIO–ALP ran its own candidates at the local level and actively used fusion in state and national races in order to pressure the Democratic Party to be more attentive to the interests of organized labor. Overtime, the GNYIUC’s political and organizational prowess helped the ALP to develop significant political capacity, giving it the balance of power in New York politics.

Following World War II, left wing factions of the CIO–ALP began to argue that the party should pursue a political strategy that more directly confronted the Democratic Party. In 1946, this new tendency within the CIO–ALP resulted in an electoral challenge to the Democrats that nearly

unseated a labor friendly Congressional candidate. In light of the CIO–ALP’s demonstrable power, when both the GNYIUC and ALP began to gravitate toward Henry Wallace’s third-party presidential campaign, supporters of President Truman became understandably worried. This worry, no doubt turned to panic in February 1948 when CIO–ALP forces defeated the Democrats and sent the ALP’s Leo Isacson to Congress. The possibility that GNYIUC and ALP support for Wallace might draw enough votes away from Truman to throw New York to the Republicans became all too real.³⁸

This was a risk that the National CIO was evidently not willing to take. While National CIO leaders had supported ALP activity when it was limited to local races, the occasional independent run for higher office, and fusion, they recognized that the rules governing American presidential elections insured that a regionally based party like the ALP, no matter how strong its showing at the polls, could only function to spoil the election for the party closest to the CIO’s interests. Accordingly, the National CIO regarded GNYIUC and ALP support for Wallace as hopeless and dangerous. The result of this disagreement about political strategy was an intra-class struggle between different factions of the CIO over what CIO policy should be.³⁹ In the end, the National CIO used the organizational power vested in it by CIO bylaws to revoke the charter of the GNYIUC, thereby terminating the links between the CIO and the ALP.⁴⁰

The rise and subsequent fall of the CIO–ALP, highlights the importance of institutional context in explaining organized labor’s “exceptional” choice to forgo building a national labor party in the United States. The Electoral College and SMWTAD have severely limited union leader’s willingness to engage in third-party politics, even when they preferred such a party to the Democrats. At times, the presence of different election laws at the state and local level has afforded unions an opportunity to pursue effective minor party strategies, but as the case of the CIO–ALP demonstrates, no matter how successful these initiatives were, there was limited room to maneuver as long as the national context remained unchanged.

NOTES

1. The literature on American Exceptionalism is vast. For good overviews see Foner (1984), Korpi and Shalev (1980), and Rogers (1990).

2. By posing the question in the affirmative, I follow Kimeldorf’s approach to understanding American Exceptionalism. Instead of asking “Why no socialism?” he asked “Why some socialism?” He then utilized a deviant case analysis to compare the CIO International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union to the AFL

International Longshoremen's Association in order to explain the success of Communists in the former. See [Kimeldorf \(1988\)](#).

3. For a review of "new institutionalism," see [Immergut \(1998\)](#). For a recent discussion on the nexus between rational choice and historical institutionalism see [Katznelson and Weingast \(2005\)](#) "Intersections Between Historical and Rational Choice Institutionalism."

4. The question as to what constitutes an "institution" is not always clearly addressed by researchers. [Goodin \(1998\)](#) defines an institution as an "organized pattern of socially constructed norms and roles, and socially prescribed behaviors expected of occupants of those roles, which are created and recreated over time" (p. 19). Following Jon Elster, I prefer to conceive of institutions as a "rule enforcing mechanism" in which the "rules govern the behavior of a well-defined group of persons, by means of external, formal sanctions" ([Elster, 1989, p. 147](#)). As Elster notes, this definition seeks to differentiate institutions from norms, which shape behavior via external, informal sanctions.

5. The importance of this difference is illustrated in a hypothetical congressional election in which the Republicans obtain 45 percent of the vote, the Democrats 35 percent, and the ALP 20 percent in every district in America. Under a winner-take-all system, the Republicans would win every seat in the government. The majority of citizens who expressed preferences for other parties would have no representation in the government.

6. Canada is of particular interest, given that many of the same international unions that opposed third-party activity in the U.S. were instrumental in building Canada's social democratic Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, which ultimately became the New Democratic Party. See [Horowitz \(1968\)](#), [Lipset \(1967\)](#), and [Young \(1969\)](#).

7. For instance, the Milwaukee Federated Trades Council (FTC) became the backbone of a successful Socialist Party. Between 1904 and 1910, the alliance between the FTC and the Social Democratic Party elected 18 socialists to office. Of these candidates eight of were union officials and ten were union members. Similarly, less successful third-party efforts were launched in 1919 by the Chicago Federation of Labor and 45 other central labor bodies. See [Gavett \(1965\)](#) and [Weinstein \(1984\)](#) (Chap. 4).

8. In 1942, the nominees in 31 out of 42 congressional districts ran on two more lines. In 1944, this occurred in 41 of 45 districts. [Bone \(1946\)](#) points out that in some cases, candidates entered all the major primaries with the hopes of winning the nomination on all lines, thereby insuring an early victory.

9. The largest affiliates were the International Ladies Garment Workers Union and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers (ACW). Carter notes that both of these unions possessed many Jewish and Italian workers that tended toward left wing politics. The Transit Workers Union, which was an important institution in the Irish community, also provided support, as did many smaller unions. For more on the history of the ALP see [Carter \(1965\)](#) and [Waltzer \(1977\)](#).

10. Election of ALP members to the city council was facilitated by another unique set of election rules: proportional representation. New York City adopted a system of proportional representation in 1936. The result of efforts to reform corrupt city politics, this system permitted voters to rank order candidates, with their votes transferring from higher ranked to lower ranked candidates if their first choices did

not receive enough votes to pass the election threshold. This system, which would be in place for 12 years, permitted the ALP to be a serious player in city politics, helping the party to build and maintain its political capacity.

11. On the question of who voted for the ALP, [Spinard \(1957–1958\)](#) argued that the ALP benefited from more of an “ethnic vote” than an “economic vote.” His findings suggested that consistent support for the ALP came from “Jewish voters with a specific ‘ideological’ voting tradition” and African Americans. There were also pockets of support in the Italian community, particularly in Vito Marcantonio’s congressional district. This raises the possibility that the ALP might have owed its success to the existence of ethnic groups with particular “ideological” traditions. This strikes me as an inadequate explanation, since there is no reason to believe that New York City’s Jews, African Americans and Italians possessed different ideological traditions from members of those same groups in other American cities. The key difference would seem to be the institutional context, which permitted a Labor Party to forge a constituency while also permitting members of this constituency to cast a vote for a minor party without wasting their vote. It should be noted that there are also methodological questions about the adequacy of Spinard’s measure of economic class, which relied solely on an index of median rent in an area.

12. While the ALP strategy centered on the Democratic Party, they sometimes used fusion with Republicans. This created complicated political wheeling and dealing that varied from election to election and borough to borough depending on the makeup of the local Democratic Party and the strategy of the ALP at the time. For more on this see [Carter \(1965\)](#).

13. This was precisely what the ALP did in 1942 when the Democrats put up what [Dubinsky \(1977\)](#) described as a “worthless candidate” for governor. Though the ALP candidate drew almost 10 percent of the vote, he did not spoil the election for the Democrats. The Republican candidate had won by a margin larger than the ALP vote.

14. The fight between left and right factions had ebbed and flowed since the ALP’s founding.

15. [Zieger \(1995\)](#) notes that there are questions about the most appropriate term to apply to unions that were led by Communists or their allies. He argues that Communist is not accurate, since many leaders were not party members. He also suggests that left is incorrect, since at times there were others in the labor movement to their left politically. Zieger settles on the term “Communist and their allies” and “pro-Soviet” ([Zieger, 1995, p. 446, fn. 38](#)). I find “Communist and their allies” to be somewhat cumbersome, and “pro-Soviet” to be misleading since it unjustly frames these actors in terms of their foreign policy views instead of their domestic activism. Thus, though perhaps not entirely accurate, I have followed the lead of [Rosswurm \(1992\)](#) and will primarily use the term “left-led” throughout the text.

16. The terms right and left will be used throughout this paper, as it was the way the involved parties and press identified the factions at the time.

17. For more on the GNYIUC see [Foner \(1990\)](#) and [Eimer \(2000\)](#).

18. For more on the primary see [Dubinsky and Raskin \(1977, pp. 272–276\)](#), [Steven Fraser \(1991, pp. 517–522\)](#), and [David Saposs \(1960, pp. 75–79\)](#).

19. It is worth noting that the Liberal Party would also use fusion to its advantage. For more on the Liberal Party see [Dubinsky and Raskin \(1977, Chap. 12\)](#).

20. The Community Councils appear to have had significant capacity in neighborhoods across the city. In 1944, the GNYIUC reported that they held more than “150 public meetings, more than 200 street rallies, led approximately 350 delegation to legislators and governmental agencies, distributed millions of leaflets and pamphlets, and put up thousands of posters published by the CIO council” (*Greater New York Industrial Union Council, 1944, p. 19*).

21. Representation on the committee was as follows: the city and state CIO provided three members each, the ALP provided one member, and the national PAC appointing one member. The GNYIUC elected Saul Mills, Mike Quill and Ruth Young, all allies of the CP, to the new committee (GNYIUC EBMN, June 12, 1944, p. 2).

22. On the registration process and popularity of the finder see the NYT (August 24, 1944, p. 32). Council activists Klare (July 20, 1998) and Foner (July 20, 1998) stressed how innovative and useful such a book was in the pre-computer age. MacDougall (1965, v. 1) attributes the books creation to GNYIUC staff member Barney Conal who also used “ethnic maps and data regarding the industrial, racial, religious and other characteristics of a political district to determine areas of concentration in any campaign and to provide clues to what kind of campaign appeals should be made in different places” (p. 50). The Democratic national committee eventually adopted Conal’s methods.

23. The article noted that both the ALP and Liberal Party had demonstrated their importance as key players in New York State politics. Their power was evident not just at the presidential level, but in state senate and assembly races across the state. See NYT (November 9, 1944, p. 1).

24. On the internal politics of the Communist Party during World War II, see Isserman (1993). On the Duclos letter that triggered the replacement of Browder and the reorientation of the CP, see Chap. 10.

25. Waltzer (1977) suggests that the decision to run against the Democrats was pushed by ALP Vito Marcantonio in order to send a message to the Democrats about any potential challenge they might be thinking of mounting against him in November 1946 (pp. 318–319).

26. Zieger (1995) notes that the adoption of a resolution to remain non-partisan “was really a declaration against a third party initiative and a reaffirmation of the CIO’s efforts to liberalize the Democratic Party” (p. 267–268).

27. For other accounts of these events see Starobin (1972, pp. 174–177), MacDougall (1965, v. 1, pp. 259–263), Zieger (1995, pp. 266–269, 447, fn. 44), Shannon (1959, Chap. 5), and Freeman (1989, p. 292). It is worth noting that Quill also attributed the line about splitting the CIO to William Foster. Zieger notes that though “challenged on specific points of timing and locale,” Quill’s account is thought to be credible (Zieger, 1995, p. 447, fn. 44).

28. For more on labor’s views regarding the pros and cons of a Wallace run see MacDougall (1965, v. 3, Chap. 27).

29. Curran broke with the CP in 1946, and resigned as president of the GNYIUC in December 1947. For more on Curran’s break with the CP see Howe and Coser (1962, pp. 460–463).

30. For more on the way these fights played out in other cities see Emspak (1972) and Zieger (1995, Chap. 9).

31. It is worth noting that the race took place in a heavily Jewish district, and that Isacson made Truman's policy toward Palestine, which many Jews were critical of, a central issue. While this issue no doubt effected the ability of the Democrats to win the race, it also important to note that the parties involved viewed the race in a broader context, as a "test of strength" for the Wallace movement. See Carter (1965, pp. 334–339).

32. Rule 8 was amended in 1946 in an attempt to reign in left-led IUCs. Its goal was to make sure that IUCs did not "trespass upon the authority of the national CIO" by taking actions on matters that the CIO had not take a position on. This concern was spawned by various IUC actions, such as a large GNYIUC picket of Winston Churchill called because of his support for a U.S.–British Alliance against the Soviets. On Rule 8, see the CIO Exectuive Board (CIO EB, November 15, 1946, frame 800P). On the picket of Churchill (see NYT, March 16, 1946, p. 1; DW, March 15, 1946, p. 2).

33. While the GNYIUC went on record in opposition to the Brophy letter, it is important to point out that Council leaders were trying to walk a fine line. As the *New York Times* coverage of the meeting noted, the Council had at no point adopted a resolution in favor of Wallace. They reported that the Council's argument was that it "had deferred to the national leadership in not taking any action contrary to its wishes, but that under no system of democracy could it be forced to take affirmative action with which it disagreed" (NYT, March 19, 1948, p. 46).

34. The vote, which was taken on a per capita basis, split along a left right axis with 315,476 in favor and 164,236 against. See NYT (September 16, 1948, p. 19).

35. The council was also charged a number of other violations including interference with the affairs of national unions. These charges stemmed from a number of incidents, including Council opposition to a transit fare hike and a rate increase by Con Edison, both of which were deemed necessary by the respective unions in those industries. See Foner (1990, pp. 350–353). On the transit fare hike Freeman (1989, Chap. 13). For more on the rise and fall of the GNYIUC see Eimer (2000).

36. The three Executive Board members were: O.A. Knight, President of the Oil Workers International Union; Martin Wagner, President of the United Gas, Coke & Chemical Workers of America; Joseph Froesch, President of the Glass, Ceramic, and Silica Sand Workers of America. Ultimately, L.S. Buckmaster replaced O.A. Knight.

37. The following five unions voted against the measure: American Communications Association, Fur Workers, Furniture Workers, United Office and Professional Workers, and the Public Workers. The Food, Tobacco and Agricultural Workers, the United Electrical Workers and the International Longshoremen's Union abstained. See NYT (November 21, 1948, p. 1, 54).

38. In the end, despite the crackdown on the GNYIUC, Wallace took enough votes in New York (13.5 percent in the city and 8.3 percent in the state) to throw the state's electoral votes to the Republicans. See Waltzer (1977, p. 428).

39. While the struggle between the National CIO and the GNYIUC over political strategy occurred within the context of a larger fight between left and right within the CIO, it would be a mistake to view the clampdown on the GNYIUC solely in terms of anti-communism. Ideologies aside, the actors involved in this struggle had profound disagreements about the structure and power of the national federation, particularly as it pertained to political endorsements and strategy. As Emspak (1984) put

it in an article critical of the National CIO's crackdown on the left, "The cry was 'communism,' but the issues were adherence to CIO policy- meaning support for the Democratic Party" (p. 102).

40. It is worth noting that had the GNYIUC been operating just west of New York in Ontario Canada, their efforts to support a third party in a national election would most likely have not been squelched by the National CIO. Embedded in a different institutional context, the Canadian Congress of Labour, which was comprised of "right wing" affiliates of American industrial unions, such as the United Steelworkers and the United Autoworkers, aggressively backed a third party with national aspirations in the 1940s. See Young (1969) and Horowitz (1968).

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SOURCES

Archival Sources

Depository Abbreviations

Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University	WSU
Catholic University of America	CUA
Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives	RWLA

Collection Designation Abbreviations

CUA-Congress of Industrial Organizations	CUA-CIO
CIO Executive Board minutes	CIO EB
GNYIUC regular meeting minutes	GNYIUC MIN
GNYIUC executive board minutes	GNYIUC EBMIN
Newspaper Guild, Local 3	NG
Saul Mills	SM
Philip Murray Papers	PM
Unprocessed Transport Workers Union Files	UTWU

Periodicals

Daily Worker	DW
New York Times	NYT

Interviews

Charles Klare, GNYIUC Director of Organizing	July 20, 1998
Henry Foner, Fur Workers Union	July 20, 1998

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THIS IS NOT YOUR FATHER'S WAR: THE CHANGING ORGANIZATION OF MILITARISM AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Alec Campbell

ABSTRACT

In this paper, I suggest that prediction is a useful methodological strategy for evaluating political opportunities/political process models of social movements. I demonstrate the utility of this theory by analyzing the current political opportunities facing anti-war/interventionist/hegemony/imperialist movements in the contemporary United States. I conclude that the prospects for a mass movement are slim relative to previous wars but that the prospect for alliances with military elites has increased. This conclusion supports Ian Roxborough's position in a recent volume of this journal that sociologists should engage military policy makers.

INTRODUCTION

In this paper, I connect two sociological debates. In the first, Ian Roxborough suggested – among other things – that sociologists ought to engage military elites and intellectuals on questions of military doctrine and strategy.

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Responses to Roxborough's suggestion ranged from support, through concern for scholarly independence, to adamant opposition. One critic proposed engaging with social movements as an alternative to military elites (Roxborough, 2003a, b; Abu-Lughod, 2003; Foran, 2003; Hooks, 2003; Centeno, 2003).

The second debate concerns the political opportunities/political process theories of social movements. The severest critics (Goodwin & Jasper, 1999) claim that these theories are so vague as to constitute tautologies. Responses to Goodwin and Jasper rejected much of their analysis and almost all of their suggested remedy. However, these responses do recognize conceptual and methodological problems with the use of political opportunities and political process models of social movements, as do many proponents of these theories (Koopmans, 1999; Meyer, 1999; Tilly, 1999; Gamson & Meyer, 1996; Meyer & Minkoff, 2004).

In this paper, I make a methodological point about social movements research arguing that prediction is an underutilized but potentially useful strategy for the study of social movements generally and about political opportunities/political process specifically. I then provide an example by making predictions from what I argue are the political opportunities available to contemporary peace and anti-war movements. This leads to the substantive point that current opportunities favor the engagement between sociologists and military elites that Roxborough calls for.

I am not addressing these debates equally. I am supporting Roxborough's call for sociological engagement with the military. I am not claiming to have resolved any of the central issues in the discussions and debates over political opportunities/political process models of social movements. I am pointing to a methodological approach that will address one issue recognized by participants on both sides of these discussions and debates. Moreover, I am proposing an addition to the existing set of methodological tools. I am not claiming that existing methods are wrong, only that they are limited and that there exists a methodological alternative with unrealized potential.

POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES: STRUCTURE AND PROCESS

The paramount importance of "political opportunities" for the emergence and success of social movements is widely (Tarrow, 1998; McAdam, 1996, 1999) though not universally (Goodwin & Jasper, 1999), accepted and

the concept of political opportunities is very widely used (Jenkins & Perrow, 1977; Smith, 1996; Noonan, 1995; Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Marco, 1995; Kurzman, 1996; Amenta & Zylan, 1991; Meyers, 1993a, b). Tarrow (1998) goes so far as to state that, "changes in political opportunities and constraints create the most important incentives for initiating new phases of contention" (pp. 199–200).

Unfortunately, definitions of "political opportunities" are almost as variable as the movements to which they are applied. Thus, Gamson and Meyer (1996) worry that political opportunities will become "an all-encompassing fudge factor for all the conditions and circumstances that form the context for collective action. Used to explain so much, it may ultimately explain nothing at all" (p. 275). Goodwin and Jasper (1999) echo this sentiment stating that, "Whether this thesis makes sense depends of course, on what is meant by 'political opportunities.' The broadest definition makes the thesis tautological" (p. 30). Typically, social movement scholars have addressed these concerns by calling for or providing greater conceptual clarity or detail. They clarify what is and what is not an opportunity, a political opportunity or a political opportunity structure. They indicate categories of each and relate them to social movements and or contentious politics (Gamson & Meyer, 1996; Meyer & Minkoff, 2004; Meyer, 1999; Koopmans, 1999; Tilly, 1999).

Distinct from the problem of conceptual clarity is the issue of retrospective bias. Goodwin and Jasper (1999) say, "virtually anything that, *in retrospect*, can be seen as having helped a movement mobilize or attain its goals becomes labeled a political opportunity" (p. 36, emphasis added). Tilly (1999) says that Goodwin and Jasper "rightly complain of the propensity to apply basic explanatory concepts flexibly after the fact thus reducing or extinguishing those concepts' rigor" (p. 57). Meyer (1999) argues that they "are right that analysts who do this work are generally interested in movements, so they look for movements and then *read back* to find expanding political opportunities. This approach risks conflating opportunities with mobilization, which can be a problem but it is one of method more than theory" (p. 87).

The debates over conceptual clarity are important and productive but I am interested in the question of retrospective bias, which Meyer accurately describes as methodological rather than theoretical or conceptual. Even if the conceptual content of political opportunities was clear and universally agreed upon, the problem of retrospective bias would remain. This implies that a solution to the problem of retrospective bias does not depend upon resolution of the conceptual difficulties plaguing the theory. As a result,

I need not commit to a specific version of political opportunities/political process or a specific resolution of conceptual issues to consider this methodological issue.

Why is retrospective bias a problem? Because knowing the outcome in advance taints the analysis. This is why reputable drug trials use a double-blind methodology. In the case of social movements and political opportunities, retrospective bias is a problem for at least two reasons. First, in a sufficiently complex political environment it will always be possible to construct a plausible case for the importance of some political opportunity.¹

Second, given the limited number of cases, many political opportunities are likely to correlate with a given movement. It is not clear how to select the real causes from spurious ones. In this regard, consider McAdam's (1999) work on black insurgency. He specifies the decline of "King Cotton," the great migration and the black vote, the electoral shift to the Democratic party, World War II and the end of American isolationism, and increasingly favorable government action as the specific political opportunities that led to black insurgency.

The procedure for selecting and verifying these particular phenomena as causal from all of the available correlating political phenomena is unclear. Why all of these and only these? Are they all equally important? Is McAdam suggesting that had America returned to an isolationist foreign policy black insurgency would not have developed? If not, what effect would a return to an isolationist foreign policy have had? The implicit standard of evidence is logical connection. McAdam tells a coherent and generally compelling story about how each of these political phenomena constituted an opportunity for black insurgency. The problem is that the ability to tell a convincing story sets the methodological bar very low and risks mistaking correlation for causation.

This is not to say that McAdam could or should have done anything differently. He faced two very difficult methodological issues. The first is retrospective bias and the second is that researchers typically have a small number of cases often with more variables than observations. There is only one American Civil Rights movement and it is in the past. Any causal explanation of that movement will face these same problems. These methodological issues are not unique. Most historical work is hampered by knowing outcomes in advance and it often faces the small N problem. These methodological issues result from the fact that the social movements research is frequently historical research.

In historical sociology, the most common solution to these issues is the comparative method of "analyzing causal regularities in history" (Skocpol,

1984, pp. 374–386; see also Skocpol, 1979; Ragin, 1987). Meyer (1999) suggests a comparative approach saying, “Rather than throw up our hands in the face of complexity and variation, it seems to make more sense to work to examine and test particular propositions across cases, and work to develop more complex and variegated models for understanding protest politics” (p. 84). Tilly (1999) also suggests a comparative approach (p. 60), though neither he nor Meyer specifically suggests Skocpol’s approach.

This is a very good idea and something already done in cross-national studies of social movements by Kitschelt (1986), Kriesi et al. (1995), Pedersen (1993) and others. More comparative studies will undoubtedly further our understanding of the role of political opportunities in the origins, course and consequences of social movements. Nonetheless, this approach still faces problems of retrospective bias and small N’s. In this situation, it is difficult to address some of the issues raised by friendly critics of political opportunities. These include missed opportunities (Sawyers & Meyer, 1999) and uncertainty (Koopmans, 1999). These issues are the subject of intense methodological debate. To Lieberson (1992) they are fatal, while to Mahoney (2003) they are unproblematic.

Fortunately, researchers can avoid these difficulties. Social movements and political opportunities are typically studied historically but they are not inherently historical. In this situation, we can borrow methodology from physical scientists and economists. If a central problem is that one can always produce a post-hoc explanation that fits the case, why not use existing sociological knowledge to generate pre-hoc explanation; a prediction? In principle, we ought to be able to use sociological knowledge to analyze existing political opportunities and make some predictions about the potential for various kinds of social movements’ emergence, content and likelihood of success.

There is sociological precedent for a predictive approach. Daniel Bell’s *The Coming of Post Industrial Society* (Bell, 1976) and Alvin Gouldner’s *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* (Gouldner, 1970) are two well-known examples. Some social movement researchers have made predictions though they have neither highlighted them nor exploited them as a methodological approach (Jenkins & Perrow, 1977, p. 267; Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996, pp. 1643, 1646; Kitschelt, 1993, p. 22). Recently Tilly (2001) joined by Goldstone (2001) focused on prediction in the immediate aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Center.

As Tilly notes, predictions can be unconditional based on statistical regularities, or conditional “if-then” predictions based on causal regularities.

For example, Tilly makes several unconditional predictions about the hijackers and several conditional predictions about what will happen if the US and/or its allies bomb the presumed headquarters of the terrorists. Similarly, when Jenkins and Perrow (1977) say, "The prospects for future insurgency, by this account, are dim. Until another major realignment takes place in American politics we should not expect to see successful attempts to extend political citizenship to the excluded" (p. 267), they are making a conditional prediction about emergence based on their understanding of existing political opportunities.

Jenkins and Perrow's prediction is very general. A more specific kind of prediction points to the existence of specific opportunities and the absence of others. This kind of prediction says that a successful movement must do this rather than that. It maps opportunities to particular strategies, tactics and framings. This kind of prediction is important because opportunities are not always recognized or seized. Activists stuck in old frames and/or repertoires of contention may miss new opportunities. This kind of prediction is more the province of pundits and activists than of scholars, though discussions of missed opportunities (Sawyers & Meyer, 1999) necessarily make predictions about what might have happened had other strategies, tactics and framings been used. To the extent that we take Meyer's advice and look at missed opportunities, sociologists will be engaged in counterfactual prediction about historical cases.

Of course, prediction has significant methodological limitations. Accurate predictions are evidence for causation but, like correlation, prediction is not causation and macro-level predictions may be accurate while the causal factors specified are not. Inaccurate predictions cannot overturn the theory of political opportunities as a whole, but they can help to isolate which political opportunities actually matter from among all of the potential correlating political phenomena. Negative predictions are the most easily falsifiable. If a theory predicts that a movement cannot emerge and it does, the theory is incorrect; but if a theory predicts that a movement can emerge and it does not, the theory may have incorrectly analyzed existing political opportunities, actors may not have seized upon the existing opportunities or opportunities may have been too small or countermobilizations may have been effective. Therefore, positive predictions should generally be more specific than negative ones.

Obviously, prediction is no methodological magic bullet. It has serious limitations. That said, the limitations of prediction are *different* from those of existing methods and prediction directly addresses the crucial problem of retrospective bias. Prediction is an addition to, not a replacement for

existing approaches. It will provide methodological diversity where no single method is adequate.

Tilly says that he made his predictions about the World Trade Center attacks in part to “encourage counter-predictions.” I shall take up Tilly’s challenge here in a way that addresses another recent debate in sociology. This debate is related not to theory and method in the study of contentious politics, but to sociological praxis in the area of war and militarism under conditions of contemporary American militarism and war making.

SOCIOLOGISTS, WAR AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Ian Roxborough recently argued that “the worldview of top policy makers and military planners introduces systematic ‘biases’ or ‘distortions’ into American foreign policy” and that sociologists could (and should) do something to illuminate these biases. He concluded by asserting that

Sociology potentially has a lot to say about the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as about other wars in the contemporary world. Sociologists have, however, generally not done work that is systematically useful, nor have they framed their work in this field in policy-relevant ways. They have abandoned the field to political scientists and policy pundits. As a result, American foreign policy is not as well informed as it might be. (Roxborough, 2003 p. 208)

Not surprisingly, Roxborough went on to suggest that sociologists ought to engage in policy work.

Roxborough’s critics tended to think that sociological understanding required a broader perspective and that for various reasons the military was not a suitable partner for the sociological enterprise. John Foran stated that he is “not looking for a constructive engagement with Bush administration policy-makers, but rather one with social movements, progressive politicians and ordinary people at home and abroad” (p. 229).

For reasons that I will make clear, I think social movements seeking to alter current military policies in Iraq and/or to counter future preventive wars will be more successful if they do some of what Roxborough suggests. I agree that we might not want to do it with Wolfowitz, Perle and Rumsfeld, but Foran himself suggests that there surely exist, “people in Washington – in the Pentagon, in the State Department, the CIA and Congress – who see that the problems of terrorism and regional instability in the Middle East are only going to grow now” (p. 230). I agree that these people exist and argue that successful social movements will not only ask them to join, but seek them out as allies making use of the institutional leverage that their

positions hold. Foran is skeptical that “the current administration is interested in real social science, and that even those who are, might be so ideological and unself-reflexive that they will have trouble making use of the insights of social science” (p. 229). However, senior military officers are not the same as the current administration and allies may be found among this group and among other long-term public servants.

In this paper, I use what we know from political, military and comparative historical sociology to assess the political opportunities facing anti-war/interventionist/hegemony/imperialist (AWIHI) social movements in the near term.² I argue, among other things, that changes in the organization and relative power of the United States military have changed the structure of constraints and opportunities for AWIHI social movements and that existing political opportunities favor elements of Roxborough’s approach. I am predicting that a successful AWIHI movement will make use of the political opportunities that I describe. I also claim that changes in the organization of the military have closed certain opportunities. Things that worked in the past will not work now. In particular, a new movement will look very different from the anti-war movement of the Vietnam era or any AWIHI movement of the 20th century.

STATES, WAR AND POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES THROUGH WORLD WAR II

Wars have frequently created political opportunities. If it is true that “war made the state,” one might view war as an opportunity for state builders. War has also provided political opportunities for revolution (Skocpol, 1979) the development of democracy (Therborn, 1977; Vagts, 1959), welfare states (Titmuss, 1969; Esping-Andersen, 1990) child welfare (Dwork, 1987), Women’s rights (Pedersen, 1993), and worker’s rights (Atleson, 1998; Lichtenstein, 1982). The opportunities created by war vary with the organization of a nation’s armed forces and its militarism.

Political opportunities in wartime depend upon the linkage between a state’s inward-looking domestic and outward-looking international elements. Mann believes that the relationship is limited, that “The modern (Western) state is not single but dual, its domestic separable from its geopolitical life” (Mann, 1988, p. 151; see also Skocpol, 1979), that state elites have far greater autonomy in the geopolitical as compared to the domestic realm, and that this is because classes and other organized social groups are largely caged by the nation state.

I agree that state elites typically have wide-ranging autonomy in geopolitics up to and including declarations of war. However, declaring war and waging war are not the same thing. Waging war often requires domestic resources and when it does, the acquiescence of domestic groups essential to the production of those resources can be contingent upon satisfaction of their political demands. More concretely, states at war sometimes need the productive and destructive power of women, children, ethnic minorities, workers and other normally disadvantaged groups and are willing to make concessions, sometimes even willing to coerce the advantaged in order to obtain it.

What matters here is the degree to which the state's war-making capacities are dependent upon domestic resources and the degree to which peacetime social and economic relationships must be reordered to gain them. I refer to this domestic dependence and reordering for war-making capacity as the militarization of society. I distinguish militarization from militarism, which is the active preparation for war in peacetime or as Mann (1988) puts it "an attitude and a set of institutions which regard war and the preparation for war as a normal and desirable social activity" (p. 124).

For much of European history war, militarism and militarization grew together. War was endemic in medieval and early modern Europe where countries that neglected militarism were conquered by those that did not (Tilly, 1990; Mann, 1988, Chapter 4). This made militarism an absolute necessity, yet rulers hesitated to increase militarization for fear of the political consequences of doing so.

Fielding an army requires men and material or the money to buy them. The most common form of extraction and the lowest level of militarization was taxation. Even here, rulers were hesitant to press militarization too far. This led to a preference for borrowing which was not without consequences (Kennedy, 1987) but which could avoid or delay tax revolt.

A deeper level of extraction concerns manpower. Domestic resources could be avoided by hiring mercenaries but these were expensive and often unreliable, few could rely on them exclusively. Domestically, medieval rulers relied upon feudal levies or militias for troops. These were largely untrained and their service was legally limited in time and place; many could not be made to serve abroad. Over time feudal service was often transformed into a more general obligation to serve but this obligation was not shared equally because local jurisdictions supplied quotas and

the pressure exerted by government could easily be taken over and pushed downward through the layers of society in town and country; past those who could afford to pay for substitutes or bully or litigate their way out of the draft to those who were too poor,

too stupid or too universally disliked to put up a fight against having to fight. (Hale, 1985, p. 77)

Thus, feudal armies came to be composed of “elements which society did not want or need and which it feared and rejected – vagrants, the unemployed, the destitute, even criminals” (Anderson, 1988, p. 28) and “gave governments the excuse to pack off the unproductive elements in society – rogues, vagabonds and paupers – to be slaughtered” (Hale, 1985, p. 24).

The men produced by this system were not volunteers but neither was this a proper form of conscription. Rather, it was a form of selective mobilization. This approach had paradoxical effects. It reduced the local resentment toward state demands for soldiers as “armies could thus be seen as removing from (society) at least temporarily (and given the mortality rates from which they suffered, very often permanently), elements of which it was glad to rid itself” (Hale, 1985, p. 77). However, “it was well realized that men of this kind recruited in this way could not provide the basis for an efficient army, but efficiency was unhesitatingly sacrificed to social convenience.” In this way, “Professional armies, in other words acted as a social safety-valve; and this ensured them at least a certain tolerance from the respectable citizens who paid for them” (Anderson, 1988, pp. 28–29).

Forced to rely on domestic manpower resources, states reduced the domestic impact of militarization by drawing few men who mattered; respectable citizens were taxed, but they did not serve. This preserved the autonomy of the state in international affairs and kept domestic peace but only at the cost of inefficient armed forces. Military capacities were less strongly linked to domestic sources but as a result, war-making capacity was reduced. In sum, states feared the political consequences of drafting men in true conscription and so, accepted reduced capacities (Rogers, 1993). In social movement terms, they believed that conscription would create a political opportunity for opposition to their rule.

All this created a tension between the desire for maximum military capacity and fear of the domestic consequences of increased militarization. If the consequences could be avoided, conscription would increase the size of the army and the average quality of its soldiers. The foreshadowing of conscription came with the *levee en masse* of the French Revolution and then with Prussian conscripts who defeated Napoleon’s imperial army. These events clearly displayed the increased war-making capacity of a conscripted army. However, the association of such armies with revolutionary

movements frightened restoration leaders who favored smaller professional armies that they hoped were more efficient and knew were more loyal (Mann, 1993, p. 427).

Fantasies of professional army efficiency were shattered in 1871 when the conscripted Prussian army defeated the French professional army in the Franco-Prussian war. At this point, continental Europe entered a period of dramatically increasing militarization through conscription and the development of very large reserve forces. Despite elite fears, the increased militarization associated with conscription did not create revolutionary political opportunities. Such opportunities required the acute expansion of militarization during wartime.

Militarization peaked during the total wars of the 20th century. In these wars, men were conscripted and reserves called up, governments organized labor-management relations, production was reorganized directly through the creation of new capacity, conservation and rationing, and indirectly through demand for war materials. In many cases, essential industries were nationalized as with US railroads during World War I.

These moments of peak militarization create political opportunities for groups that can leverage the need for their loyalty and their productive and destructive capacities into political gains. This leverage is frequently used to motivate state intervention (into class or racial conflicts) as it is the state that prosecutes the war and needs the loyalty and labor power. In sum, when state elites cannot wage war without the active participation of masses of citizens, war creates a political opportunity for those masses of citizens. Historically, elites have recognized this and sought to retain their autonomy by limiting militarization.

The US does not follow the European pattern. Prior to World War II, the United States cannot be described as militaristic in any meaningful way. The Army was tiny and state elites paid little attention to it in peacetime. I am not suggesting that the US was pacifistic or unwarlike. On the contrary, the country fought several wars and engaged in a nearly continuous genocidal campaign against indigenous peoples. I am saying that the US did not prepare for these wars in any meaningful way. American military history prior to World War II is characterized by long periods of neglect punctuated by rapid inefficient and unorganized mobilizations, consequent nearly total demobilization and renewed neglect. Through World War II, the United States won wars because it had enormous latent military potential, weak neighbors, even weaker indigenous peoples and large surrounding oceans. These allowed it to secure military victories without militarization and

despite slow and inefficient mobilization. Through World War II the United States is an anomalous case, aggressive and warlike but unmilitaristic, a combination unimaginable in Europe.

Both World Wars produced political opportunities in the United States. Unions, African Americans, women and other groups clearly saw the opportunities created by war and sought to benefit from them. Some of these benefits were lasting while others were short lived. African Americans and unions fared better after World War II than World War I. While militarization was intense in the United States, which had to make up for its peacetime lack of militarism, it was also short lived because of late entry into both World Wars.

WAR MILITARISM AND MILITARIZATION SINCE WORLD WAR II

Since World War II, the United States has dramatically expanded its militarism (Hooks & McLauchlan, 1992; Hooks, 1993) while simultaneously attenuating its militarization. Thus, in the post-World War II period the United States has dramatically increased its peacetime preparation for war but decreased the degree to which the state must rely on the domestic population or remake the social order to generate its war-making capacity. This decrease relative to the total mobilization of World War II has come in three stages.

Between 1947 and 1973 conscription kept militarization at historically high levels. The possibility of military service was an element of almost every male citizen's life course. However, a closer look at the draft mechanism reveals decreasing militarization over time. In the Korean War, substantial numbers of World War II veterans were redrafted and large numbers of national guardsmen were mobilized. Thus, the Korean War disrupted the lives of large numbers of solid citizens. During the Vietnam War, the draft was largely restricted to young men finishing their schooling. Guard call-ups were extremely limited and very few older men were drafted. Furthermore, as baby boomers came to military age, there were far too many potential soldiers and large portions of each cohort had to be deferred or exempted as supply exceeded demand. Conscription establishes a high level of militarization, but through deferments and low age limits, established citizens are largely undisturbed by it.

More importantly, during the Korean and Vietnam wars the economy was not mobilized for war to the degree that it had been during the World

Wars. To be sure, an important segment of the peacetime economy was now devoted to war production and there was a substantial “military–industrial complex.” This amounts to significant militarization. However, there was no rationing, no wage and price controls, no conversion of factories from consumer goods, no nationalization of industries or firms, no war induced labor shortages and no patriotic pressure on unions to avoid striking. The government did not even sell “war” bonds. When war came, it did not reorder social relationships for those not conscripted to the same degree that the World Wars had.

As a result, the home front in Korea and Vietnam was unlike World War II. Those not fighting were not enlisted as a part of the war effort and so militarization was much less a part of their lives. This is not to suggest that militarization played no part in people’s lives or that people were unconcerned. I am only suggesting that while total wars mobilize the entire society in the war effort the Korean and Vietnamese wars did this to a far lesser extent. Still, there was conscription and in Vietnam this helped to produce an anti-war movement centered among those eligible for the draft.

To see how important is the absence of a war-mobilized economy, consider the response if American citizens had not been able to buy new cars or homes between 1966 and 1971 as they had not been able to do during World War II. Consider further the response if the government had insisted on a no-strike pledge from trade unions or frozen wages. We cannot know what would have happened under these counterfactual conditions but it seems likely that public opinion and the composition of the anti-war movement would have been substantially different.

After Vietnam, the United States abandoned conscription. This substantially reduced militarization but until the end of the Cold War, the United States maintained a very large military force. This period constitutes an intermediate stage of militarism in which there was no conscription but the Armed forces still required large numbers of citizens.

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has substantially reduced the size of its military forces. In 2000, US military forces were about 2/3 their 1980 size. At the same time, the population has been continuously increasing. Thus, active duty military personnel amounted to about 0.49% of the population in 2000 as compared to about 0.9% in 1980 and 1.37% in 1960. No one serves against his or her will, and unlike the pre-conscription professional armies of Early Modern Europe, these soldiers are of very high quality as the decreasing demand for soldiers has allowed the United States military to raise enlistment standards. As compared to the previous century, the 21st century US army is relatively small and composed of highly

professionalized, technically proficient, long-service professionals more reminiscent of the 18th and 19th century monarchies than of modern 20th century states.

So where does the US stand with regard to war, militarism and militarization? The United States remains warlike and committed to the use of war as a solution to political problems. Moreover, the United States has, through the Gulf and Iraq wars, made credible its threats to use military force and through the doctrine of preventive war, it has expanded the conditions under which it will use that force. The US is probably more belligerent and aggressive than at any previous point in its history.

The US also remains highly militaristic. Its preparations for war in peacetime continue. Indeed, militarism may be at an all-time high. The United States continues to spend enormous amounts on preparation for and the conduct of war. This militarism has given the United States a decisive advantage in contemporary military conflicts. As many neoconservatives like to claim, the United States is probably the greatest military power in the history of human civilization and it works assiduously to preserve that power.

America has been warlike since its inception and militaristic for 60 years. What is new is the degree to which militarism has been unhitched from militarization. The result is that, at this moment, the use of military force has as few consequences for the majority of citizens as it has had at any time in the last 140 years. Taxes are the average citizen's only connection to American military power. We are asked to support the troops but our support, sympathy and feeling are all abstract. The vast majority do nothing practical, they do not commit sons and daughters to the battlefield, they do not recycle metal or rubber much less conserve gasoline. Hummers do not become tanks and fighter planes, as the nation does not convert its factories to war production. Indeed, we limit the production of war materials to what the "peacetime" economy can provide. World War II style solutions that involve militarizing the economy are not even considered because it would contradict ideological (privatization) and fiscal imperatives.³

To summarize, the United States achieved its peak militarization during World War II. Militarization was felt through conscription, rationing, wage and price controls, conservation drives, war-bond drives, state ownership of productive property and economic conversion to war production. We do none of this now, and so are relatively unmilitarized. We support the war by feeling and attitude, not by doing anything. The government never asks its citizens to participate in the war effort because to do so would increase militarization and risk dissent. The political consequence of demilitarization is to reduce citizen commitment to the war effort, possibly even to the point

of indifference. While indifference would have been fatal in the total wars of the 20th century, it is preferable for state elites seeking to preserve their geopolitical autonomy, presuming that they can retain sufficient war-making capacity without militarization.

We are a warlike and militaristic but oddly unmilitarized nation. In this regard, our current military structure most resembles European absolutist states of the 17th and 18th centuries. Minimal citizen participation is combined with maximum executive control. War has little practical tangible impact on most of our population. Of course, there are differences; the troops are far better qualified, no longer Wellington's scum of the earth. The executive is checked by democratic structures. However, the structure of the military makes war a low priority for the majority of the population. It may be a moral issue but it is not one of interests and choices; it reorders few lives. In my concluding section, I will describe the effects that this situation has on the potential for social movements concerned with war and militarism.

THE REVOLUTION(S) IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

How can the United States be aggressive, militaristic and demilitarized at the same time? The immense relative strength of the United States military makes this possible. The United States spends more on its military than the next 20 nations combined and nearly as much as the rest of the world combined. It has the largest nuclear arsenal, the largest navy and the largest air force. Its army is one of the largest and its troops are more effectively trained and highly motivated than many larger armies.

Much of the relative American military power results from the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union as a military competitor. This dramatically reduced the military capability of the next largest military power and led to reduced military spending among other advanced industrial nations in Europe who no longer felt threatened (Mann, 2003). The rest of the American military advantage results from what is sometimes called the revolution in military affairs. This revolution amounts to the harnessing of computer and other advanced technology to a new generation of weapons systems. These include stealth aircraft, smart bombs and advanced imaging technology, which contribute to tactical, or battlefield intelligence. This has increased the ability of the United States military to find and to accurately strike targets.

The United States now has decisive military power in wars fought against states and their armies. The key to American power is the control of the

commons, air, sea and space (Posen, 2003). This control, particularly the control of space, which is essential to the gathering of intelligence information, gives the United States a unique ability to gather information and to strike anywhere on the globe. This revolution in military affairs and the consequent control of the commons allows the United States to demilitarize. American technological advantages are so great that total mobilization is not required.

While impressive, the military power of the United States is not absolute.⁴ The military does not have an effective defense against weapons of mass destruction used against its own troops on the battlefield. Because the United States can defeat most state armies in symmetrical warfare, rational states that fear American aggression will seek to develop weapons of mass destruction as defensive measures. The lesson of Iraq for state leaders without weapons of mass destruction is that they are easily deposed by the American military. This would explain recent actions by North Korea and Iran.

The United States is also relatively weak in asymmetrical conflicts conducted by irregular forces, hidden among a population using cheap weapons and improvised tactics and technology. Asymmetrical warfare reduces the value of the control of the commons as air power cannot be used in close combat and local level intelligence cannot be gathered with satellites. Asymmetrical warfare is also intensive and so exploits the small size of the United States combat forces. Ironically, defeating armies in the field requires fewer troops than occupying a defeated enemy and defeating irregular insurgent forces. The current situation in Iraq reveals this weakness. The United States had few problems dispatching the organized Iraqi army. However, a relatively small number of insurgents are effectively tying down the bulk of the United States Army.

Finally, some have argued that the United States is limited by an unwillingness to take casualties. This claim is made by believers in and supporters of American military power and empire (Ferguson, 2004) as well as critics (Mann, 2003). While this is a widely held view, recent evidence suggests that it may be wrong. Table 1 shows data cited by several authors to support the contention that the public is not casualty averse (Feaver & Gelpi, 1999; Lacquement, Jr., 2004; Hyde & Charles, 2000). The survey asked military elites, civilian elites and the public about acceptable casualty levels in three scenarios. It also contextualized the question by providing the number of military deaths in recent wars. The results also show that the public is more willing than either civilian or military elites to accept casualties and far more willing to do so in what might be thought of as peace-keeping or state-building missions.

Table 1. Highest Number of American Military Deaths Acceptable to Various Groups in Three Scenarios.

Scenario	Military Elite	Civilian Elite	Mass Public
Stabilize democratic government in Congo	284	484	6,861
Prevent Iraq from obtaining WMD	6,061	19,045	29,853
Defend Taiwan from Chinese invasion	17,425	17,554	20,172

Source: Feaver and Gelpi (1999).

In reality, the United States is unlikely to take significant numbers of casualties in the near future. The death toll in Iraq, while substantial, is unlikely to increase rapidly and will almost certainly not reach the levels experienced in Vietnam.

To understand why, we must compare the political and military situations in Iraq and Vietnam. On the surface, the conflicts may seem quite similar as both involve the use of irregular forces that engage the technologically superior American military asymmetrically. However, in a unipolar world the Iraqi resistance cannot rely on the substantial overt support of superpowers or neighboring states. Any state playing a role similar to North Vietnam would be invaded by the United States and its leaders ousted. This is a disincentive for state elites who might consider supporting the Iraq insurgency. To make an analogy between Vietnam and Iraq we must imagine a Vietnam without cheap supply from the Soviet Union and without North Vietnamese regulars. This is a Vietnam without Tet or Khe Sanh. I think it is a Vietnam with many fewer casualties. Iraq is more like Northern Ireland or Palestine than Vietnam. The British remained in Northern Ireland for some 30 years taking casualties in dribs and drabs. If the United States can shift some of the security burden to local forces, it could stay in Iraq indefinitely taking low levels of casualties.

PROSPECTS AND PREDICTIONS FOR CONTEMPORARY AWIHI MOVEMENTS

How does this affect social movements opposing American wars/interventions/hegemony/imperialism? In this concluding section, I want to take

material from social movement theory and use it to make predictions about how an AWIHI movement could develop and what strategies it could effectively employ. It would be useful to consider the literature on the anti-Vietnam War movement. Unfortunately, the anti-Vietnam War movement “has been almost totally ignored by social movement scholars” (McAdam & Su, 2002, p. 697).⁵

In this paper, I am not committing to a specific version of political opportunities. My focus is on prediction as a methodology and not on clarifying the conceptual slippages that both critics and supporters recognize. As I have argued, prediction should be useful for any version of political opportunities theory. That said, I will follow Koopmans (1999) and try to distinguish between opportunities, political opportunities and political opportunity structure. I will also link my predictions to specific statements about political opportunities in previous research.

Political Opportunity Structure

The political opportunity structure consists of relatively stable aspects of the state structure and political organization. The concept of political opportunity structure is most often applied to cross-national comparisons because “cross-national differences in political opportunity structures often concern the most stable and deeply rooted aspects of political systems, and are thus structures beyond reasonable doubt. In within-country analyses these most structural aspects of political opportunity structure will be constants and therefore generally less helpful in explaining variation over time” (Koopmans, 1999, p. 100). Koopmans may be correct in most instances, but a focus on AWIHI movements exposes variation in the political opportunity structure across issue areas within a single country.

Many authors (Eisinger, 1973; Kitschelt, 1986; Kriesi et al., 1995) have used measures of state “strength” and/or “openness” to measure the effects of the political opportunities structure. Using this measure, the United States has a weak state because federalism and a strong judiciary provide multiple access points for social movements (Kriesi, et al., 1995; Tarrow, 1998). Thus, some analyses of American social movements examine the state rather than the federal level (Amenta & Zylan, 1991; Amenta, Carruthers, & Zylan, 1992). In addition, using this measure the American state has an inclusive political culture in which protests are unlikely to be repressed and protesters’ demands are often incorporated by the two centrist parties (Kriesi, et al., 1995; Tarrow, 1998).

For these reasons, the theory anticipates high levels of relatively non-violent protest in the United States. However, the political opportunity structure facing AWIHI movements is different from that facing other movements. War is a federal policy and so the legislative and judicial apparatuses of the several states are not access points for anti-war movements. Moreover, the federal judiciary is generally unwilling and often unable to intervene in foreign policy. Segregation was attacked through the judicial system in *Brown v. Board of Education*. There is no corresponding judicial access for AWIHI movements. Finally, the state is probably more willing to repress dissent in the case of war than in cases of domestic social movement activity. Wiretapping without judicial review and indeterminate detention are not yet things about which environmentalists or union activists have to worry.

Thus, the structural elements of political opportunities are arrayed against the possibility of a social movement in this issue area. Movements must act at the federal level, the judiciary will be of little assistance and high levels of state repression are likely. Social movements are not impossible under these circumstances but as Kriesi et al. (1995) show, they are less common and more confrontational. This leads to the prediction that an AWIHI movement is unlikely to arise and that any AWIHI movement that does arise is likely to be confrontational and perhaps even violent. Of course, research on the political opportunity structure is probabilistic and movements do arise in strong states with exclusive political cultures. The anti-Vietnam War movement is an example. However, the barriers are higher for AWIHI than for other movements and many familiar approaches (legal challenges and local action for example) are unlikely to work. I will deal with the Vietnam example in the next section.

Political Opportunities

What non-structural political opportunities exist for the nascent AWIHI movement? I argue that demilitarization and the end of the Cold War are important political opportunities. Demilitarization changes the constituency of the AWIHI movement relative to previous anti-war movements and the end of the Cold War makes available new elite allies with whom the AWIHI movement may build alliances.

Demilitarized Constituencies

War produces complicated sets of what McCarthy and Zald (1977) called beneficiary and conscience constituents. Anti-war movements' potential

beneficiaries are both foreign and domestic. Opposition troops benefit as American soldiers stop killing them. Civilians in opposition territory may benefit but this judgment depends fundamentally upon one's political views.⁶ With reference to opposition troops and civilians, activists are acting as conscience constituents. America's own troops, potential troops and the families of the troops who are suffering from war time-induced hardship (death, conscription and death of loved ones) are also potential beneficiaries. In this case, anti-war activists have often been beneficiary constituents. Student activists in the anti-Vietnam War movement were very often beneficiary constituents as were participants in the New York draft riots during the Civil War.

The decreased militarization of American society has reduced the number of beneficiary constituents in American Society to a bare minimum. The war in Iraq has next to no effect on American consumption patterns. The military takes a smaller proportion of the population than at any time in the past 50 years. This decrease is even larger if we account for the increased numbers of women in the military. All military personnel serve as volunteers; no one is forced to serve in the military. All of these things conspire to reduce the number of beneficiary constituents that AWIHI movements can mobilize.

Here, the dearth of scholarship on the anti-Vietnam War movement is a serious problem. To use the lessons of that AWIHI movement we would need to understand the relationship between the anti-draft and anti-war movements. If, as I suspect, the anti-draft movement and its beneficiary constituents were essential to the anti-war movement as a whole, then the absence of conscription is a significant problem for contemporary AWIHI movements. Evidence showing that the anti-war movement did not rely on anti-draft sentiment would contradict the argument I am making.

The revolution in military affairs reinforces the effects of declining militarization. As I have described above casualty levels in Iraq and in similar future interventions are likely to be modest relative to 20th century conflicts. This means that even for soldiers and their families, the benefits of ending war are less dramatic than in previous wars. So, there are fewer beneficiary constituents, and the benefits are less significant.

This means that any future AWIHI movement will be composed largely of conscience constituents. Following McCarthy and Zald, I predict that AWIHI social movements will tend to be professionalized. This is likely to result in a preference for lobbying and other interest group-type actions than in mass-based disruptive actions. Thus, any future AWIHI movement's relying on a mass-based confrontational approach are likely to fail as there will be insufficient numbers of beneficiary constituents to sustain such action

in the long run. Future AWIHI movements are likely to draw more cash than protesters. AWIHI movements also may lose support as conscience constituents switch loyalties (to immigrant's rights perhaps) or lose interest. This also means that colleges are not particularly likely to be the center of anti-war activity as they were during Vietnam when students faced the possibility of the draft. A better model for the demographics of activism might be the Central American peace movement of the 1980s, which was also composed largely of conscience constituents (Smith, 1996).

The relative dearth of beneficiary constituents also affects the effectiveness of potential AWIHI movement strategies. Put bluntly, focusing on personal risks and the loss of life in Iraq is largely a waste of time for AWIHI social movements. Not many Americans are dying and Americans care little about Iraqis who die.⁷ I predict that AWIHI movements that focus on this issue will have little effect.

Similarly, AWIHI movements should not be concerned about conscription. Conscription will not be reintroduced because there is no significant support for it. The people do not want to be conscripted, state elites do not want to limit their geopolitical autonomy by increasing militarization and the military does not need the enormous numbers of troops conscription would produce and certainly does not want to train hundreds of thousands of unwilling conscripts.

My analysis of militarization leads me to predict that a successful social movement will focus on treasure rather than blood. Americans are not forced to serve in the Iraq war but they are forced to pay for it. This one remaining aspect of militarization links the domestic population to the state's geopolitical activities. The central weakness of the contemporary organization of American military is that it is extraordinarily expensive. Maintaining control of the commons requires enormous investment in technology. Just as important, volunteer soldiers are very expensive. Because they are raised out of the labor market rather than forced to serve by the state, volunteer soldiers earn a competitive wage while conscripts can be severely underpaid. Thus the military has high capital and labor costs.

As the danger of the job increases, as it has since the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the military will have to decrease standards – thus compromising efficiency – or raise wages thus increasing costs. The military faces this choice now as the Iraq war begins to affect recruitment. I do not think that this presents insurmountable difficulties for the military. After all, private contractors have been able to find people willing to go to Iraq for a price. However, it will make an already expensive military even more expensive.

The common citizen's most direct connection to American militarism is also financial; they bear the tax burden of military power and action. I predict that a successful AWIHI movement will focus on the financial costs of military action. This would not be historically unprecedented; the French revolution grew out of the calling of the estates general necessitated by a war-induced financial crisis. Of course, that relationship was unrecognized by participants and there is no guarantee that a war-induced fiscal crisis would be interpreted as such in the United States. AWIHI movements could and should lay the groundwork for a correct understanding of this potential economic crisis.

Elite Allies in the post-Cold War Era

The presence of elite allies is another form of political opportunity frequently referenced in the social movement literature (McAdam, 1999; Tarrow, 1998; Guigni, 1998). It is difficult to imagine that elite allies are more available now amid a neo-conservative ascendancy than they were during the Vietnam War with an active civil rights movement, a still powerful labor movement, an independent media and a dominant Democratic Party with New Deal and progressive roots. Corporate elites might eventually begin to worry about the financial consequences of war but they would have to pull their heads out of the tax cut and corporate incentive trough, and that seems unlikely in the near future.

I think that the end of the Cold War has made possible elite alliances that were unthinkable during the Vietnam War. In particular, there is a very real potential for alliances between AWIHI movements and military elites. I think that Roxborough (2003a) is correct to argue that "the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower fundamentally altered the strategic situation. What followed was a decade-long debate among military strategists about the nature of the post-Cold War world. This debate was complex and at times incoherent" (p. 276).

In the post-Cold War era, the United States military is uncertain about its strategy, mission and doctrine. The collapse of the Soviet Union eliminated containment as a framework for understanding the military's role in the world. This uncertainty about mission, strategy and doctrine creates an opening for alliances between AWIHI movements and military elites. For all its defects, the American military elite's commitment to containment theory and a strategic focus on the Soviet Union and communism could not be overturned. In the Cold War period, military elites and intellectuals were not looking for explanations of the world because they thought they already understood it. They were not open to alternative explanations and

understandings. In the post-Cold War world, military elites are looking for explanations of the world and their role in it. As a result, engaging in debates over strategy and doctrine is more worthwhile now than in the past.

While the Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz clique has temporarily resolved this debate, there is no reason to believe that this debate is closed. The policy of preemptive action has been solidified in the same way that the policy of containment was solidified in the post World War II era. There is still space to discuss the nature of America's strategic situation and the role of military force in that strategic situation. This constitutes a significant political opportunity that AWIHI movements can exploit.

To exploit this opportunity, AWIHI movements must address the uncertainty of the military by developing its own clear statement of military strategy and doctrine. What threats does the United States face and with what strategy should it counter them? How will the military be a part of that strategic solution? If, "another world is possible," what role will the military play in that world? Can American military power produce good outcomes (in Bosnia, Rwanda, Darfur or anywhere else)? If it can, under what conditions is this most likely? Is the world safer, less violent or in any other way better with a single-military superpower than with multiple smaller powers? In retrospect, would we have used American ground troops in former Yugoslavia? Would we have introduced troops into Rwanda? Why? How should we relate to NATO? How should the US military relate to UN forces? If we do not believe in eliminating militarism, what do we believe in? Put differently, I think AWIHI movements should focus less on "peace" and more on structuring American militarism in a positive way. I think there is a unique opportunity for such efforts to yield results and I predict that the most successful AWIHI movements will be those that engage the military on these issues.

There are reasons to believe that military elites and intellectuals would be open to outside input. Foran and Hooks in their criticisms of Roxborough admit as much. Hooks (2003) argues that a solid sociological analysis might "identify a fundamental breach of trust in which the idealism of US officers and enlisted personnel are betrayed by the policy makers who have chosen war" (p. 240). While Foran (2003) argues that some people in the Pentagon must see "that the problems of terrorism and regional instability in the Middle East are only going to grow now. The unsolved problem of ruling Iraq after the war and the fact that no one has a viable plan for doing this should be giving those making the current policy some pause" and that "the movement needs to be patient and creative, stay together and make allies, and much more" (p. 230). I think Foran and Hooks are correct. There probably are some military and former military officers who see problems

with the current approach (Clark, 2004). AWIHI movements should seek alliances with these people.

A divided elite is also beneficial to social movements and it seems very likely that the current military situation is creating divisions within the military itself. Given the high costs of the war and the over commitment of forces, it would be very surprising if there were no conflict and division between military elites oriented toward expensive high-tech weapons like Star Wars on the one hand and those commanding troops on the ground. An AWIHI movement with an understanding of how the military needs to transform to meet current threats could exploit this likely division. It is not beyond the realm of imagination that field commanders and recruiters would be attracted to a reorganization of military priorities away from Star Wars-type projects.

More generally, it is very far from clear that military officers want to engage themselves in conquering or policing a new American empire. Many military elites were committed to the Powell doctrine. The Bush administration has cast aside that doctrine which established a high bar for justifying military intervention and essentially forbade state making, nation building and extended policing and peacekeeping missions.

The Powell doctrine attracted military elites because, as Roxborough points out, they are deeply committed to the “normal theory of civil–military relations” which strictly separates political and military power and action. As Roxborough also points out, the normal theory is unrealistic. Current military operations involve intervention (major conflict in administration terms), stabilization and transformation. The military is organized around intervention and is uncomfortable with and not necessarily good at stabilization and transformation, which are political tasks. An AWIHI doctrine that spelled out the relationship between politics and military power could be attractive to military elites. From the anti-war standpoint, serious thought about stabilization and transformation might have made raised the bar for going to war high enough to avoid it.

I predict therefore that a successful AWIHI movement will form alliances military officers and intellectuals. Of course, AWIHI movements and military elites are not natural allies and there will be distrust on both sides. Military elites are unlikely to be sympathetic to movements that seek complete and total demilitarization and the end of all militarism. An AWIHI movement that follows this course cannot be a pacifist movement. I do not think most people interested in AWIHI movements are pacifists, but the general failure of such movements to make positive recommendations for the military makes them appear anti-militarist and pacifist. Of course, some

activists are committed to anti-militarism and/or pacifism and the approach I am outlining is not open to them.

Considering the possibilities from the other direction, progressives, intellectuals and AWIHI movement members need to recognize that the military and military elites embody some things that we strive for in society. Military elites resemble intellectuals in many ways. They are highly educated; they work with both theory and data. They have forgone the higher earnings their education could provide out of a commitment to a life in which they find fulfillment and honor. In many cases, they are intellectuals. Advanced degrees including PhDs are common among senior military officers.

As an institution, the hierarchical organization of the military masks forms of equality that many progressives would like to see in society more generally. For example, the difference in pay between the most-highly paid military officer and the lowest paid grunt is far less than in private corporations. Those who decry the high pay of corporate CEOs might find the military an interesting model. In addition, the military's junior executives face the same risks as the low-paid grunts. Coal company executives and supervisors do not often die in mineshaft explosions but Captains, Lieutenants and Sergeants frequently die in battle. The military has also been a supporter of affirmative action. I do not want to underestimate the suspicions of these two groups relative to one another, but the military embodies non-martial virtues that progressives could find easy to support.

If AWIHI movements are to find allies among the military, they must do what Roxborough suggests, "initiate an engagement with the military from the outside." Hooks worries that this project could lead only to a new project Camelot that relegates social scientists to the secondary role of determining the ways in which the military can kill and brutalize more efficiently. Roxborough too worries about being co-opted. This is a significant worry. In the days of project Camelot the risk was perhaps not worth the effort. My argument here is that in the post-Cold War era, the risk is worth the effort because strategic uncertainty should make military intellectuals more open and because the political opportunity structure is so narrow that any opportunity must be explored.

One final point, if I am correct that there is uncertainty among military elites regarding defense policy and theory, then this uncertainty will eventually be resolved. If progressives, sociologists and those interested in AWIHI movements do not participate, then whatever new doctrine is developed will solidify all of the lacunae in military thinking outlined by Roxborough. AWIHI movements should seize the opportunity presented by the military's theoretical uncertainty.

Other Opportunities

Abeyance Structures

It might be useful to think about what social movements in abeyance (Taylor, 1989) might be reenergized in the current moment. The administration's current policy has disastrous consequences for nuclear proliferation. Many states do not have military structures capable of holding out against American intervention. Post-intervention insurgencies may be quite successful in these countries but that is cold comfort for state elites who are likely to be deposed in the intervention phase. In the unipolar world of American military hegemony, nuclear weapons are the best deterrent for states. Thus, American aggressiveness and unilateral action actually promotes proliferation (Mann, 2003).

This crucial weakness in American strategic doctrine actually undermines our own security. Only 20 years ago there was a large and vibrant cross-national movement opposing the proliferation of nuclear weapons by the United States. SANE and CND were large organizations. The threat of nuclear weapons is real and visceral. In incorporating this into a left military doctrine, we could also try to activate abeyance structures in the now all but dead no-nukes movement. This will be all the more possible if continuing high energy prices reinvigorate the moribund nuclear energy industry.

Framing

The larger the movement the more generic its aims must be. The most generic AWIHI movement demand is to end the war and/or bring the troops back home. Anti-war activists do not seem to recognize how limited this demand really is. The Bush administration certainly wants to end the war and bring the vast majority of troops back home. The difference between the mainstream anti-war movement and the administration is largely one of when to bring the troops home. There is also, of course, a question of how many troops to bring home. Here, the Korean War should serve as a warning to AWIHI movements. Public opinion turned against the war but there was little concern about the continued commitment of tens of thousands of troops for 40 years after the end of the war. If the Bush administration succeeds in bringing the bulk of troops home, even while leaving a substantial number to train Iraqi troops and intimidate Iran, a large segment of the conscience constituents now opposing the war will move on to other issues.

In other words, anti-war movements are not necessarily anti-imperialist, anti-hegemony or anti-interventionist. Mass-based movements are likely to

end up letting the anti-war tail wag the anti-interventionist/hegemony/imperialist dog. There is an opportunity to affect more than this war, to get at the new phenomenon of American power and belligerence, but a mass-based movement focused on opposing the war is not the appropriate vehicle for doing so. I predict then that the most effective AWIHI movement will be small, professional and oriented toward the larger questions of strategy doctrine. It will not frame the issue around a specific war.

CONCLUSION

Currently available political opportunities do not favor the development of a sustained mass-based AWIHI insurgency in the United States. The political opportunity structure is not conducive to such a challenge, demilitarization has reduced the numbers of beneficiary constituents who would hold the barricades in such a challenge and the revolution in military affairs has reduced the benefits (in blood at least) of such a challenge.

At the same time, the end of the Cold War has produced significant new political opportunities. Among these is the possibility of alliances between progressives and military elites and intellectuals. This possibility arises from the theoretical uncertainty among military elites in the post-Cold War period and from the possibility that the Iraq war is producing divisions among those elites. Also, given the limits imposed by the political opportunity structure, this option may be the most fruitful.

If this analysis of political opportunities is correct then Roxborough's suggestion that sociologists should seek "a constructive, perhaps even combative relationship with policy makers" is going to be more effective than Foran's call for constructive engagement with social movements, progressive politicians and ordinary people. I think mobilizing ordinary people will be very difficult for the reasons that I have outlined. Foran does not trust the administration. I do not trust it either but I think my mistrust is probably shared by military, intelligence and foreign policy elites and intellectuals.

Theoretically, I have tried to use this discussion to show how predictions can act as a methodological strategy and more particularly how they can avoid some of the most serious methodological problems in discussions of political opportunities in the social movements' literature.

NOTES

1. I am not suggesting that researchers simply mine the data looking for plausible stories. A referee of an earlier version of this paper suggested that researchers reason

from covariation between opportunity structure and forms or intensities of social movement action. I do not doubt this. Nonetheless, I suspect that people looking for political opportunities will rarely fail to find them. I think we should be skeptical of scientific procedures which always produce significant results.

2. In his response to critics Roxborough argues that sociologists use a range of terms (e.g., global hegemony, international hegemony, imperial hegemony, empire, neo-imperialism) to indicate “a new phenomenon for which we have, as yet, no clear and agreed upon understanding” It is this new phenomenon to which my imagined movement is opposed. “Anti-new phenomenon movements” seemed cumbersome so I use AWIHI.

3. In this light, consider the repeated furor over unarmored Humvees and transport trucks. The solutions are firmly tied to existing market capacity. When the manufacturer says it is producing all it can, that is the end of the story. This was not the World War II approach where the American state financed the building of new industrial capacity and at war’s end owned 40% of the nation’s capital assets (Hooks, 1993).

4. The following discussion of the limitations of American military power relies upon Mann (2003) and Posen (2003).

5. This may be because aspects of the movement are at odds with the theoretical innovations in social movement theory developed in that period. Those theories generally attacked the classical traditions focus on grievances arguing that grievances were more or less constant for African-Americans (McAdam, 1999) or migrant workers (Jenkins & Perrow, 1977) or other disadvantaged groups. The anti-War movement does not fit this mold in part because it does not exclusively or even primarily benefit the disadvantaged but also because it is quite clearly rooted in relatively recent grievances.

6. In my view, Vietnamese civilians would have benefited from American withdrawal in 1965, while German citizens would not have benefited from allied withdrawal in 1944. Most would agree with the second but many would not agree with the first of these claims. In both cases oppositions soldiers would benefit.

7. Here it is also important to note that while many civilians have been killed in Iraq and the US government is often callous about those deaths, civilian loss of life is nothing like it was in World War II or Vietnam. Fallujah was awful but it was not Dresden, Nagasaki or Hanoi. I do not suggest that this makes it acceptable, only that it reduces the ability of a social movement to use this as a means of gaining adherents.

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**PART III:
SCHOLARLY CONTROVERSY**

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MODES OF REPAIR: REPARATIONS AND CITIZENSHIP AT THE DAWN OF THE NEW MILLENNIUM[☆]

John Torpey

In the early 1990s, the Organization for African Unity (the predecessor of the African Union) impaneled a so-called Group of Eminent Persons “to explore the modalities and strategies of an African campaign for restitution similar to the compensation paid by Germany to Israel and to survivors of the Nazi Holocaust” (Mazrui, 1993). Subsequently, a conference was held in Abuja, Nigeria, in June 1992 to explore the possibilities of mounting a campaign for reparations for past wrongs done to Africa.¹ A few years later, the South African Reparations Movement (SARM) was founded in Durban, and organized the First National Reparations Congress in Johannesburg in January 2002.² Almost simultaneously, on the other side of the world, a young black lawyer named Deadria Farmer–Paellmann filed suit in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York against FleetBoston Financial Corporation, Aetna Insurance, and a railroad company named CSX Corporation, seeking damages and compensation for 35 million descendants of African slaves. Soon thereafter, another lawyer involved in the FleetBoston

[☆]I am grateful to David Abraham and Heribert Adam for comments on an earlier draft. This is a revised version of an essay titled “Victims and Citizens: The Discourse of Reparation(s) at the Dawn of the New Millennium,” in Stephan Parmentier, ed., *Reparation for Victims of Gross and Systematic Human Rights Violations* (Antwerp: Intersentia, forthcoming).

suit, Ed Fagan, launched a \$50 billion class action suit against Citigroup, UBS, and Credit Suisse on behalf of victims of apartheid in South Africa. Fagan had already earned considerable notoriety as counsel in some of the legal actions that brought in more than a billion dollars in reparations for Holocaust survivors in the late 1990s – perhaps the paradigm case of reparations claims-making.³

As these examples suggest, the notion of “reparations” for historical injustices has come to be increasingly widely used in political discourse in the last decade and a half. Indeed, lawyers have spent a great deal of effort explicating the meaning of the term in the contexts of human rights and what has come to be known as “transitional justice,” and numerous political movements and groups have coalesced around the idea of seeking reparations for a variety of past wrongs. These efforts have emerged at the same time as a burgeoning discourse of “victims’ rights” that reflects a novel preoccupation with victims and their needs. As the historical understanding of the twentieth century has evolved and transformed – in particular, as for many Westerners the Holocaust has come to dwarf World War II in relative significance⁴ – the stress on victimization has come to underpin broader efforts to use history as the basis of claims for compensation and apology. In the process, the category of *beneficiary* has in some respects been assimilated into that of *perpetrator*. Meanwhile, the socialist and social-democratic project of promoting economic equality has competed with a politics of identity that is oriented more toward “recognition” than “redistribution.”⁵ To the extent that some groups seek “recognition” of their special difference, the very meaning of citizenship – an institution once thought to be tasked with the charge of creating equality – has thus been called into question. The contemporary notion of “reparations,” which involves elements of both “recognition” and “redistribution,” thus at once seeks to realize and to undermine the idea of citizenship as equal treatment.

Given the shift in the meaning of the term “reparations” that these developments both entailed and reflected, the efflorescence of “reparations politics” is in itself a remarkable phenomenon. In what follows, I attempt to explicate the transformation of the meaning of the term “reparations,” to make sense of the ways in which it has come to structure a good deal of social action, and to consider the extent to which the growing concern with reparations reflects a shift in the kinds of attention accorded to victims and a corresponding challenge to the idea of citizenship as an expectation of equal treatment. I also examine the question of the extent to which a concern with seeking compensation for past injustice may compete with efforts to address injustices unfolding under our very eyes.

THE MEANINGS OF “REPARATIONS”

The late twentieth-century spread of interest in the notion of “reparations” cannot be understood apart from the semantic meanings of the word itself. The term is one of the “re-words” that Charles Maier has identified as the object of rising interest among various groups in recent years.⁶ The first thing that must be said is that the word came to be transformed, sometime after World War II, from its earlier connotation of “war reparations” into something much broader. Before the Second World War, the use of “war” as a modifier here would have been nearly redundant; in that era, it went without saying that “reparations” were an outgrowth of war. The paradigmatic case of reparations, perhaps, was that mandated by the Versailles Treaty that ended World War I and imposed heavy obligations on the Germans to compensate the Allies for their wartime losses. In cases such as this, the term was synonymous with “indemnities”; again, the use of “war” to modify the main term would have been largely superfluous. It went without saying – in English at least – that “reparations” was an exaction imposed by the winners of a war on the losers, who were said to have been responsible for the damage caused by the conflict.⁷

There was not a little “victor’s justice” in the formula underlying “reparations,” and the party on whom the indemnity fell was keenly aware of this fact. The burden of German reparations that came out of Versailles has of course widely been seen as having contributed greatly to the resentments that fuelled the rise of the Nazis and hence the outbreak of the Second World War. The Germans may well have had particular reasons for resentment. The commonplace practice of imposing reparations was exacerbated after the First World War, according to Robert Paxton, by a novel element of moral recrimination that may have marked a significant signpost on the way to future usage.⁸

After World War II, in the most prominent early effort by a German to deal with the legacy of Nazi rule, the philosopher and “inner émigré” Karl Jaspers wrote in *The Question of German Guilt* of the need for the German populace to atone for the wrongdoing carried out in its name. Jaspers argued that it was incumbent upon the Germans to “make amends” for the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime, claiming that “everyone really affected by the guilt he shares will wish to help anyone wronged by the arbitrary despotism of the lawless régime.” The German word Jaspers used was “*Wiedergutmachung*,” a term that could be translated variously as “reparations” or “reparation.” *Wiedergutmachung* would entail “tightening our belts so that part of their destruction can be made up to the peoples

attacked by Hitler's Germany."⁹ The emphasis here was on reconstruction, the restoration of what had been destroyed by German actions. In that sense, Jaspers' usage appeared consistent with previous usage, which saw reparations as a response to war-inflicted damages.

Jaspers went on to note that there are two motivations for aiding those in distress, and that these were not to be confused: "the first calls on us to help wherever there is distress, no matter what the cause – simply because it is near and calls for help. The second requires us to grant a special right to those deported, robbed, pillaged, tortured and exiled by the Hitler regime." In making this distinction, Jaspers averred, "both demands are fully justified, but there is a difference in motivation. Where guilt is not felt, all distress is immediately leveled on the same plane. If I want to make up for what I, too, was guilty of, I must differentiate between the groups afflicted by distress."¹⁰ In the overall context of Jaspers' argument about the "way of purification" that he regarded as essential to a viable postwar German society, the meaning of the passage is somewhat obscure insofar as his concern was to persuade the German population that they had some responsibility to make amends for the devastation wreaked by their country. The burden of Jaspers' text is precisely that *all* Germans must regard themselves as sharing this responsibility.

Whatever his intentions in *The Question of German Guilt*, Jaspers' distinction resembles the two very different senses of the notion of "reparations" that have been key to the development of the broader discourse of reparations politics in recent years. In the first set of circumstances to which Jaspers refers, the phenomenon to which a response is necessary might be characterized as a sort of *generalized* distress; one need not feel any personal responsibility for the difficulty in which someone might find himself in order to feel an obligation to assist him. One might argue that this is the challenge of modern citizenship as an institution oriented to achieving equality among the members of a state in the face of an economic system that systematically produces inequality.¹¹ The citizen seeks to ameliorate the distress of his or her fellow citizens "simply because it is near and calls for help." This is the solidarity expected of citizens among themselves.

In the second case, however, the circumstances in question concern actions for which "I, too, was guilty." To be sure, the question of one's responsibility for the actions of one's government may be disputed. Jaspers clearly believed that all Germans were responsible for the atrocities committed at the behest of the Third Reich in a way that he would presumably not have claimed was true for, let us say, the heirs of the system of racial slavery in the United States. "Reparations" in the first sense relates to

rectifying injustices whether or not one had any hand in the commission of the wrongs in question, whereas guilt – at least in the sense of contemporaneity and, so to speak, political propinquity – is intrinsic to the second meaning. This second case suggests an obligation accruing to the *perpetrator* of wrongdoing, however mediated by the political system. What has happened in the past couple of decades is that the latter meaning has come to be extensively equated with the former; that is, the category of *beneficiary* has to some degree been assimilated into that of *perpetrator* in our historical consciousness. This is perhaps particularly true of those pursuing efforts to claim reparations for wrongs done long ago, but for which at least a plausible case can be made that (a) gross violations of human rights occurred to the relevant group in the past and (b) the effects of those wrongs persist into the present. Clearly, all of this is a long way from the notion of “war reparations.”

Despite the more or less equivalent meaning of “reparations” and “reparation” in the translation of Jaspers’ text, moreover, the two terms have come to connote rather different things. The singular “reparation” has come to suggest a panoply of different responses to atrocities and wrongdoing, including “restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction [“measures aimed at the cessation of continuing violations”] and guarantees of non-repetition.”¹² Reparation thus involves a variety of actions and activities that seek to restore the *status quo ante*. With the possible exception of “guarantees of non-repetition,” which are predominantly political and legislative in nature, the activities that comprise “reparation” are notably legalistic in character and may or may not involve transfers of money. In contemporary usage, the notion of “reparation” thus hews closer than its sibling “reparations” to the terms’ roots in the idea of “repair.” That is, “reparation” is more akin to the idea of restoration of the state of affairs before the violation occurred. By contrast, “reparations” has come to be used almost synonymously with “compensation” – that is, with money transfers of a relatively direct kind. One “*makes* reparation,” in short, but one “*pays* reparations.” Paradoxically, perhaps, the singular of the term connotes a multiplicity of activities, whereas the plural tends to entail only one.

This usage is reflected in the “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law” adopted by the UN Commission on Human Rights in April 2005. This document is perhaps the most important expression of the contemporary desire to insure that victims of human rights violations have a solid foundation for making claims against those who have wronged them.

The document, the drafting of which began in the late 1980s, seeks to lay out the bases upon which such claims can be made, by whom, against whom, for what offenses, and with what aims. The language of the text and the prominence in its drafting of two leading international human rights lawyers – Theo van Boven and Cherif Bassiouni – make it clear that the document is primarily a product of legal thinkers and concerns. Indeed, the reparative measures it outlines would be perfectly familiar to anyone with a basic knowledge of Western legal systems of torts and damages.

In this sense, the Basic Principles and Guidelines reflect the expansion to the international realm of legal concepts that have long been common coin in domestic contexts.¹³ They bear witness to the shift in international law from a system geared toward nation-states to one in which individuals and subnational groups increasingly have “standing,” or at least are major actors in the system. That is, the “law of nations” – in which the relevant parties were states – has been slowly mutating into a different kind of system, in which individuals are legitimate actors as well. This development is of course connected to the general challenge to “sovereignty” in the post-World War II period and the rise of such notions as “human security” as an alternative to traditional state-based notions of security.¹⁴

During roughly the same period that the U.N. has been working on the “Basic Principles,” the notion of *reparations* (plural) has gained considerable momentum as a rubric under which to make claims in a variety of different contexts around the globe. It is worth noting, however, that one of the most prominent and significant campaigns to make amends for historical injustices – one that, indeed, set major precedents for what was to come – usually went under the term “redress.” I refer, of course, to the campaign mounted by activists seeking action regarding the “internment” of Japanese–Americans and Japanese–Canadians during World War II. Apparently the term “redress” was chosen because the contemporary meaning of the term “reparations” had not yet taken hold and the term was hence viewed with some apprehension. Indeed, the Japanese American Citizens League’s “National Reparations Committee” changed its name to the “National Committee for Redress” in 1978 because the former term generated “strong emotional reactions” that, it feared, would distract “public attention from the main issue of the campaign.”¹⁵ Earlier, John W. Dean III, the former Nixon adviser, had recommended the term “redress” to the committee because “the redress of grievances was a right of U.S. citizens.”¹⁶ In the end, of course, the compensation of approximately \$20,000 per person that was paid to the Japanese–Americans and Japanese–Canadians was not especially large, even if it was not entirely insignificant either. Although

the campaign was more about official acknowledgment of past wrongdoing than it was about the money involved, redress activists wanted to insure that the amount paid was at least significant enough to be symbolically meaningful. Still, it seems reasonably clear that Japanese–American redress was “not about the money.” The U.S. Congress, for its part, was intent on seeing to it that the case did not come to be seen as a precedent for other cases, especially claims by American blacks.¹⁷ These intentions and the term “redress” notwithstanding, the case in fact did much to promote the idea of “reparations” as a way of dealing with various kinds of injustices.

Despite (or possibly because of) the fact that the plural version of the term “reparations” has come largely to mean one thing – money – it has become the central idea structuring a variety of campaigns around the world for addressing various wrongs. These efforts include a movement for reparations for forced and slave laborers exploited by the Nazis during World War II, for blacks in the United States (although there is some division over the question whether these reparations would be for slavery, for Jim Crow legislation, or for specific cases of atrocities such as took place in early twentieth-century race riots in Rosewood, Florida or Tulsa, Oklahoma), for apartheid in South Africa, for the depredations of the Germans in pre-World War I Southwest Africa (now Namibia), for the so-called “comfort women” sexually exploited by the Japanese Army during World War II, and others as well. It is immediately evident that these cases involve very different kinds of wrongs. They do tend to have one factor in common, however: namely, the violation took place across and to a large extent on the basis of an ethnoracial distinction. The only example in which this kind of distinction is not the most salient is the case of the comfort women, where gender was the chief basis of exploitation. Still, even the comfort women were chosen (largely) on the basis of their ethnoracial distinctness from the Japanese (although some were Japanese as well). In any case, what is striking is the fact that so many different groups have mobilized around the idea of reparations for past injustices suffered by people in the past – often, though by no means always, by those from what these activists regard as “their” group (or its ancestors). Hence reparations politics, even when they seek to address economic inequities, often involve an important element of “recognition.”

VICTIM CONSCIOUSNESS AND CIVIC IDENTITY

The spread of reparations politics has taken place more or less simultaneously with the diffusion of “multiculturalism” and “identity politics,” on

the one hand, and with a growing concern about victims and “victims’ rights,” on the other. These relatively new paradigms of public order represent challenges to the idea of undifferentiated mass publics that went hand-in-hand with “Fordist” production processes in mid-century advanced industrial societies. In their stead, reparations politics has raised the banner of the victims of oppression as groups deserving special consideration, concern, and compensation. Nathan Glazer is correct that “we are all multiculturalists now” in the sense that the kinds of discrimination that rationalized past injustices and the ethnoracial distinctions on which they were often based are no longer regarded as acceptable or publicly defensible in liberal democratic societies. But what one might call the “identitarian” version of multiculturalism goes beyond this to insist on special recognition for the bearers of particular social characteristics (women, non-whites, homosexuals, etc.). These ideas take issue with the traditional notions of common citizenship and equality before the law.¹⁸ In the case of victims’ rights, indeed, they may call into question the notion that the law is an instrument of the entire society, rather than one wielded on behalf of particular individuals or groups. Let us examine this latter issue first.

The upgrading of the experience of victimhood in contemporary life has been widely remarked, not least by those such as Robert Hughes who regard it as a central element of a larger “culture of complaint.”¹⁹ But even less dyspeptic observers agree that something important has taken place in the image and standing of victims in recent years. David Garland, a leading authority on crime and punishment, has thoughtfully described the changing status of the victim in the context of criminal law. His telling discussion is worth reproducing at some length:

Over the last three decades there has been a remarkable return of the victim to center stage in criminal justice policy. In the [previously dominant] penal-welfare framework, individual victims featured hardly at all, other than as members of the public whose complaints triggered state action. Their interests were subsumed under the general public interest, and certainly not counter-posed to the interests of the offender. All of this has now changed. The interests and feelings of victims – actual victims, victims’ families, potential victims, the projected figure of “the victim” – are now routinely invoked in support of measures of punitive segregation [the new paradigm in crime control] The new political imperative is that victims must be protected, their voices must be heard, their memory honoured, their anger expressed, their fears addressed The victim is no longer an unfortunate citizen who has been on the receiving end of a criminal harm, and whose concerns are subsumed within the “public interest” that guides the prosecution and penal decisions of the state. The victim is now, in a certain sense, a much more representative character, whose experience is taken to be common and collective, rather than individual and atypical. Whoever speaks on behalf of victims speaks on behalf of us all Paradoxically, this vision of the victim as Everyman has undermined the older

notion of the public, which has now been redefined and dis-aggregated. It is no longer sufficient to subsume the individual victim's experience in the notion of the public good: the public good must be individuated, broken down into individual component parts. Specific victims are to have a voice There is, in short, a new cultural theme, a new collective meaning of victimhood, and a reworked relationship between the individual victim, the symbolic victim, and the public institutions of crime control and criminal justice.²⁰

Garland's characterization calls our attention to what one might describe as the "privatization" of criminal justice, which of course has many other dimensions as well. The transformation described by Garland with regard to the criminal law context has its analog in the realm of state terrorism. Indeed, the victim of political violence has arguably assumed even greater cultural salience than the mere victim of crime, for the latter can be seen as having experienced an irrational, unsystematic, pointless kind of suffering; the victim of political violence, in contrast, can be thought of as having suffered the willful mistreatment of the greedy and power-mad. Accordingly, he or she can be seen as especially deserving of attention and perhaps even as having a whiff of the saintly for having survived this egregious maltreatment.

Let there be no mistake; it is unarguably a good thing for victims to be able to see their former tormentors brought to justice and, perhaps, to receive some sort of compensation for the opportunities or limbs or property that they have lost. The problem is that the idea of accountability for wrongdoing has come to be seen more and more in terms of a response to particular victims rather than in terms of an accounting to the society as a whole. In protest against this trend, Henry Rousso, the prominent French historian of "the Vichy syndrome" (the tendency of the postwar French to disavow their country's collaboration with the Nazi occupiers) refused to act as an expert witness in the trial of Maurice Papon because he saw the proceedings as part of the larger process of the privatization of justice.²¹ The law is intended to serve the interests of the entire citizenry, not specific sections of it. Otherwise, there would be no point in having legal proceedings at all; those wronged could simply exact revenge directly.

Just as criminal law has increasingly been privatized, so has history itself.²² That is, as the past in recent years has been "democratized" – that is to say, taken out of the hands of experts – it has also increasingly been multiplied and utilized as an instrument of social conflict. There are now many "histories," not a single "history." This is a result not merely of post-modernism's resistance to unitary narratives, but also of the spread of groups mobilized around efforts to call attention to or to promote the

re-consideration of particular pasts. The stakes in these cases are social recognition of various kinds, perhaps including reparations. The Belgian scholar Jean-Michel Chaumont was perhaps the first in recent years to point this out. In his study of “the competition of victims,” which focuses mainly on the dispute over the notion of the “uniqueness of the Holocaust,” Chaumont notes that what appears to be an historical controversy over the facts is really a conflict among social groups.²³ To be sure, as Orwell pointed out in *1984*, there are always political stakes involved in our understanding of the past. Yet there is a distinction between interpretations of the past that have *political* implications and those that are *politicized* – “weapons forged for a current ideological contest”²⁴ – and that distinction needs to be maintained. Moreover, historical research may undermine the efforts of those seeking to use history for political ends. As Daqing Yang has written, “historians should be aware that their discipline, by demanding and rewarding constant revision and reinterpretation, might well be subversive to the purpose of commemoration.”²⁵ Indeed, scholars who suggest that “the victims of an inhuman regime might have lost some of their humanity on the road to perdition” are not likely to be welcomed by the “entrepreneurs of memory” who are vital to many reparations efforts, even if the community of historians might agree that such efforts make a contribution to historical truth.²⁶

The fragmentation of the body politic is the other side of the privatization of justice and in certain respects the condition of its possibility. Well-meaning though it may be, the idea of multiculturalism has helped strengthen this propensity in the more liberal-democratic societies by encouraging a sense of separateness from the larger polity and an embrace of “imagined communities” below the level of the citizenry as a whole. This in turn has been reflected in the rise of “identity politics,” which makes political claims on the basis of people’s membership in groups defined by sociological characteristics rather than by virtue of their common membership in a politically defined community.²⁷ With the aid of the upgraded attentiveness to victims and their experiences, identities can now be forged or at least strengthened through an embrace of the erstwhile victimization of one’s group. Perhaps the leading example of this phenomenon has been the Holocaust, which – despite its dependence on what some Jews reject as the “lachrymose version of Jewish history” – has been used by organized Jewry as a way to sustain a waning sense of identification with the group.²⁸ The Nanjing massacre has played a similar function for the diaspora Chinese, as has the Armenian genocide of the early 20th century for many overseas Armenians.²⁹

Whereas much of the most sophisticated and serious writing on politics in the 1950s and early 1960s wrung its hands about “mass politics” and

conformism, our era faces entirely different problems.³⁰ Chief among these, perhaps, is the very idea of a coherent “public” that has any politics at all, much less utopian ones. As the political theorist Susan Buck-Morss has argued, “[T]he mass-democratic myth of industrial modernity – the belief that the industrial reshaping of the world is capable of bringing about the good society by providing material happiness for the masses – has been profoundly challenged by the disintegration of European socialism, the demands of capitalist restructuring, and the most fundamental ecological constraints. In its place, an appeal to differences that splinter the masses into fragments now structures political rhetoric and marketing strategies alike.”³¹ In the United States, for example, the decline of mass publics is reflected in the relative deterioration of “market share” for the three top networks during the last three decades or so and the cession of audiences to the proliferation of cable channels. Such trends are underway in Germany and elsewhere as well. As the rise of Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi suggests, politics and salesmanship come to look more and more alike. An era in which the citizen is challenged by the “customer” is not fertile ground for political engagement of any kind.

More broadly, the concept of citizenship itself has been challenged in numerous ways. Among intellectuals especially, doubts have been raised about the degree to which a common citizenship actually meets the needs of all members of a socio-political order; “one size fits all” has come to be seen as insupportably insensitive to difference.³² It has been observed that the institution of citizenship – highly exclusionary in itself, to be sure – is at odds with the inclusive liberal order within the borders of democratic nation-states. Indeed, the exclusionary aspects of citizenship have come to be regarded among many liberals as racist or otherwise indefensible, contributing to a weakening of the justification for borders.³³ At the same time, pervasive awareness of new patterns of international migration has led some to question whether the once- (supposedly) sacrosanct institution of citizenship is not in decline. Dual nationality has become increasingly accepted by states, and the possibilities for relatively more rapid movement across state boundaries has facilitated the emergence of forms of attachment to different countries that are less profound than many nationalists would prefer. As a result, it is now widely believed among specialists in such matters that “the distinction between citizens and non-citizens has become less clear-cut.”³⁴

Under these circumstances, it is not difficult to understand why people’s sense of identification with a particular country might flag. As this tendency deepens, the incentives to seek one’s sense of self in other, apparently more primordial groupings are easy to imagine. This trend, too, strengthens the

inclination to use past injustices as a source of identity-formation and – consolidation. Such efforts may lead to an improvement in the well-being of many of those wronged in the past, or their heirs. But to what extent does the preoccupation with past injustices compete with efforts to address contemporary injustices?

FIXING THE PAST VS. FIXING THE PRESENT

The contemporary concern with reparation(s) and “coming to terms with the past” appears to reflect a perspective that there are now greater possibilities for “fixing the past” than might once have been the case. The armamentarium of human rights, such as the Basic Guidelines and newly emerging international legal institutions like the International Criminal Court, fuel this optimism. Despite these important developments, however, no amount of criminal prosecution or reparation for the victims can truly “make whole what has been smashed.” “Past injustice is over and done with; the slain are truly slain,” as Max Horkheimer once put it.³⁵ The dead will not come back to life, the maimed must bear the burden of diminished capacities, and the unjustly imprisoned will not get back the lost days of their lives. The most that can be done is to ease the suffering of the living, to acknowledge the losses they have sustained and bring to justice their perpetrators, and to try to give the wronged the best opportunities conceivable.

But this universe of possibilities is little different than it was before. Why, then, all the emphasis on fixing the past in the current period? Historians’ imaginations were fired in the early 1960s by E. P. Thompson’s dictum that he wanted to rescue the odd jobbers of the English past “from the enormous condescension of posterity.”³⁶ That no longer seems to be enough, despite Voltaire’s insistence that we owe respect to the living, “but to the dead we owe only the truth.” Nowadays, it is Faulkner whose words seem to capture the *Zeitgeist*: “The past is not dead. In fact, it’s not even past.”

Indeed, the past has expanded in importance in contemporary society in all kinds of ways – theme parks, “heritage” organizations, truth commissions, reparations campaigns that seek to promote economic equality through quasi-judicial means. Against this background, one wonders whether there may not be “too much history,” and whether this may not reflect a cunning triumph of some of the conservative political forces discussed above. Some of this surfeit of history³⁷ has to do with the interpretation of the history of the twentieth century. To be sure, as has been widely said, the last century revealed a capacity for generating mass death that was

unprecedented in history. But to leave the evaluation at that depressing conclusion misses the central watershed of the era: the defeat of fascist regimes in Europe and Asia that set the stage for profound political transformations around the globe. The victory of the Allies in 1945 “undermined the foundations of *all* forms of political legitimation that did not – at least verbally, at least in words – subscribe to the universalist spirit of political enlightenment.”³⁸ The defeat of fascism was therefore the fundamental precondition for the burst of cosmopolitanism in whose tracks we live today, and without which the entire discussion of reparations would be inconceivable. In this regard, it cannot be forgotten that the Soviet Union and “progressive forces” more generally played a key role in shaping this world.

But those forces were epistemologically and politically tied to the future in a way that now seems alien almost to the point of unrecoverability. The interpretation of twentieth-century history as a thoroughgoing catastrophe, rather than as a period like every epoch with triumphs as well as disasters, “has brought with it a significant entropy of our sense of future possibilities.”³⁹ In reaction to this development, the past has come to command our attention to a degree that is striking by comparison to an era in which socialist-oriented labor movements were still vibrant political forces. Those movements were inspired by the egalitarian future that they sought to usher into existence; in contrast to the contemporary preoccupation with fixing the past, their rallying cry was “don’t mourn, organize.” Those progressive forces saw socialism – or at least the incorporation of social rights of citizenship that would soften the blows of the capitalist whirlwind of creative destruction – as the realization of the aspirations to equality that had been the fountainhead of the revolutions that made the modern world. Socialism and egalitarian citizenship were forward-looking creeds that stressed the common fate of human beings and thus de-emphasized ethnic and other identitarian ties. With the decline of socialism and the weakening of citizenship, “roots” – and their inevitable orientation to the past – have therefore grown in significance. In this context, Charles Maier wrote presciently in the early 1990s, the “surfeit of memory is a sign not of historical confidence but of a retreat from transformative politics.”⁴⁰

In a context in which ethnicity has re-asserted itself and the past has correspondingly risen in cultural and political significance, there may be a competition for people’s attention and energies: do we devote our energies to present injustices or to past ones? Of course, it is not entirely possible to draw a line dividing the past from the present, and those who concern themselves with past atrocities and injustices typically see themselves as working toward a better future. There is no reason to doubt that this is the

way they view their efforts, and it may well be that ending a climate of impunity, for example, is an urgent necessity that requires digging up the past to get the story straight, find the responsible parties, and bring them to justice. But one sometimes suspects that the concern with the past is driven by myopically ethnic concerns and a desire to blacken the reputation of the one-time perpetrator-nation rather than to do much for the living. This kind of preoccupation with past injustice is clearly problematic; it foreshortens our concern for others in a manner that seems dubious at best. As Adam Michnik has put it, “You have to remember, but you have to be able to transcend the frontier of your own suffering; you must not insist on remaining in the world of your own suffering.”⁴¹

Let me attempt here a cursory empirical examination of the question whether attentions given to one – arguably strongly related – problem are lost to another. In the first half of 2004, the media and a number of humanitarian organizations began sounding the alarm about what Physicians for Human Rights called an “unfolding genocide” in the Darfur region of Sudan. The groups that called attention to the atrocities being carried out by the Sudanese government with and through its proxy Janjaweed militias were generally either religious, humanitarian, or Africa-oriented in nature. In contrast, a moderately vigorous search found only very limited involvement of organizations whose principal *raison d’être* involves atrocities and genocide against their own ethnic group playing any role in promoting assistance to the suffering in western Sudan. The major exception was the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, which temporarily halted the activities in its “Hall of Witness” on June 24, 2004 to call attention to the crisis in Darfur and to demand government action. The Museum’s “Committee of Conscience,” whose mandate is to work to halt genocide or related crimes against humanity, had already issued a “Genocide Warning” for the region in January 2004.⁴² It is perhaps worth noting in this connection that “the Holocaust Museum ... was envisioned as an activist, morally engaged memorial, much more than a place just to ‘remember.’”⁴³

Thus, while concern about genocide may be a matter of conscience for some groups, the fact that the Darfur case involves an utterly different population seems to have meant that it was relatively unimportant to most of those groups. Clearly, there is a range of responses observable in this connection, and the spread of interest in international disasters is a notable phenomenon of our age. Yet this was perhaps even more true when “internationalist” ideologies were more prevalent. When it comes to mobilizing for recognition of atrocities and genocide, what tends to matter is what has happened to one’s own group, not that terrible things are taking place

somewhere in the world about which one might sound the alarm. Groups concerned primarily with what they regard as their own past suffering may sustain this concern across lengthy historical and geographical distances. Needless to say, ethnic particularism is at odds with the ethical universalism underlying the documents that were promulgated with the aim of preventing further genocides, and the organizations that have sought to realize those aims. Regardless of how far back the wrongs in question may lie, some groups will mobilize only around recognition of their “own” suffering.

And yet there is relatively little that we can do about fixing the past; although reparation(s) can restore some of the material losses and ease some of the sense of insult, they cannot “make whole what has been smashed.” The “satisfaction” called for in the Basic Guidelines may or may not be entirely satisfying; it cannot make the original wrong go away. As Stanley Cohen has argued, “[N]othing can be done to put right the residues of previous atrocities. The choice is not between truth and justice, but between the amount of past injustice that is and is not tolerable.”⁴⁴ At least among some groups, the threshold of tolerable past injustice seems to have dropped, but this does not necessarily reflect any greater capacity to overcome past wrongdoing. Instead, it may reflect a lachrymose interpretation of our recent past and a corresponding retreat from the project of shaping the future.

CONCLUSION

In a discussion of the “end of the ‘postwar’” in Japan, the historian Carol Gluck has written that, in the aftermath of that period, we live in a “‘nontopia’: we are without a vision of the future.”⁴⁵ Similarly, in his powerful analysis of twentieth-century Communism, *The Passing of an Illusion*, François Furet observed that the collapse of that particular expression of the utopian imagination had left us in a vacuum with regard to the search for utopia: “The idea of *another* society has become almost impossible to conceive of, and no one in the world today is offering any advice on the subject or even trying to formulate a new concept. Here we are, condemned to live in the world as it is.” But, Furet continued, “This condition is too austere and contrary to the spirit of modern societies to last. Democracy, by virtue of its existence, creates the need for a world beyond the bourgeoisie and beyond Capital, a world in which genuine human community can flourish.”⁴⁶

The spread of reparations politics appropriately reflects the interregnum that Furet so insightfully describes. With the Basic Guidelines on the right

to reparation, international institutions and transnational activists seek to extend to the unfortunate inhabitants of non-liberal states the benefits of and the legal remedies associated with Western liberal individualism (and to shore up that ethos there). In those cases where reparations are sought for systemic injustices such as slavery and colonialism and their legacies, reparations politics seeks to sustain a utopian vision under rather unfavorable conditions that include a questioning of the idea of common citizenship under the rule of law. That idea was once aspiration enough for the dispossessed and disenfranchised. The efforts of lawyers and human rights activists to establish rights to reparation for violations of human rights surely contribute to “a world in which genuine human community can flourish.” But they are no substitute for the struggle to create “a world beyond the bourgeoisie and beyond Capital,” and may indeed distract from that endeavor, particularly to the extent that they cultivate a disproportionate preoccupation with “our” suffering at the cost of a concern for the suffering of all.

NOTES

1. See Elazar Barkan (2000, pp. 301–302) and Wole Soyinka (2000, p. 45).
2. Interview with Frelimo Phaka, General Secretary, South African Reparations Movement (SARM), Johannesburg, South Africa, January 15, 2003.
3. Fagan’s controversial involvement in the Holocaust-related actions garnered him a scathing front-page feature in the *New York Times* examining what the paper regarded as his often-questionable tactics and practices. See Barry Meier (2000, pp. A1, A21).
4. On this point, see Tony Judt (2005).
5. See Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth (2003).
6. Charles S. Maier (2003, pp. 295–304).
7. It is perhaps worth noting that this meaning of the term “reparations” is the only one employed in the European history textbook that I used as an undergraduate in the late 1970s, Robert Paxton’s (1975); the current, broader usage was simply not yet part of the lexicon.
8. Paxton (1975), *Europe in the Twentieth Century*, p. 221.
9. Karl Jaspers (2000, pp. 112–113). I have slightly revised the translation, on the basis of *Die Schuldfrage: Von der politischen Haftung Deutschlands* (Munich/Zurich: Piper, 1987[1946]), p. 81.
10. *Ibid.* I have again slightly modified the translation.
11. See T. H. Marshall (1964, pp. 71–134).
12. See UN Human Rights Resolution 35/2005, “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian

Law,” adopted April 19, 2005, available at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/CHR/resolutions/E-CN_4-RES-2005-35.doc.

13. Philip Bobbitt (2002) insists, correctly in my view, that “international law derives from constitutional law” and that therefore “contemporary developments in limiting sovereignty are a consequence of the change in the constitutional order... and are not imposed by international law, however flattering such an image may be to those who administer international institutions.” See his *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History* (New York: Knopf, 2002), p. 362.

14. For a skeptical view of the idea of sovereignty, see Stephen D. Krasner, 1999.

15. Mitchell T. Maki, et al. (1999, p. 80).

16. Maki et al. (1999), *Achieving the Impossible Dream*, p. 253, n. 75.

17. See Maki et al. (1999), *Achieving the Impossible Dream*, p. 240.

18. For a vigorous critique, see Brian Barry (2001).

19. Robert Hughes (1993).

20. David Garland (2001, pp. 11–12).

21. See Henry Rousso (2003, pp. 277–293).

22. For a suggestive discussion, see Jean Comaroff, forthcoming.

23. Jean-Michel Chaumont (1997, pp. 17–18). Chaumont in many ways anticipated the kind of analysis advanced a couple of years later by Peter Novick (1999). Insofar as Chaumont’s book has been translated into German, one wonders why it has not been published in English as well.

24. Charles Maier (1997[1988], p. 32).

25. Daqing Yang (2000, p. 151).

26. The quotation is from Zygmunt Bauman (1989, p. x), discussing the response to Hannah Arendt’s claims in *Eichmann in Jerusalem* that the leaders of Jewish communities in Eastern Europe shared a heavy load of responsibility for the Holocaust.

27. See Todd Gitlin (1995).

28. This is the chief argument of Novick (1999). See the critical remarks on Novick in Jeffrey Alexander (2002, pp. 5–85).

29. See Joshua Fogel (2003, p. 139).

30. See, for example, William Kornhauser (1959) and Richard Hofstadter (1962).

31. Susan Buck-Morss (2000, pp. ix–x).

32. Perhaps the canonical version of this argument is Will Kymlicka (1995).

33. See Joseph H. Carens (2002, pp. 100–118). For a defense of boundaries around the body politic despite their arbitrariness, see John Rawls (1999, pp. 38–39).

34. Castles and Miller (1998, p. 44).

35. Quoted from a 1937 letter to Walter Benjamin in Rolf Tiedemann (1983, p. 107).

36. E. P. Thompson, (1968 [1963], p. 12).

37. See Friedrich Nietzsche (1997, pp. 57–123) and Charles S. Maier (1993, pp. 136–151); and Comaroff (forthcoming).

38. Jürgen Habermas (2001, p. 46).

39. Andreas Huyssen (2001, p. 73).

40. Maier, “A Surfeit of Memory?” p. 150.

41. “More Humility, Fewer Illusions: A Talk Between Adam Michnik (1994) and Jürgen Habermas,” *New York Review of Books*, Vol. 41, No. 6, March 24, 1994, p. 29.

42. See <http://www.ushmm.org/conscience/index.utp?content=sudan/dafur/index.php>, accessed June 25, 2004; see also Jaclyn Schiff (2004).

43. Edward T. Linenthal (2001[1995], p. xiii). Still, the first person approached to be the Museum's director, president of Orion Films Arthur Krim, declined the offer, saying, "I prefer to work for something for the future rather than for the past." (p. 21).

44. Stanley Cohen (2001, p. 247).

45. Carol Gluck (2003, p. 312).

46. Furet (1999, p. 502).

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REPARATION AS LUXURY OR AS BASIC NEED: ATONEMENT FOR CANADIANS, REDISTRIBUTION FOR AFRICA

Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann

REPARATION VS. REDISTRIBUTION

Demands for atonement for past wrongs to ethno-cultural groups have become popular in Canada. On November 12, 2005, the Government of Canada announced to the Italian–Canadian community a package to atone for wrongs to individuals of Italian origin unjustly interned as enemy aliens during World War II. This package was part of the government’s Acknowledgment, Commemoration, and Education Program.¹ The prime minister acknowledged, but did not apologize for, the injustice of the internment. \$Can 12 million were set aside for commemorative projects, but not to compensate any individual survivors of the internment, or their heirs.² This money is part of a package of \$Can 50 million – double the \$25 million originally set aside in the 2005 federal budget – to compensate a number of ethno-cultural groups for injustices their real or fictive ancestors experienced.³ The editorial writers of Toronto’s *Globe and Mail* objected to the government’s encouragement of a “currency of grievance,” calling it “the antithesis of a forward-looking public policy.”⁴ This objection encapsulates the debate about public policies and monetary payments designed to

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compensate for past wrongs to groups, as opposed to policies and payments designed to redistribute wealth to groups and individuals suffering in the present.

John Torpey discusses the dangers to a sense of shared citizenship in the contemporary move toward reparative justice. This is a serious matter. The democratic project ought to be one in which all citizens are seen as equally worthy of concern and respect, to use Dworkin's famous phrase.⁵ All should be entitled to a share of the society's wealth sufficient to provide a minimum bundle of needed goods. This bundle is the set of economic human rights to which all individuals are entitled. To ensure that this entitlement is filled requires a commitment to distributive justice. This is the premise of the socialist and the social democratic political projects, both of which focus on inequalities among social classes.

By contrast, asserts Torpey, recognition politics may undermine the redistributive agenda.⁶ Members of (usually) ethno-cultural social groups focus on past injustices and demand that these injustices be recognized. By recognizing the injustice, the wider society also recognizes the uniqueness of the group making the demand. Thus, the politics of reparative justice is also a politics of recognition. Identity as a victim group takes an honored place in public discourse. It displaces discussion of the more common injustices endemic to a market economy: inequitable distribution of social goods, poverty, and unemployment. Lacking a fixed ethno-cultural identity, the poor are less able to compel attention to their own demands for material justice.

In broad terms, I agree with Torpey. In Canada, where I live, social class is still the best predictor of one's life chances. While some groups, especially Aboriginals and blacks, are more likely than others to be members of the poorest classes, other "racial" or ethno-cultural groups that have suffered historic injustice are not. Canadians of Japanese, Chinese, Sikh, and Jewish descent can easily find in their histories examples of the injustices they or their ancestors (biological or fictive) suffered. Yet, not all members of these groups of minority Canadians endure material deprivation in the present. Why should their concerns for recognition of historic injustice take precedence in public discourse or policy making over more serious concerns of poverty? Fifty million dollars may seem a small amount in the Canadian budget, but it is still fifty million dollars that could be spent on social programs. Moreover, the funds come from general tax revenues, some paid by the very poor.⁷

Many Canadians cannot identify racial or ethno-cultural ancestors who suffered injustice as a distinct group are nevertheless descended from people

who were very poor. Canadians whose ancestors were very poor may well possess less real wealth and less social capital than other Canadians descended from wealthier individuals. Not all “majority” or “dominant” Canadians in the past were well off, even if they were white. Indeed, poverty among these white, Christian Canadians was common, well into the 1950s.

Yet the poor cannot call for reparation. Only certain kinds of past injustices are discussed using the rhetoric of repair. The entrepreneurs of memory, it might be argued, do not leave room for entrepreneurs of poverty. But, if relations among citizens are to be rooted in social solidarity, perhaps some activists for reparations ought to eschew their victimhood and concentrate instead on their civic obligation to assist those most oppressed at present in their own society, regardless of their group identity. Equality and solidarity require concern for all who suffer abuse of their human rights now, and respect for all who so suffer, regardless of whether they can connect their suffering to a past history of group victimization.

REPARATIONS FOR AFRICA

While victim groups in advanced democracies may be satisfied with symbolic atonement for past wrongs, victims in Africa use the rhetoric of repair to call for large amounts of monetary compensation. If Africans are entitled to equal concern and respect, then the Western world must pay significantly more attention to their basic needs.

Torpey begins his article by referring to the attempt by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), forerunner to the African Union, to set up a Group of Eminent Persons to pursue reparations to Africa.⁸ For the past four years, I have been thinking about the African call for reparations. Between 2002 and 2004, I and two graduate assistants interviewed 75 highly educated Africans from 26 countries about reparations for the slave trade, colonialism, and post (“neo”) colonial relations.⁹ These 75 Africans included 41 human rights activists, 23 academics (many of whom were also activists), eight Ambassadors to the United States, and the three still active members of the Group of Eminent Persons.

Some of the Africans we talked with had been familiar with the rhetoric of reparation before we met them. They had heard of the 2001 United Nations Conference on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, held in Durban, South Africa in August–September 2001. At this conference, there was much discussion of reparation both to Africans and African-Americans for slavery and the slave trade, colonialism, and

neo-colonial relations. Some of the Africans we spoke with had heard of the African-American movement for reparations, and some knew that Jews had obtained reparations for the Holocaust.

Others, however, had not heard of reparations until we introduced the term to them. Yet many latched quickly on to the idea. When we asked our African respondents what reparations meant to them, the answer was almost always the same: funds for health care, education, transportation, and communications, and other basic material needs. The underlying message seemed clear: the economic situation was so bad that Africans would seize on any means possible, any rhetoric available, that might help them to realize their basic needs. In effect, reparations became for these Africans a “tactical political move”¹⁰ to demand international redistribution of wealth. When we asked about apology, a similar perspective emerged. While some of our respondents wanted an apology from “the West” for past exploitation of Africa, all found this aspect of reparation secondary to provision of financial and material compensation.

These Africans’ responses to questions about reparations revealed their hopelessness about contemporary African politics. Many Africans are now severely impoverished because of civil wars, famines, and genocide generated in the first instance by their own countrymen, even if colonial relations and the current world economic and political systems also contributed to these terrible events.¹¹ The sums allegedly extracted from Africa over the past four decades by its own political leaders are far in excess of those needed to provide basic services such as immunization.¹² There is little hope for economic redistribution in most of the countries our African respondents came from. The national bowl of stew in most countries is extremely shallow.

The only hope for redistributive politics for Africa, it seems, is in the realm of international relations. The international bowl of stew is very deep and rich. A rhetoric of repair, focusing on five centuries of exploitation by the West, is one that might generate a small payoff. If to generate this payoff Africans must transform themselves into a distinct group of victims, they are willing to do so. Some are also angry. They resent not only the West’s past exploitation of Africa, but also the wealth, freedom, and general lack of obligation to the international poor that seem to characterize Westerners now. Their anger feeds the demand for repair for past and present injustice.

One might think that such a call for reparations is merely tilting at windmills. There is no large social movement for reparations for Africa, none that could compare even to the several small, ethno-culturally based movements that currently dot the Canadian landscape. Moreover, claims

for reparations for past injustices deflect from consideration of real, present political, social, and economic relations, both domestic and international. Africa may not yet be capable of mobilization for the kind of social-democratic politics of redistribution that Torpey is worried is disappearing from the contemporary Western world. It may have to undergo a period of heightened inequality, as capitalist policies and economic relations are entrenched, before it can increase continental output sufficiently that there is any kind of surplus for the state (assuming efficient states will some day exist) to redistribute. These are very serious political and policy questions. They are all the more serious because of the extreme poverty of most Africans, exacerbated by HIV/AIDS. Yet a politics of international resentment encased in a rhetoric of repair will not solve the problems of the 75 people we talked with, or of their compatriots.

Torpey worries that the politics of recognition is also oriented to the past, rather than the future. The Africans we spoke with were concerned above all with redistribution of wealth. But some also sought recognition. Some thanked us for talking with them, for acknowledging their existence and their problems. But the recognition they asked for was not as members of racial or ethno-cultural groups. Just as Shakespeare's Shylock asked if he were not a man, they asked if they were not human. They asked to be included in the universal human race, to be valued as individuals. If the only weapon presented to them was a politics of repair, they were prepared to use it, but they were looking to the present and the future, not the past.

REPARATION, RIGHTS, AND ATONEMENT

Both for Africa and for non-European identity groups within the West, the rhetoric of reparations intersects with the cultural politics that have pervaded much academic and elite discussion for the last 20 years. The West as a cultural entity, it is proposed, has been imposing its way of life on non-Western societies. This way of life includes imposition of a human rights discourse that prioritizes the individual over the community; pays attention to civil and political rights but ignores economic rights; and denigrates third-generation collective rights such as the rights to humanitarian aid, development, and a clean environment. Originally thought to be tools for the liberation of all humankind from oppression and exploitation, human rights become in this discourse their exact opposite. Their Western origin or "identity" renders them irrelevant to those bearing the identity of "Others," such as Africans.

Practitioners of identity politics want to create a world in which no matter what is one's own identity, one is recognized as human by others. This is an admirable goal: all individuals need recognition as human beings worthy of treatment with concern and respect, and this is particularly the case for persons occupying minority or persecuted statuses.¹³ But identity politics often relies on what Benedict Anderson calls "homogeneous empty time."¹⁴ Recognition politics often uses past wrongs to create identity. Time is homogeneous: past is present; nothing has happened of any significance between a past event and now. What was done *then to us* by *them* is what is done *now to us* by *them*. Past persecutions constitute present grievances.

Identity communities are also imagined. Identity politics requires creation of a sense of homogeneity among communities' disparate members. Individuals fitting certain status categories, such as "Italian-Canadian" or "Chinese-Canadian" are imagined to be members of a previously persecuted group, even though there are often many differences among these individuals. Stress on historical difference also allows a certain pride in victim identity, one more way to "feel" oneself different in a homogenizing modernity, as Torpey notes. A symbolic suffering, a suffering for the ancestors (real or imagined) whom one may never have known, gives one a feeling of specialness or uniqueness.

Africans attracted by the politics of identity may also believe – with good cause – that they are members of a group that has uniquely suffered. But Africans do not assert their uniqueness in order to be differentiated from the bleak modernized landscape. Africans, today, suffer what used to be the common fate of almost all human beings – poverty, illness, and abuse. The international law of human rights, in particular economic rights, was originally designed to remedy these ills.

But partly as a consequence of the move to identity politics of the last 25 years, some human rights activists and scholars also focus on recognition. Recognition, it can be argued, is an aspect of respect, and respect is a necessary component of the human dignity that is the underpinning of the entire enterprise of human rights. When representatives of many of the world's cultures and religions (though notably not of sub-Saharan Africa) met in San Francisco shortly after World War II to formulate what became the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, they agreed that the preamble to the Declaration should begin with the words "Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world" Human dignity requires acknowledgement of one's lived experiences. As numerous truth commissions during the last 25 years have taught

us, it especially requires acknowledgement of one's suffering, the violation of one's basic human rights.

Torpey cites Voltaire as having said that we owe respect to the living but "to the past we owe only the truth." Yet, despite the excesses of a politics of repair based in continually recreated and often exaggerated feelings of harm, sometimes we do owe the past more than the truth. Sometimes we must also atone for past harms. The \$Can 50 million dedicated to rectification of past injustices against some ethno-cultural minorities in Canada is the price of atonement. Atonement includes symbolic reparations such as monuments and museums, which can educate the public about past history without turning that past into a fictitious present of continued persecution. Atonement can also include group compensation in a forward-looking direction, such as the fund given to Japanese-Canadians to pursue policies to improve race relations in contemporary Canada. Atonement can help repair fractured relations between communities, and build social trust among previously dominant and previously subordinated segments of a society. This type of atonement accepts that the feelings of hurt among previously oppressed or subordinated ethno-cultural groups, and their need for collective psychic repair, are genuine, not merely stirred up by entrepreneurs of memory.

These types of atonement, though, may be luxuries of wealthy, advanced capitalist states that can afford symbolic reparations without undercutting more basic public policy measures. In less developed countries, every tiny amount of money devoted to symbolic repair represents a sum not devoted to structural repair.¹⁵ The Africans with whom I and my research assistants spoke were not interested in the symbolic atonement that permeates Canadian discussion of appropriate reparation for past wrongs. Museum and monuments appeared like luxuries to them, as did proposals for reparative history lessons to be held in schools that did not exist. For these Africans, atonement meant recognition of their basic humanity. Respect meant providing for them the minimum economic resources necessary to live a life of dignity.

REPAIRING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE WEST AND AFRICA

What then, is the obligation of the Western world to Africa? Should its preoccupation be reparations, as the OAU's Group of Eminent Persons suggested? Should the West repair the past, or look to the future?

Common-sense morality suggests that one is most responsible for the harms one has directly caused. Common-sense moralists also adhere to a concentric-circle theory of obligation that concentric circle moves outwards from family, to community, to nation, to strangers.¹⁶ Common-sense moralists will not be interested in a politics of repair for social conditions that may have been caused in part by the West's past relations with Africa, but are also caused in large part by contemporary political and economic relations within that continent.

Nevertheless, for many Westerners who have formed empathic connections with Africa, Karl Jaspers' injunction, "Help wherever there is distress, no matter what the cause," will also ring true. These are the Western individuals who are able to transcend their "myopic ethnic concerns" and organize to help others. In Canada, for example, the small Jewish group *Ve'ahavta* supports a home in Zimbabwe for women with AIDS, and its director has forcefully urged the Jewish community to assist the victims in Darfur. Some of those who adopt such a forward and outward-looking approach do so as a means to honor their own ancestors' suffering. Their route to psychic repair is through ethical universalism, rather than ethnic particularism. They exhibit concern and respect for distant others.

By contrast, ethnic particularists are more likely to think that what matters is only "what has happened to one's own group, not that terrible things are taking place somewhere in the world about which one might sound the alarm." Such a perspective focuses on the past, and provides the dubious comfort of excusing oneself from present obligations to others because one is a member of a victim group. It can also result in an unwillingness to look beyond the particular suffering one's co-religionists or co-ethnics might have endured, to other kinds of suffering.

In Canada so far, the politics of recognition is a small social movement. To recognize particular past injustices might buy votes for the reigning political party, but it does not significantly detract from the politics of redistribution. But the inward and past-oriented focus of the politics of reparation is a much larger problem when moved out of the confined (nation) state. In this era of international apartheid, the closed borders of the Western world are the biggest barriers to prosperity – indeed to life – of increasing numbers of people from "the rest" of the world. The key question, then, is whether there can be a significant sense of shared citizenship and solidarity across these borders. The Africans we interviewed did not seem to expect much solidarity from the West, they felt abandoned. In a

world that seemed to have stolen from them everything they needed to survive, they cried to be recognized as human. The path to psychological repair for them was through improvement of their countries' economies. They could not yet conceive of a world in which they could expect dignified, respectful treatment from others. Atonement would come after economic security. Redistributive politics were prior to reparative politics. Recognition as human was still a faint dream.

NOTES

1. Canadian Heritage, *News Release*, "Agreement-in-Principle to Highlight Italian-Canadians' Contribution to Building Canada," http://www.canadianheritage.gc.ca/newsroom/news_e.cfm?Action=Display&code=5NO3, accessed November 17, 2005.
2. *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), "Ontario to Unveil Italian Redress Package," November 12, 2006, pp. A1 and A9.
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), "Ottawa writes cheque to keep grievances alive," November 12, 2006, p. A24.
5. Dworkin (1978).
6. See also Fraser (1995).
7. Vernon (2003).
8. For further information on this attempt, see Howard-Hassmann (2004, pp. 81–97).
9. For a summary of the opinions of the first 57 people interviewed, see Lombardo and Howard-Hassmann (2005).
10. Torpey (2001, p. 337).
11. Howard-Hassmann (2005).
12. Ocheje (2002, pp. 752–757).
13. On the importance of social recognition to human rights, see Orend (2002, pp. 121–122, *passim*).
14. Anderson (1991, p. 24). The phrase is originally from Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations* (London: Fontana, 1973, p. 265).
15. Quinn (2004, p. 403).
16. Howard-Hassmann (2003, pp. 200–214).

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REPUBLICAN MERITOCRACY, IDENTITY POLITICS AND THE IDEA OF REVERSE REPARATION: COMMENTARY

Yossi Yonah

ABSTRACT

In this commentary I take issue with Torpey's claim that political developments at the dawn of the new millennium caused liberal democracies to tilt away from those visions that have the potential of promoting an inclusive and just society. I argue that the politics of identity and its modes of repair do not necessarily undermine these visions but rather render them often possible and even infuse them with their true meaning. I present my argument against Israel's recent policies to privatize state-owned lands and of the various strategies employed by different social groups to influence these policies in their favor. These policies, I claim, involve all the ingredients that figure in Torpey's lamentation against the politics of identity and its modes of repair. In a way, they buttress Torpey's disdain for the politics of difference, for they show how the category of culture or cultural affiliation figure detrimentally in the articulation of social groups' demands for reparation based on their past. But nonetheless, and in contrast to his condemnation of identity politics, I present this account with the aim of underscoring its significance and of stressing the importance of reparation as a means to promote equal and full citizenship.

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My claim is that social and political arrangements in the nation-state are so ordered – either formally or informally – that they promote the interests of the dominant groups, based on their alleged past contribution to the res public, i.e., the common good of the nation. Put differently, the promotion of these interests is grounded in what we may label republican meritocracy. Republican meritocracy amounts to a reward system allocating benefits to dominant groups for the efforts they allegedly exerted in the past in promoting the ‘vital interests’ of the nation. Thus, this system takes on board the notion of compensation but incorporates it within a meritocratic system. It does not grant these groups with a compensation for past injustices inflicted upon them but a compensation for their alleged past contribution to the nation. Hence, when marginalized and oppressed groups embark upon identity politics they do not actually depart from a political system that looks askance at the idea of reparation and compensation, but rather they employ moral vocabulary which is already embedded in that system.

What is the best polity? Although it is rather difficult to provide a complete and satisfactory answer to this question, not many nowadays will contest the assertion that one of the main manifestations of the best polity is the assurance of full and equal inclusion of all individuals and groups in society. But what are the basic moral and political principles that can generate such outcome? These are the questions lying at the center of Torpey’s discussion. According to Torpey, political developments at the dawn of the new millennium brought it about that liberal democracies have tilted away from those visions that have the potential of promoting an inclusive and just society. Torpey has in mind, for example, socialist and egalitarian visions of citizenship that stress “the common fate of human beings and thus de-emphasized ethnic and other identitarian ties” (p. 14).

Following in Robert Hughes’s footsteps, he laments what he sees as an ever-growing tendency among social groups to adopt the “culture of complaint” that puts emphasis on “fixing the past” rather than on “fixing the present.” It is the mounting appeal of this culture, he argues, that thwarts the realization of universal visions of citizenship. One major manifestation of this culture, he claims, is the “shift in international law from a system geared toward nation-states to one in which individuals and sub-national groups increasingly have “standing,” or at least are major actors in the system” (p. 11). This shift, indicating the “privatization of justice” and the law, is attended, he adds, by the advent of political discourses focusing on

victim consciousness, multiculturalism, identity politics, and the politics of recognition. These discourses lead, Torpey maintains, to “the fragmentation of the body politic” (*ibid*).

Torpey has a clear moral and political agenda. Instead of capitulating to these discourses we should, he urges, reinvent and uphold universal visions of citizenship. These visions enable us, he maintains, to transcend our preoccupation with ‘our’ suffering and to worry about the suffering of all, to disengage from attempts to “fix the past” and to exert efforts, instead, aiming to fix the present, to forget past injustices and address, instead, present injustices. Drawing on Jasper’s *The Question of German’s Guilt*, he defines the “challenge of modern citizenship as an institution oriented to achieving equality among members of a state in the face of an economic system that systematically produces inequality” (p. 4).

It is difficult to remain indifferent to Torpey’s plea for liberal democracy that espouses universal visions of citizenship. Actually the advantages of such visions are self-evident. They offer a moral and political agenda that aspires to guarantee equal and full inclusion in society to all independently of their respective racial, ethnic and cultural backgrounds. In contrast, it is also difficult to ignore the disadvantages of political discourses that are keen on privatizing justice and law. The politics of recognition and its modes of repair do tend sometimes to obstruct universal visions of citizenship and their attendant values of equality and impartiality. But it is important to realize, at the same time, that the politics of recognition and its mode of repair have emerged, in its contemporary garb, as a result of the failure of these visions either to prevent injustices inflicted on distinct social groups or to mitigate the lingering effects of these injustices. Furthermore, ideally speaking, the politics of identity and its modes of repair do not necessarily suggest a break from universal visions of citizenship, but aspire to amend and complement them (Kymlicka, 1995). Sometimes this politics succeeds to realize its goal and sometimes it fails to do so, but it constitutes nonetheless an indispensable corrective of these visions, for it addresses their inherent failure to live up to their universal credo. Now of course the politics of identity and its various modes of repair have their own surfeit. The intellectual and political efforts should be directed therefore to assure, as much as possible, that the this excess be contained, that the politics of identity and its modes of repair indeed amend and complement universal visions of citizenship and not undermine them.

Although mentioning cases where the demands for repair come up against the relationship between states, Torpey focuses on cases where such demands come up against the relationship between different social groups

within the state or between a distinct social group and the state. This is understandable. It is there in the latter political framework that the tension between universal visions of citizenship and the demands for recognition and reparation vigorously emerges. It is there that the challenge for these visions is most strongly felt.

But challenging these visions, as I stated, does not necessarily mean that the politics of identity and its modes of repair undermine them; rather, it often renders them possible and endow them with their true meaning. Before elaborating on this claim, I wish to provide a short account of Israel's recent policies to privatize state-owned lands and of the various strategies employed by different social groups to influence these policies in their favor. These policies, as we will shortly see, involve all the ingredients that figure in Torpey's lamentation against the politics of identity and its modes of repair. In a way, they buttress Torpey's disdain for the politics of difference, for they show how the category of culture or cultural affiliation figure detrimentally in the articulation of social groups' demands for reparation based on their past. But nonetheless, and in contrast to his condemnation of identity politics, I present this account with the aim of underscoring its significance and of stressing the importance of reparation as a means to promote equal and full citizenship. My claim is that social and political arrangements in the nation-state are so ordered – either formally or informally – that they promote the interests of the dominant groups, based on their alleged past contribution to the *res public*, i.e., the common good of the nation. Put differently, the promotion of these interests is grounded in what I label *republican meritocracy*. Republican meritocracy amounts to a reward system allocating benefits to dominant groups for the efforts they allegedly exerted in the past in promoting the 'vital interests' of the nation. Thus this system takes on board the notion of compensation and incorporates it within a meritocratic system. It does not call for grating these groups with a compensation for injustices inflicted upon them in the past but a compensation for their alleged contribution to the nation in the past.

Thus, in confronting republican meritocracy – characterizing virtually all nation-states – identity politics and its modes of repair do not necessarily constitute a departure from a just system that secures equal and full inclusion in the nation; rather, they constitute sometimes a necessary corrective to a persistent, obdurate and unjust distribution of benefits carried out in the nation-state under the façade of equal citizenship. I use then the case of Israel's land policies to substantiate this claim. This case, I argue, can be generalized, indicating, more or less, how nation-states, operating under the guise of universal citizenship, sustain a system of unequal allocation of

rights, benefits and opportunities. Again, identity politics and its modes of repair becomes a necessary moral response to this untoward political reality.

ISRAEL'S LAND POLICIES: THE ELUSIVE CLAIM OF HISTORY

Like all modern nation-states, Israel espouses a universal vision of citizenship. Its declaration of independence states that Israel “will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel; it will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture; it will safeguard the Holy Places of all religions; and it will be faithful to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.” Despite the universal orientation of this declaration, Israel, like all other modern nation-states, maintains intricate practices – some of them formal and some informal – which systematically exclude and marginalize social groups, based on their real or imagined distinct cultural identity and on their relative or meager contribution to the nation and its interests in the past. One of the main areas in which such practices are glaringly evident is the area of public land.

Immediately after its establishment in 1948, Israel developed elaborate methods to nationalize lands owned by Arabs, who either fled or were expelled during and after the war in 1948; secondly, it confiscated lands owned and cultivated by Arabs (Kretzmer, 1990); and thirdly, it embarked on various projects aimed at populating frontier areas, that often included the massive, forced population of these areas by new Jewish immigrants who arrived in Israel mainly from Arab countries (Law-Yone & Rachel, 1994, p. 7).

Following these practices, 93% of Israel's lands are controlled and administered by the Israel Land Authority (ILA). The ILA came into existence as a result of a 1960 Knesset enactment, with a mandate to manage state lands totaling approximately 20 million dunums. A standing policy of the ILA (basing itself on Basic Law: Israel Lands) stipulates that state ownership of lands shall not be transferred by sale or in any other manner. Thus, the only way in which lands are allocated for agricultural, residential or commercial use is through long-term leases. The reason for this is the fear that lands could be purchased by “hostile elements,” that is, by Arabs. Leases for agricultural lands carry provisions strictly limiting its use for agricultural purposes. The lands included in this category relate to 3–4 million dunums, which amounts to about 20% of Israel's national territory.

Some estimate the present market value of these lands at about US\$60 billion.¹

Much of the publicly owned agricultural land in Israel has been leased, on a long-term basis, to communal farms (*kibbutzim*) and cooperative farms (*moshavim*) that played a crucial historical role in its seizure of control in frontier areas already before the establishment of the state in 1948. However, during early 1990s, the government of Israel has initiated some changes in ILA policies regarding agricultural lands. These changes amount to, as some argue, a “regressive agrarian reform,”² for they transferred proprietary rights over the land to a small Jewish sector of Israeli society that does not exceed the 5% mark of Israel’s population. There are three main reasons for these changes. First, agriculture has lost its once-revered place in the Zionist ethos. Second, agriculture has lost its dominance as a productive force in Israeli economy. Third, there has been a growing need for land resources for housing, a need that was exacerbated in the wake the immigration from the former Soviet Unions in the early 1990s. Thus, in 1992 the ILA issued a regulation allowing farmers to embark on residential and commercial projects on lands previously slotted for agriculture purposes. Formally and legally, since the farmers have no proprietary rights over the land, this conversion of land usage ought not entitle them to any compensation. But the ordinance stated that following the conversion of its usage, the farmers would be permitted to purchase these lands at a 50% discount of its value. The discount was considered due compensation for loss of income from agriculture. The financial significance of this decision was momentous. For example, members of some Kibbutzim and Moshavim who took advantage of the previous government’s initiative are expected to reap profits in the sum of half a million to two million dollars each. These profits do not include the value of the house that each of them occupies.³

Encountering voices of protest from the Mizrahi Democratic Rainbow (MDR),⁴ academics and journalists, the government appointed several committees that gradually reduced the compensation to the Moshavim and Kibbutzim, but still granted them generous reparation for loss of income from agriculture. Meanwhile, the MDR has been implementing its own public campaign against granting farmers proprietary rights over the lands with a Supreme Court petition demanding that the Court issue an injunction “suspending all decisions taken over the last years in the matter of converting the use of agricultural lands.” Despite this injunction, the Kibbutzim and Moshavim continue their campaign to gain greater compensation and benefits following the privatization of Israel’s agricultural lands.

The government's campaign to privatize public lands, while granting the farmers generous compensation, has been accompanied by another campaign to privatize public assets – apartments owned and managed by public housing holding companies. Currently, these apartments are leased mainly to Mizrahi immigrants who arrived in the 1950s and 1960s from Arab countries and to their descendants. Many of the apartments are located in “development towns” established in frontier areas. These towns constituted an integral part of continuous national efforts to populate these areas, thus consolidating Israel's control over territories won from Palestinians in 1948 war. The privatization of the apartments was originally supposed to be carried out in a straightforward manner: the government wanted to sell the apartments to their tenants for straight market value. However, encountering the objection of the deputy minister of Housing and Construction to this policy, the Minister of Treasury withdrew the plan and instead proposed granting the right to manage them to private entrepreneurs.⁵ It is important to mention at this juncture that the government occasionally initiates campaigns to sell some of the apartments, considered low-profit yielding, to their tenants for a subsidized price. On the whole, no readiness for recognizing the tenants' proprietary rights over the apartments was noted on part of official authorities. This was the case despite the fact that the financial value of these apartments is considerably less than that of the houses and lands held by Kibbutzim and Moshavim: most of the apartments are worth around \$50,000–\$60,000, while the price of those located in central urban areas may reach \$150,000–\$200,000.

Despite the government's fierce objection, the parliament voted (October 1998) in favor of a legislation (Public Housing Act) granting tenants of public housing with the right to purchase their apartments at a discount, the amount of which is determined by duration of residency: the longer the residency, the greater is the discount. But the legislation of the Act did not put an end to the opposition on the part of the government, which circumvented it by making no room for it in the Budget Act. Fearing negative public reactions, however, the government issued its own public housing sales campaign, allowing residents to purchase their apartments at a much less generous rate than that enacted in the Public Housing Act.

While members of Kibbutzim and Moshavim are granted generous compensation by the government and Mizrahi Jews are denied similar compensation, Israeli Arabs had been deprived of much of their lands by Israeli governments as part of a systematic transfer of lands from Arabs to Jews (Kretzmer, 1990; Yiftachel, 1998). What we see then, as stated, is an agrarian reform, land redistribution, allocating different rights over the

land to different groups based, allegedly, on their past contribution to the national goal of consolidating control over the land Israel won in 1948 war.

The government's initiative to privatize agricultural lands, while granting farmers generous compensation for the loss of "their" lands, was supported by a rhetoric grounded, as stated, in republican meritocracy: descendants of the founding generation claiming a share of the state's land resources in proportion to their contribution to its establishment and consolidation. They celebrate the "pioneering project of the redemption of the land," a project they maintain positioned the Kibbutzim and Moshavim "at the front of the national camp."⁶ In consequence, they claim that those who sacrificed most for "the redemption of the land" (in this case, they themselves) rightfully deserve to possess it or a substantial share of it. "The main problem for the Kibbutzim's future generations," writes a former Kibbutz member and prominent real estate lawyer and entrepreneur, "is to protect these lands as household property. Also, today these lands are owned by tillers of the soil, that is, in the possession of those who make Zionism come true. Let us remember that it was their parents who settled the ground and created facts on it."⁷ Writing in the same vein, Labor Party MK extols the contribution of the Moshavim and the Kibbutzim to the geographical consolidation of the state: "Today there is a historical opportunity to grant the farmers the rights they deserve, not out of charity but out of justice, and to show these people who labor arduously and who protect the borders of the state, that the State of Israel knows how to repay them with gratitude."⁸ Similarly, Ariel Sharon, Israel prime minister, and himself Moshav bred, states that "nothing would have existed if it were not for the farmers We were raised on these lands, on the lands our parents came to with a dream, overcoming all obstacles until they realized it. I do not think for one second that anyone has the right to take this land from them, because they settled and cultivated it for sixty or seventy years."⁹

It is important to note that although the Kibbutzim and Moshavim have demanded special benefits grounded in republican meritocracy, they have not articulated them in a multicultural language. They have exercised a strategy often used by dominant groups, a strategy that takes the distinct identity of the dominant group to be inherently elusive – which both exists and does not exist. While distinguishing themselves from other sectors of society, dominant groups portray themselves as the ultimate manifestation of society, embodying its highest values and ideals. That is, while emphasizing their distinct identity, they portray themselves as a quintessential constituent of the national collective, displaying its "better self." Thus, the

allocation of special benefits to them is construed as *an act that the nation performs not onto one of its sub-groups but onto itself*.

Tenants of public housing have also used the national rhetoric in order to substantiate demand for compensation. Their struggle, unlike the struggle carried on by the farmers, assumed a multicultural hallmark. That is, it was initiated by movements and organizations that attempted to rally public support around an agenda that emphasizes ethno-cultural affiliation. They actually combined claims for recognition with claims of distribution (Fraser, 2000). They argued that Israeli political elites have misrecognized the past contribution of Mizrahi Jews to the state of Israel and that this misrecognition facilitated their discrimination in the allocation of land resources. Thus, they also, like representatives of Kibbutzim and Moshavim, traded on Republican terrain. They asked for recognition for their past hardship and misfortune, and demand, accordingly, reparation for their hitherto unrecognized sacrifice. They argued that by virtue of populating frontier settlements and towns, Mizrahi Jews, like Kibbutzim and Moshavim, actually functioned as bearers of Israel's national policy of demographic dispersion, allowing the State of Israel to consolidate its grip over frontier territories liberated or occupied in the war of independence. Thus, Shlomo Ben Ami, who was then the Minister of Internal Security, stated "The fight is over more than home ownership: we are creating a new definition of Zionism. The immigrants who settled in far-flung development towns and poor urban neighborhoods, and who in many cases withstood years of Arab infiltration and shelling were pioneers This was Zionism just like the Zionism of kibbutzim and moshavim."¹⁰ Similar language was used by the spokesman of MDR, who demanded that a parallel be drawn between "agrarian and urban defenders of the Jewish State." "No one," he says, "ever talked about the immigrants from the Arabic-speaking countries as heroic even though, in fact, they really were."¹¹ Similarly, one of MDR's leading figures emphasizes that "Mizrahi immigrants who occupied the border neighborhoods and towns were just as much pioneers and contributed just as much to the security of the state as the mythological Zionist farmer."¹²

Not surprisingly neither the claims of Kibbutzim and Moshavim nor the claims of Mizrahi Jews for recognition and distribution leave room for Israeli Arabs, for in both cases these claims are grounded in Zionist republican meritocracy that leaves them with very little room. Thus in relation to this restrictive national politics, they can aspire either to transform Israel into "a state of all its citizens," drawing on a universal vision of citizenship, a post national nation-state that transcends ethnic religious identities or articulate their claims in the language of collective rights that include

demands for reparation for past misconduct inflicted upon them.¹³ It is safe to argue that there is no consequential party among Israeli Palestinians espousing the first option. It should be noted in this regard that the slogan “a state of all its citizens” voiced by some Palestinian intellectuals and politicians does not rule out claims of recognition on part of the Palestinians. Thus, for instance, the platform of the Palestinian Balad party, which won three parliamentary seats in the general elections of January 2003, calls upon Israel to adopt a constitution that “will form the legal basis for social equality and political partnership in *a state of all its citizens*.” The platform goes on, however, to state that Balad will act “for the recognition of the Arab minority in Israel as a national-cultural minority, and insist on its right for self-rule in those matters that distinguish it from the *Jewish majority in the state*.” This position received expression in the writings of Palestinian legal activists vis-à-vis Israel’s land and housing policies.

In response to the Supreme Court’s historical ruling decreeing unconstitutional the practices of Jewish communal villages not to allow Arabs to purchase land there and to build their houses upon it along side with Jewish dwellers, they argued the following:

Arabs never demanded their integration in Jewish villages. Will there be an important contribution the children of the Kadan Family – that won the case in the Supreme Court – of its children study in a school that does not use their mother’s tongue? Will there be an educational contribution to them if they do not learn the history of their people but Zionist History? ... Israeli Arab agenda demand the return of Arabs to the villages from which their were uprooted, ... the recognition of Palestinian as a national minority, the extension of Arab municipalities’ geographical scope of jurisdiction, the provision of priorities in the budget allocation to Arab municipalities, an end to the confiscation of Arab land in the Negev and the abolition of the decrees to destroy illegal Arab houses. The Kazir ruling does not meet these demands.¹⁴

This line of argument, easily detected in the writings of other Arab intellectuals (Jabarin, 2000), expresses their grounded misgivings and reservations concerning the prospect of transforming Israel into a liberal democracy operating in light of a universal vision of citizenship.

THE NATION-STATE AND IDENTITY POLITICS: COMPLEMENTARY OR CONTRADICTORY?

One may argue that it is not advisable to draw general conclusions from Israel’s political reality. Israel, they may continue, belongs to a regressive group of nation-states that ground their legitimacy in ethno/religious

identity and therefore assume formal barriers that prevent full and equal inclusion of those who do not belong. But as the extensive literature on nationalism and the nation-state shows, all nation-states, whether those which answer the logic of ethno-nationalism or those which answer the logic of civic nationalism¹⁵ (severing nationality from ethno-cultural roots) assume systematic barriers preventing the full and equal inclusion of all, excluding and marginalizing them based on their racial, ethnic and religious background (Balibar, 1991; Smith & Blocker, 1994).

In their various manifestations, then, nation-states have an inherent proclivity to exclude and marginalize social groups in society. The proclivity to act in this manner is ground in republican meritocracy: who ever allegedly contributed more to the nation in the past should get more from the state in the present. Compensation for past effort and sacrifice then is the rule. Thus, the first to use compensation as one of the moral criteria guiding the allocation of rights and benefits are not the excluded and marginalized groups, as critics of identity politics and multiculturalism argue, but rather the dominant groups in society. Identity politics and its modes of repair are nothing then but a response to this political reality. They are designed in part to confront the use or, better say the misuse, of the moral category of compensation by dominant groups in modern nation-states.

Furthermore, the reverse employment of this category in identity politics can be perceived as an attempt to push further the idea, customary in liberal and democratic thought, that the assurance of equal and full inclusion of all individuals and groups in society requires differential treatment. That is, identity politics pushes further the idea that to insure equality among individuals they must be treated unequally. This idea is embedded, after all, most evidently in the very policy of equality of opportunity and its special extension – affirmative action in its broadest form. Interpreted broadly, affirmative action requires the provision of various forms of compensation for those social groups that face systematic discrimination in the allocation of rights, material resources and opportunities in society. This policy is justified on the ground that “if society as a whole contains serious injustices with complex effects, there is no way for a single institution within that society to adjust its criteria for competitive admission or employment so that the effects of injustices are nullified as far as that institution is concerned” (Nagel, 1979, p. 94).

Now although Nagel’s advocacy, a well as the advocacy of other moral philosophers for the policy of affirmative action, focuses on its implications to the principles that should guide admission to educational institutions and to the professional job market, the justification they provide for this policy

appeals, implicitly, to moral vocabulary sustaining identity politics and its various modes of repair. That is, it singles out excluded and marginalized social groups – minorities and women – and demands that remedial steps be taken in their favor. This policy acknowledges past injustices and wrongs inflicted upon these groups and seeks reparation for them. It assumes then the moral weight of the combined claim of recognition and redistribution (Yonah, 2005).

Although using different rhetoric, both Mizrahi Jews and Israeli Arabs have advanced such claim, expressing different manifestations of identity politics. That is, both groups have demanded compensation either for their past contribution or discrimination inflicted upon them in the past. That is, while Mizrahi Jews draws on the same Zionist republican meritocracy used by dominant groups, Israeli Arabs ground their claim in their status as a national minority exposed to protracted and systematic discrimination by the Jewish state.

No doubt, there is a major difference between the acknowledgment by liberal thinkers that equality requires unequal treatment and the politics of identity, as it emerges in different political contexts. The policy of preference, as Nagel stresses, is mainly relevant in political contexts where formal discrimination ceases to exist and where sincere and honest efforts are made to deracinate racism and prejudices. This policy, he argues, is designed to address informal and elusive forms of sexual and racial discrimination. “Where there has recently been widespread deliberate discrimination in many areas,” Nagel writes, “it is not surprising if the formerly excluded group experiences relative difficulty in gaining access to newly opened positions, and it is plausible to explain the difficulty at least partly in terms of disadvantaged produced by past discrimination” (*ibid.*, p. 92). Identity politics and its modes of repair, as we saw in the previous section, do not emerge in response neither to lingering consequences of past discrimination nor to present, yet elusive and surreptitious discrimination; they emerge in political contexts in which racial and ethnic discrimination tends to be carried out in the open and often assumes formal expressions. But the difference in the nature and form of the discrimination does not essentially change the main goal of the politics of identity and its modes of repair. Its main goal then is to facilitate equal and full inclusion of excluded and marginalized social groups in society. That is, their political and moral program does not necessarily indicate, as Torpey argues, a drastic break from universal visions of citizenship. On the contrary, it may facilitate the realization of such visions. Again, Israel’s land policies and the public debate it stirred were introduced with the aim of explicating a typical context in which the

complicated nexus combining recognition, reparation and citizenship is ordered.

This context enables us to see that the nation-state is the *locus classicus* in which the demands for recognition and reparation are made. These demands are made in response to an inherent deficiency plaguing the nation-state and its republican meritocracy. Generalizing on Israel's land policies, we may identify three complementary reasons manufacturing this deficiency. First, the history of the nation-state is often saturated with committal of injustices against social groups of distinct racial, ethnic religious and cultural backgrounds residing within its borders. Second, the historiography of the nation-state usually ignores or mitigates this fact, supplying an account of history that valorizes the place of the dominant groups as the bearers of the national ethos and as the principal agents who promote its goals. Using Benjamin's terminology, this account supplies the victors' version of history. Third, historiographical practices of this kind are continuously employed in the nation-state to legitimize the economic and political advantages of the dominant groups, on the one hand, and the economic and political disadvantages of the oppressed groups, on the other. That is, they legitimize the lingering effects of past injustices and reproduce them. Now, all these practices obtain while the nation-state continuously and earnestly upholds a universal vision of citizenship, promising to treat all citizens equally and to protect their civil, political and social rights.

Torpey may know all of that. But he believes that the nation-state, the one that "de-emphasizes ethnic and other identitarian ties," is the solution to our social ills and maladies. Espousing this solution, he may actually endorse Habermas' idea of constitutional patriotism or post-national nation-state that is able to sever the status of citizenship from any cultural and ethnic affiliation, from any imagined or real affinity to the national collective (Habermas, 1992). The establishment of such a nation-state, "an alienated state that maintains a distance from civil society, a 'formal,' and 'empty' state which materializes the dream of no specific ethnic community and thus leaves enough room for the dreams of all communities" (Žižek, 1993), should be able to secure equal and full inclusion of citizens and render the need for reparation obsolete. No doubt, this moral and political vision has undeniable merits. But it indicates a utopia and not a viable and foreseeable political project. Excluded and marginalized groups in the nation-state cannot wait idly for these halcyon days; they find it necessary to espouse identity politics as a means to promote, not society's fragmentation but its cohesiveness. Yet, it shuns the idea that social cohesiveness and solidarity can be manufactured by creating a homogenous collectivity and it

disputes the belief that social justice can be facilitated solely by culture-blind moral and political principles.

NOTES

1. *Haaretz* (March 23, 1998).
2. Miron Benvenisti, "The Privatization of Memory," *Haaretz* (March 18, 1999) and Dani Rabinovitch, "From Socialism to Feudalism," *Haaretz* (March 23, 1999)
3. For an extended account of this issue, see (Yonah & Saporta, 2002).
4. A movement established in 1997 by Intellectuals and social activists of Mizrahi backgrounds.
5. *Haaretz* (January 8, 1997) and *Yedioth Ahronoth* (January 13, 1997).
6. Arik Bashan, *Hakibbutz* (May 3, 1998).
7. *Hakibbutz* (September 3, 1998).
8. *Globes* (March 8, 1998).
9. *Haaretz* (December 3, 1999).
10. *The Jerusalem Post* (February 20, 1998).
11. *The Jerusalem Post* (July 4, 1997).
12. *The Jerusalem Post* (July 4, 1997).
13. These two options are not mutually exclusive.
14. Jamil Dkwar, "To what extent this is an achievement," *Haaretz* (March 15, 2003).
15. For a discussion on the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism see, for instance, Kamenka (1976), Kohn (1965), Meinecke (1970), and Plamenatz (1976).

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REPARATIONS CLAIMS: POLITICS BY ANOTHER NAME[☆]

Melissa Nobles

ABSTRACT

In his article, "Modes of Repair: Reparations and Citizenship in the Dawn of the New Millennium," John Torpey argues that reparations claims are mere extensions of identity politics and its preoccupation with group victimization and historical injustice. This essay takes another view, arguing that reparations politics is both a tactic used by groups to enhance their citizenship and a response to government's failure to address enduring and deeply rooted inequalities. Historical grievances are part of the political toolbox that groups employ to advance their interests. Reparations claims are pluralist politics by another name. Why would we expect them to be otherwise?

John Torpey is worried. He worries that reparations claims are mere extensions of identity politics and its preoccupation with group victimization and historical injustices. More troubling, however, is the seeming lack of political imagination that identity politics fosters, leading to an inability to envision a better future grounded in universal, not particularistic, claims

[☆]Response to "Modes of Repair: Reparations and Citizenship in the Dawn of the New Millennium" by John Torpey.

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and indifference to today's atrocities. Torpey's worries are not new. In the US, the purported rise of identity politics since the 1960s (as if white racial domination was not a form of identity politics) has long been identified as a potential source of American disunity. European scholars lament the continued propensity of narrow ethnic identities and concerns to displace class identities and to thwart eventual class emancipation. Nor are Torpey's observations necessarily limited to "reparations politics." Scholarly and popular presses reveal deep concerns about the prevailing problems of governance worldwide: the impoverishment of politics in democracies (e.g. the ever-increasing influence of money, electorate polarization, etc.) and the suppression of popular will in undemocratic polities. Torpey's concerns about the diminished quality of political life are well taken, yet the causes of this decline are neither primarily nor exclusively identity politics nor attendant reparations claims. Indeed, Torpey appears to acknowledge this, for he focuses not only on state multicultural policies but also on the privatization of justice and history and the failures of mass politics and capitalism. Nonetheless, even if reparations politics is only a symptom of these alleged shortcomings, it poses special challenges, according to Torpey, precisely because it is rooted in group membership, typically ethnic or racial; it challenges universal notions of citizenship and it advances a narrow group-based politics, on both the domestic and international level.

I take a more sanguine view of reparations politics. I view it as a tactic used to enhance citizenship and a response to government's failure to address enduring and deeply rooted inequalities. In my view, reparations claims neither exhaust nor replace political strategies, discourses or visions. These claims exist along side and not in place of other strategies and are entirely compatible with more conventional forms of political participation. Historical grievances are part of the political toolbox that groups use, and at the moment, these tools are proving effective. In short, reparations claims are pluralist politics by another name. Why would we expect them to be otherwise? Moreover, the sources of reparations politics are much closer to home than Torpey leads us to believe. Demands for apologies and compensation to indigenous peoples of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States are directly related to past state policies of exclusion and subordination. Whether groups should use the past as a basis for present-day advocacy is an issue, over which Torpey and I disagree. There are the dangers that Torpey points out of excessive "navel gazing," potential "politicization" of history, and of narrow self-interest. However, these faults neither characterize reparations politics on the whole nor they are limited to it.

Torpey identifies Holocaust reparations as the template for current-day reparations claims. Reparations claims and awards have expanded beyond settling war debts to include cases of historical injustices, and the inclusion of these new cases signals the expansion of the meaning of reparation(s) itself. Undeniably, the recent successes of Holocaust-era lawsuits provided an example for certain of the current lawsuits for reparations, for American slavery and for the slaughter of Namibia's Herero people by the German army in the early twentieth century, among other cases. As Michael Bazzyler observes, the estimated 12 World War II (WWII) lawsuits against private entities for WWII Holocaust-related crimes filed by victims between 1945–1995 were summarily dismissed.¹ However, since 1995, nearly all such lawsuits have been successful, totaling settlement payouts of over US\$8 billion.² Bazzyler attributes these recent successes and emerging lawsuits to several factors. The most important are the use of American legal methods of discovery, the creation of “class action” suits to pursue transnational litigation against multinational corporations, and growing receptivity of US courts to human rights law.³

Yet, political demands to acknowledge and compensate for past wrongs predate these court cases. For example, the first demands for compensation for American slavery were lodged in 1865, at the end of the US Civil War. Although Holocaust-era lawsuits have clearly influenced the legal tactics and strategies used by present-day advocates, their longstanding claims have found expression in many earlier campaigns. Moreover, Holocaust reparations have not been a template reflexively applied by other advocates to their own demands. Rather, the timeline for demands for reparations and apologies corresponds closely to particular national experiences and more specifically, to state policies and consequent group mobilization. Calls for apologies and reparations are not simply analogues of Holocaust claims, nor are they the products of multiculturalism, privatization, or the ideological vacuum of the post-Cold War world.

In the 1990s, Aboriginal peoples in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States called for official apologies and from their respective governments for historical injustices. In nearly all of these cases, the apologies and reparations (or demands for them) were the results of a legislatively enabled commission, charged with examining a specific state policy or national history in general. In Australia, for example, a commission was formed to examine the official state policy of removing (usually forcibly) Aboriginal “half-caste” children from their parents' care, while in Canada, the commission's mandate was much broader, as it was charged “to investigate and report on the situation of Aboriginal peoples across the

country.”⁴ Moreover, these commissions were themselves the products in large measure of Aboriginal political activism and mobilization.

Historian Roger Nichols describes the interactions between indigenous groups and the Canadian and American governments as occurring in five stages over time from independence, to mutual relations, to dependency, marginality, and concluding with political resurgence.⁵ Much of the same may be said of Australia and New Zealand. As is (or should be) well known, for extended periods of each country’s history, Aboriginal peoples were relegated to “wardship” status. National citizenship or subjecthood to the British Crown could be acquired only after specific conditions were met, if such conditions were offered at all. It was not until the 20th century that indigenous peoples in Australia, Canada, and the United States were granted citizenship without being required to change their language and customs or demonstrate prerequisite “civilized” behaviors.

In all four countries, meaningful state-led policy reforms began in the 1950s and 1960s. The pressures for change were both domestic and international. Bureaucrats and politicians began to view past policies of assimilation as largely ineffective domestically and increasingly out of step with new international norms. Indigenous peoples were living in a materially impoverished and politically weak state of wardship, very few were “assimilated” and the majority were segregated, marginalized, and neglected. These policies were increasingly viewed as affronts to domestic political ideals of equality and inclusiveness. Governments responded by proposing formal inclusion or integration. Such inclusion meant the dismantling of laws, procedures, and administrative institutions that kept indigenous peoples separate and excluded from the formal rights and entitlements of citizenship. The expressed goal was to bring them in, to view them, and to treat them like other citizens.

Indigenous groups responded critically to these moves toward formal equality. Government officials and indigenous leadership held opposing views. Indigenous groups largely opposed assimilation. For them, the solution had to include self-determination, cultural acceptance, and not just formal citizenship. They envisioned a differentiated or “asymmetrical citizen status,” aptly captured in the Canadian term “citizens plus.”⁶ As importantly, cultural rights and traditions were to be respected. Indigenous leadership made clear that their constituencies wanted neither to become nor to be treated just like everyone else.

The largely negative reactions to proposals that would bring formal equality but little else led governments to respond with greater attention to indigenous claims and more deliberate efforts to include them in policy

formulation. In short, the current policies of governments with respect to indigenous peoples, and their participation in government, bear the stamp of their contributions. Alain Cairn's observation of Canada's experience holds true for Australia, New Zealand, and the United States: "The elimination of difference was the official policy of the Canadian state when Indian influence on that policy was negligible. The present drive to recognize and reinforce difference is a product of Aboriginal input."⁷ In light of the long history of forced assimilation and marginalization, indigenous peoples have acted to change their political and administrative relationship with federal authorities. Their initiatives are rooted in their deep sense of grievance and exclusion. As they see it, these grievances require apology, compensation, and concrete political alterations. Multicultural challenges to citizenship are nothing less or more than predictable and understandable responses to a heretofore ethnically exclusive citizenship.

Not surprisingly, demands for apologies and reparations have occasioned public and contentious re-evaluations of national histories. It is certainly true that such re-evaluations have led to charges and counter-charges of an excessive politicization of history, where a suitable, but shifting, threshold has been exceeded. In Australia, these debates have become especially contentious and are referred to popularly as the "History Wars." Yet, in my view, it is plainly wrong to suggest that history writing in the past was less politically influenced, even if less obviously so, than it is today. Typically, national histories were written in ways that minimized, justified, or ignored the experiences and treatment of Aboriginal peoples. History writing then was selective in ways different, but certainly no better, than Torpey implies it is today. Then, as now, public interest in historical questions sharpens and heightens the stakes already attendant to historical knowledge seeking. Then, as now, it matters who the historians are, what the facts are, and how they are interpreted.

If politics is less visionary, as Torpey judges, this deficiency ought not be blamed on identity politics or on reparations claims. Blame it, if one must and as Torpey ultimately does, on the failure of European socialism, on capitalist restructuring, globalization, and the apparent weakening of citizenship, among other things. However, from where I sit, the view is far less dim and the outcomes mostly salutary. Demands for reparations and apologies have enhanced politics in a number of ways. First, public debates about national histories have improved politics and national self-understandings, the excesses notwithstanding. It is much more difficult in Australia, Canada, the United States, and New Zealand to speak blithely of glorious national pasts without acknowledging that certain groups had

different experiences that are indispensable components of the national story. Second, challenges to citizenship and calls for its expansion have far more often enriched citizenship than impoverished it. History teaches that citizenship is an elastic concept imbued with multiple meanings. Whatever the alleged dangers that multiculturalism poses to traditional notions of citizenship, citizenship itself seems well up to the challenges. Indeed, resistance to Aboriginal claims for a “citizens plus” status would seem proof, in part, of the resilience of symmetrical views of citizenship.

Torpey rightly reminds us that focusing on past injustices should not overshadow or displace attention to present-day atrocities. Indeed, the best of backward-looking strategies ultimately attend to the issues of today and of the future. The tasks are not incompatible. After all, authority over the past rests in the present. Our interest in history is often governed by the concerns of our present. We are all responsible for examining and confronting the complexities of our present as well as of our past.

NOTES

1. Michael J. Bazyler, unpublished paper, p. 2.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
4. Olive Patricia Dickason (1997, p. 397).
5. Roger Nichols (1998, p. xiv).
6. Alan C. Cairns (2000, p. 52).
7. Cairns, *Citizens Plus*, p. 48.

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REJOINDER

John Torpey

Let me begin my response to the foregoing critiques by saying how grateful I am to have been given the opportunity to engage in this exercise. My work on the issue of reparations has been inspired by the desire to make a contribution to contemporary debates about how to achieve a more just and egalitarian world. I am honored to have had such thoughtful and generous interlocutors in that endeavor.

I might add that I began my investigation of “reparations politics” as a result of having read an account in the *Globe and Mail* newspaper in the late 1990s concerning the Canadian government’s adoption of a “Healing Fund” intended to repair the troubled relationship between the state and its aboriginal peoples. At first, I had no idea what a “Healing Fund” might be; when I realized that it was an effort to force the state to be accountable for its past wrongdoing, I became an enthusiast and soon embarked on my research on cases in which such developments were occurring. The democratization of history seemed to be bearing unexpected fruits, leading to a context in which past wrongs could be addressed, overcome, and laid to rest.

In the course of my inquiries, however, I became less sanguine about the concern for righting past wrongs. A preoccupation with the past had long been the terrain of conservatives; the preoccupation with past grievances had long been the province of nationalists of various kinds; and the preoccupation with victimhood had long been the arena of embittered losers (historical and otherwise), and tended in my view to cultivate a problematic sense of wounded privilege.¹ The departure from the kinds of progressive thought on which I had been nurtured seemed striking and, yes, worrying.

The emphasis on the past, on wrongs that could not be fixed (as opposed to ones that could be), and on human beings as weak (“traumatized”) and in need of the ministrations of various professionals seemed to me, however well intentioned, a major shift from the robust image of humans and the society they might create that had been characteristic of progressive thought theretofore. In my understanding, progressive thinking was marked above all by its future-orientation, its universalism, and its humanism. Yet here the old slogan “don’t mourn, organize” seemed to have been transformed into the cry, “organize to mourn,” especially for particular groups said to be “victims.” I began to feel uneasy about all this, and my perspective on reparations is shaped to a considerable degree by these considerations.

My critics have focused above all on my concerns about “identity politics,” and of course they are not wrong to find such reservations in my article. It goes without saying that certain groups have been disproportionately wronged in the past. Yet, as Rhoda Howard-Hassmann writes, this does not mean that everyone who is wronged will succeed in having attention called to the wrongs in question. The most obvious case in point is the persistently poor, whether domestic or overseas, whose poverty has been pushed to the margins of public concern in recent years. Even Nancy Fraser, however nuanced her efforts to reconcile the vectors of redistribution and recognition, believes that there has been a distressing shift away from a politics of redistribution in the recent past. Whether this is the *fault* of identity politics is a different matter. But clearly we have been witnessing in recent years a split in the left between those more committed to “identity politics” and those more committed to “commonality politics.”² During these years, the distance between the rich and the poor in the United States – of whom a disproportionate share are black, brown, and female – has grown at an alarming pace. Meanwhile, powerful economic and political elites in the United States and elsewhere have made it clear that they wish to divest themselves of the economic obligations that have supplied a measure of reassurance against social risks in the past century – pensions, medical care, and government assistance to the indigent. These developments raise urgent, fundamental issues affecting the well-being of all (living) citizens, and the stakes of their resolution are arguably greatest for those groups typically of concern to the proponents of “identity politics” because of their greater reliance on these programs.³

Yossi Yonah and Melissa Nobles both point to the matter of groups dispossessed of their land and homes – the Arab population in Israel/Palestine, and in the Americas and the Antipodes, respectively – as crucial to our thinking about reparations. The conditions of the dispossessed are

indeed a matter of significant moral concern. Yet these two constellations of groups are in fact very different. Those in Israel/Palestine who lost their real property have a legal claim to some sort of compensation, and such compensation will undoubtedly play a role in any settlement of the tragic situation in that region. Meanwhile, Yonah's notion of "republican meritocracy" suggests a real truth about the way citizenship has worked in practice. Indeed, blacks (and, of course, others) in the United States have typically enjoyed greater recognition of their rights as a consequence of their contribution to American military efforts (see [Klinkner & Smith, 1999](#); [Theda Skocpol, 1992](#)). The point is to insist that the requirements of citizenship be realized for all irrespective of when they arise. In the case of Israel/Palestine, the currently predominant "two-state solution" will likely require some recompense for the wrongs done to currently living dispossessed Palestinian Arabs; the "right of return," however, is likely to be more rhetorical than real. Alternatively, the project of creating in Israel/Palestine "a state of all its citizens" may in time come to appear preferable, despite the fact that there is relatively little support for the idea at present.⁴

The claims of "indigenous people" – a novel group in contemporary political discourse (see Ronald [Niezen, 2003](#)) – are a different matter. These claims are often extremely difficult to sort out. Many putative "indigenes" are only very partially so, and those who are "on the rez" are those who have declined the opportunity to enter and join the larger society of which they or their ancestors involuntarily became a part as a result of historical developments, and from which they were long excluded from membership by law. But it is not always easy to know who should be blamed and who might benefit from these past actions. If one considers the region of the United States, for example, that was part of Mexico until 1848, one wonders whether Mexico does not bear some burden for the conquest and subjugation of the "indigenous people," with whom many of them procreated with the result that a new population – the mestizos – came into existence. They were themselves then subsequently dispossessed by the march of American empire. Those of Mexican descent in the American Southwest can thus be seen as both victims and perpetrators of the wrongs of the past, and as both conquerors and heirs of the lands in question.

Those officially attested as American Indians have had the opportunity since the late 1980s to apply to open casinos, and they have done so with considerable alacrity – often in cooperation with large outside investors from the gambling industry, with attendant complaints about poor wages and working conditions from their employees. Back on the reservation, meanwhile, some observers have noted a tendency toward corruption,

cronyism, and the reinforcement of patriarchy in the distribution of the perks accruing from the increased autonomy accorded tribal leaderships. This has nothing to do with the proclivities of Indians, of course; it often results when structures of accountability are not well developed and enforced, such as we have seen in much of post-independence Africa (see [Ratner, Carroll, & Woolford, 2003](#)). In short, guarantees of greater access to full citizenship in American society – especially including opportunities for education and work – might be a fairer resolution of Indians' claims than the creation of semi-autonomous enclaves with weak structures of democratic governance.

Nobles mobilizes in support of her arguments for the value of “Aboriginal input” in contemporary politics the views of Canadian scholar Alan Cairns, yet Cairns is a critic of the “nation-to-nation” view advanced by more group-oriented advocates of indigenous peoples. His formula is “citizens [of Canada] plus.” This means taking into account the understandable grievances of those whose ancestors did not ask to become members of the Canadian polity, but not accepting the notion that such persons are separate from that polity. The demands for land claims can only be sorted out via negotiation, and it is unrealistic to think that substantial swaths of North America or the Antipodes are likely to be returned to the descendants of their “original” inhabitants. Doing so would inevitably cause great and novel injustices to those who assume that they acquired title to their properties perfectly legitimately. Even as things currently stand, it is only those Indian groups in the United States who are officially recognized as (members of) tribes that are eligible for such forms of compensation as exist. This sets off unseemly and sometimes bitter struggles to claim tribal status and membership, and involves the government in upholding blood-quantum determinations of “identity” that one imagines we would want to leave behind. The appalling conditions on many reservations should be a matter of concern to all of us, but it is not clear that land claims are going to resolve them satisfactorily.

Yossi Yonah raises the issue of affirmative action as a response to formal discrimination. I heartily agree that such a policy can be and has been beneficial to those subjected to discrimination, particularly including blacks in the United States. Affirmative action has been crucial to the remarkable emergence in the past 40 years or so of a substantial black middle class. Appropriately framed, moreover, affirmative action has come to be seen by large segments of the American population as well as by leading elements of the business, military, and political communities as an acceptable and

desirable policy intended to right historic injustices against blacks, the original target of the policy. The problem is that it has been extended to other groups not disadvantaged in the same ways as blacks, and this has contributed to undermining its credibility. Americans tend to be allergic to “preferences,” and endorse the idea of “equal opportunity” in increasing numbers (see Skrentny, 2002; Graham, 2002). Against this background, the room for political maneuver on racially based policies is very narrow indeed.

My concern is to make progress in the face of the steady advance of global inequality, but especially in the context of American politics. I was concerned about the practical political prospects of “reparations” claims-making in the contemporary world. The more I looked into the matter, the more the idea that the U.S. government was going to transfer substantial sums of money to a social group distinctive primarily for its stigmatized identity – i.e., blacks – came to seem rather implausible. The question then became: what good do the idea and the language of “reparations” do to advance the cause of blacks in the United States? My research suggested that use of the term tended to generate more antagonism than enthusiasm among whites (indeed, among non-blacks more generally), who would have to be won over for any such program to win adoption.

Since those who advocate “reparations” often actually want college scholarship programs, loans for blacks wishing to launch small businesses, and the like, it seemed more promising to pursue those goals directly than to advance a more divisive and hard-to-justify claim for “reparations.” This is the case not least because of the simple political facts of the matter; as Adolph Reed has argued, those who have pushed the demand for reparations have given little evidence of being able to mount a serious political campaign in support of the issue. Hence they are condemned to pursuing their aims through the courts. But this is an intrinsically uncertain strategy; without popular and legislative majorities supporting them, legal victories can be quite shaky and can backfire politically.⁵

It is important to see here how different the demand for reparations is from the demands of the Civil Rights Movement. The latter simply insisted that the United States live up to its much-ballyhooed claims regarding equal treatment of all. The legislative victories (especially *Brown v. Board of Education*) required the transformation of public opinion and, indeed, legislation and enforcement before the gains they nominally proposed, such as desegregation of public places and schools, were actually implemented (see Rosenberg, 1991). It is toward political majorities that our efforts to rectify injustices – whether rooted in historical pasts or simply in the

contemporary workings of our economic, educational, and status systems – must be oriented.

Ultimately, it seems to me that the struggle for “full” citizenship is never complete, and that this involves a commitment of solidarity to all that is called into question – as a matter of emphasis, if not in absolute terms – when the demands of particular groups are stressed over the focus on equality for all. Similarly, with regard to the impoverished Africans whom Rhoda Howard-Hassman recalls to our attention, they need assistance from us in order to achieve a minimal dignity denied to them by their circumstances. The extent to which we are *responsible* for their poverty as a result of colonialism and slavery – as opposed to more contemporary arrangements advantaging First World producers over their African competitors – is debatable. Their suffering calls for help, simply because it is there, but it is likely that we will be more successful in persuading people to do something for those closer at hand and to whom they feel some connection. This is the challenge of citizenship.

NOTES

1. I am reminded here of Public Enemy’s classic rap song, “Party for Your Right to Fight.” At the beginning of the song, against the background of a wailing police siren, the unmistakable voice of Authority says, “You’re quite hostile!” In response, one of the singers (I believe it was Flavor Flav) insists, “I gotta right to be hostile – my people been persecuted!” Despite my enjoyment of the song, it is this sensibility I have in mind in the foregoing remarks.

2. The terms are Todd Gitlin’s (1995).

3. Here it might be said that one of the more outrageous claims made by David Horowitz in his infamous pamphlet “Why Reparations are Wrong and Racist Too” was that “welfare” was a form of reparations. More white people receive “welfare” than blacks, even if the latter were disproportionately represented on the rolls. It was to eliminate the racial aspects of Democratic support for “welfare” that Bill Clinton decided to “end welfare as we [knew] it”; see Jason DeParle (2005).

4. For an argument in support of a one-state solution, see Adam and Moodley (2005).

5. As we saw recently with regard to campaigns for “gay marriage.” For Reed’s arguments, see Reed (2000).

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